Kathaleen St. Jude McCormick
How Judge McCormick rules, drawn from 40 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge McCormick
Kathaleen St. J. McCormick is Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. She joined the court as a Vice Chancellor in November 2018 and became Chancellor in May 2021. She earned her undergraduate degree at Harvard University and her law degree at Notre Dame Law School.
Judge McCormick's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge McCormick's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge McCormick decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Tornetta v. Musk, she found the defendants had not proved the fairness of Tesla's CEO compensation plan, including because the board never tested whether the award was necessary to retain Musk.
“Swept up by the rhetoric of 'all upside,' or perhaps starry eyed by Musk's superstar appeal, the board never asked the $55.8 billion question: Was the plan even necessary for Tesla to retain Musk and achieve its goals?”
In Tornetta v. Musk, she credited directors' candid testimony that negotiations with Musk were cooperative rather than adversarial; that testimony supported her finding that the board had not negotiated at arm's length.
“In credit to these witnesses, their testimony was truthful. They did not take a position 'on the other side' of Musk. It was a cooperative venture. There were no positional negotiations.”
In Altieri v. Alexy, she dismissed a stockholder’s Section 271 challenge to Mandiant’s sale of its FireEye business. She found that Mandiant remained a cybersecurity company after the sale, so the transaction did not qualitatively amount to a sale of substantially all its assets.
“Mandiant was a cybersecurity company before the Sale. It is a cybersecurity company after the Sale.”
In Murray’s adverse-possession case, McCormick credited the family’s maintenance of an unfenced planter and grass strip as possession of that land. After de novo review and a site visit, she granted their exceptions to the magistrate’s narrower recommendation.
“Likewise, by maintaining the planter and the surrounding grass area, the Murrays were treating the disputed area as their own.”
Procedural preferences
In Twitter v. Musk, she denied a four-week trial delay because Twitter had shown continuing harm from uncertainty over the merger and even that delay risked further harm.
“I previously rejected Defendants' arguments in response to Twitter's motion to expedite, making clear that the longer the delay until trial, the greater the risk of irreparable harm to Twitter. ... I am convinced that even four weeks' delay would risk further harm to Twitter too great to justify.”
In the Twitter merger case, McCormick granted defendants leave to amend their counterclaims under Rule 15(a), limited discovery to the new allegations, and kept the October trial date.
“This court rarely declines amendments under Rule 15(a) based on futility.”
In Twitter v. Musk, she ordered production of data-science analyses invoked in the defendants' counterclaims because the analysts were also fact witnesses; Rule 26(b)(4)(B)'s non-testifying-expert protection did not cover those analyses or related communications.
“Defendants expressly relied on the Data Scientists' preliminary analysis to justify making additional information requests and later terminating the Merger Agreement. Defendants also rely on the Analyses throughout their counterclaims. In these circumstances, it is clear that the Data Scientists did not act solely as non-testifying experts.”
In Javice v. JPMorgan Chase, she denied certification of an interlocutory appeal from an advancement ruling because the expected benefits of immediate review did not outweigh the costs.
“Although the Bench Ruling resolved a substantial issue of material importance, this order denies the application because the benefits of interlocutory appeal do not outweigh the costs.”
In Regal Rexnord v. WEG Electric, she denied leave to file a proposed partial summary-judgment motion because she was not persuaded it would conserve party or judicial resources.
“I am not convinced that the partial motion that Regal seeks leave to file would conserve litigant or judicial resources. The request for leave to move for summary judgment is denied.”
In Ahmed v. JPMorgan Chase, she denied a late interlocutory-appeal application because the applicants had not shown good cause to extend the deadline.
“Good cause does not exist to extend the deadline. The application is denied.”
Cautions
In Wollner v. PearPop, she entered default judgment as a discovery sanction after the petitioner repeatedly disobeyed a compel order despite direct warnings, and ordered him to pay the company's related reasonable fees.
“Given Wollner's egregious misconduct, it is appropriate to grant PearPop's motion for a default judgment.”
In Jernigan Capital v. Storage Partners of KOP, she granted summary judgment on the plaintiff’s contract claims and awarded related fees. The defendants had not opposed the motion, and she found bad faith in their refusal to comply with discovery and failure to appear at a hearing.
“Defendants have engaged in dilatory tactics throughout this litigation, such as refusing to comply with a motion to compel and failing to appear at the August 4, 2020 evidentiary hearing.”
In Silverberg v. Padda, she denied reargument because the intervening decision the plaintiffs cited did not change the control-group standard applied in the original opinion.
“The Opinion, therefore, did not misapprehend any legal principle germane to the control group analysis that would affect the outcome. Thus, Sheldon does not support reargument.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Turning to the legal analysis, Plaintiffs' motion to expedite is granted. To obtain expedition, a party must 'articulate a sufficiently colorable claim and show a sufficient possibility of a threatened irreparable injury' absent expedited proceedings.”
“Plaintiffs’ Motion for TRO is denied.”
“The exceptions are overruled. The Magistrate's Final Reports dated January 29, 2024 and June 17, 2024, are adopted and final.”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts III through V is denied, except that Pugh and Harrison are dismissed from Count V.”
“Based on the defendants' representations, I am denying the plaintiff's motions, albeit without prejudice to re-raise the requests if events warrant.”
“the defendants’ request for leave to move for summary judgment is denied.”
“Based on the authorities cited to me, therefore, California law is not as clear as LBG argues. The motion for reargument is denied.”
“This post-trial decision enters judgment for the plaintiff, finding that the compensation plan is subject to review under the entire fairness standard, the defendants bore the burden of proving that the compensation plan was fair, and they failed to meet their burden.”
“TransPerfect’s objections are overruled, except to the extent its objection to the January 2021 legal bills is not moot, which is sustained in part.”
“Although the Bench Ruling resolved a substantial issue of material importance, this order denies the application because the benefits of interlocutory appeal do not outweigh the costs.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in its entirety. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants.”
“Defendants' motion to amend is granted. Court of Chancery Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be 'freely given when justice so requires.'”
“I previously rejected Defendants' arguments in response to Twitter's motion to expedite, making clear that the longer the delay until trial, the greater the risk of irreparable harm to Twitter. ... I am convinced that even four weeks' delay would risk further harm to Twitter too great to justify.”
“Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not protect the Analyses that lie at the heart of this lawsuit. Because Rule 26(b)(4)(B) does not protect the Analyses, it does not protect documents or communications relating to those Analyses.”
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