David Hume, IV
How Judge Hume decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In restrictive-covenant disputes, he closely parses whether a noncompete or nonsolicit's affiliate-inclusive definitions sweep in businesses the departing employee never worked in or had access to, and treats that overbreadth alone as fatal, declining to blue-pencil the provision back into shape.
“A restrictive covenant that includes affiliates 'presents the probability that a restrained party could unknowingly breach the covenant.'”
He reads a contract's own stated remedy for nonperformance (such as an accruing interest charge) as the parties' complete bargain, and will not import an unstated default date or breach theory just because the outcome now seems unfavorable to one side.
“The parties, as they are allowed, agreed to these provisions however lamentable they may now seem to Hassanein.”
On Section 220 books-and-records demands, he separates a legitimate valuation purpose from a broader request to investigate wrongdoing, granting only the records tied to the proper purpose actually proven.
“Plaintiff has a proper purpose of valuing his investment and evaluating a possible sale. ... I did not find a proper purpose for investigating wrongdoing or determining whether other stockholders were made representations like those made to Trematerra.”
Procedural preferences
In discovery disputes he looks past a party's own crafted affidavit to whether counsel actually performed the concrete verification step (such as reviewing a production file before sending it) that would have prevented an inadvertent disclosure.
“OOSC did not take the most reasonable step. He elected not to conduct a final review of the .zip production file. That basic step would have prevented the inadvertent production.”
He treats attorney-conduct complaints (such as an alleged Rules of Professional Conduct violation) as outside a trial judge's sanctioning power, directing that such concerns be raised with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel rather than resolved as part of a discovery motion.
“The Delaware Supreme Court supervises attorney conduct and enforces the DLRPC. ... 'trial judges have no independent jurisdiction to enforce the Rules of Professional Conduct.'”
He is willing to raise and resolve subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte, including holding that a statutory dispute-resolution process is not 'arbitration' within the meaning of the Federal and Delaware Arbitration Acts absent an actual agreement to arbitrate.
“A brief look at the history of the FAA reveals that IDR proceedings are not arbitrations because an agreement to arbitrate must arise out of a contract.”
Cautions
He credits objective, documented conduct (or its absence) over a party's own asserted intent or subjective understanding of a transaction's legal effect, particularly when a witness's own conduct is inconsistent with the interest they now claim.
“Brothers's subjective understanding of his profits interest does not support the conclusion that he holds a membership interest in KPI.”
In fraud pleadings at the motion-to-dismiss stage, he requires the complaint to specify who made an alleged misrepresentation, when, and what was promised, but will let a properly particularized fraud claim proceed even alongside a related contract claim.
“The Court denies the Motion on the fraud count and grants the Motion on the breach of contract count related to fee-shifting for the reasons articulated below.”
On claims requiring clear and convincing proof (such as a forged signature), he weighs a witness's documented memory or cognitive impairments against competing testimony rather than assuming credibility from sympathetic circumstances alone.
“Because I find that Plaintiff has not proven that the deed was forged, I rule in favor of Defendants.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Consequently, there are issues of material fact that must be resolved before complete relief under Count I can be granted properly; thus, Petitioner's Motion must be denied.”
“This report denies summary judgment for two reasons: First, under Delaware's well-established evidentiary standards, credibility is a factual issue best resolved by the finder of fact after a trial on the merits. Second, the validity of the deed purportedly transferring the real property to Wengert as sole owner must be resolved before Wilson's requested relief can be properly granted.”
“Applying the default provisions of the LLC Act, KPI's transfer of a profits interest to Brothers constituted an assignment of economic rights, and not a full membership transfer. Because Brothers is not a member, he lacks standing to compel inspection of KPI's books and records.”
“For the reasons explained above, I find that Straub violated discovery and this Court's scheduling order. Straub has waived attorney-client privilege for the supplemental production material for this case only. Straub and OOSC are responsible for the fees and costs associated with the supplemental production and this motion.”
“Plaintiff has a proper purpose of valuing his investment and evaluating a possible sale. He is entitled to categories of books and records as set forth in this opinion. I did not find a proper purpose for investigating wrongdoing or determining whether other stockholders were made representations like those made to Trematerra.”
“As a result, I hold that the non-competition agreement is unenforceable and grant Plaintiff's motion to dismiss. This is my final report.”
“The obligation imposed by the contract is payment of annual 6% interest. That interest has been added to the principal. Neither NTO nor Eliovits have breached the contract. ... The parties, as they are allowed, agreed to these provisions however lamentable they may now seem to Hassanein.”
“Moreover, under the principles of statutory interpretation promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval and in keeping with several District Court decisions interpreting the No Surprises Act, this Court declines to create a private right of action. These counts are dismissed. The Court further dismisses Plaintiff's three alternative causes of action for failure to state a claim under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6).”
“Because I find that Plaintiff has not proven that the deed was forged, I rule in favor of Defendants.”
“For the reasons explained above, I recommend that BluSky's request for preliminary injunction be denied and the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted on all counts for failure to state a claim. This is a Final Report under Court of Chancery Rule 144.”
“I have found each of the restrictive covenants unenforceable. As a result, BluSky is not reasonably likely to succeed on the merits. Having failed to meet the initial element, BluSky's request for preliminary injunction is denied.”
“Panzura owes the contingency premium fees to Stelfox. ... Panzura owes Stelfox the Cochran Firm's fees. ... Stelfox is entitled to fees-on-fees. She is also entitled to prejudgment interest.”
“For the reasons below, I agree with the Receiver's assessment that Claim 964.02 should be valued at $0. Bernier's Objection to the Claim is denied.”
Put Judge Hume's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Hume actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Hume's own signed orders and cites them.