Danielle Gibbs
How Judge Gibbs rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Gibbs
Danielle Gibbs has served as a Magistrate in Chancery on the Delaware Court of Chancery since December 2024. She previously served as chief legal counsel to Delaware Governor John Carney and as the state's chief deputy attorney general. She earned her undergraduate degree at the University of Maryland and her law degree at the University of Baltimore.
Judge Gibbs's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Gibbs's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Gibbs decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Kieler v. Lend Me It, Gibbs denied a request to vacate a default judgment. She found the company's six months of inaction unexplained and rejected its unsupported claim that later production had satisfied the order.
“Defendant’s failure to respond is not ‘excusable neglect’ in this instance; it appears Defendant simply ignored its obligations to this Court without justification.”
On advancement claims, she treats a director's subjective motivation as irrelevant to a 'by reason of the fact' analysis, declining to let a corporation relitigate the merits of underlying misconduct allegations at the advancement stage.
“It would undermine the policy supporting advancement to condition the right on the motivation ascribed to a director's conduct.”
Procedural preferences
In Blue Pointer Gesture v. Schrade, she stayed the later Delaware action while related contract claims were being litigated in Texas. She found that proceeding with both suits would waste resources and risk conflicting judgments.
“Litigating both actions would be inefficient and pose an unnecessary risk of conflicting judgments.”
In Acuna, Gibbs treated Section 9.03 as a choice-of-law provision and found that it did not restrict where the parties could litigate; the requested anti-suit injunction therefore lacked a jurisdictional basis.
“Section 9.03 is a choice-of-law provision that reflects the parties’ agreement”
Cautions
In the final report in In re Estate of Robert Marchlewicz, she construed the decedent’s will as leaving two properties to the petitioner. She found the first sentence of the relevant paragraph clear and did not need to resolve uncertainty about its second sentence.
“Decedent's intent is clearly expressed in the first sentence of Paragraph A. He clearly devised the two real properties to Petitioner.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Plaintiff is entitled to advance payment of fees and expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the Underlying Action, and to fees-on-fees, as provided in Sections 44(c) and (d) of Webinar's bylaws.”
“I conclude that Respondent has not demonstrated sufficient cause for the Court to deny Petitioner's request. Accordingly, I recommend that Respondent, as Estate representative, be required to sell the Property.”
“The Motion is DENIED and Plaintiff’s request for fees is DENIED IN PART.”
“Plaintiff's fee request is GRANTED. Defendant shall pay $39,298.70 to Plaintiff's attorneys.”
“Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. This litigation is STAYED pending the final disposition of the Texas Action.”
“The motion to dismiss is granted under Rule 12(b)(1).”
“This matter is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1), with leave to transfer.”
“The plaintiff's theory would require me to draw inferences from the pleaded facts that are unreasonable. ... I recommend that the Court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety.”
“I conclude the copy adheres to Decedent's testamentary intent, and I recommend that the Court enter an order admitting Petitioner's proffered copy of the Will to probate.”
“I conclude that the beneficiaries of Decedent's Will are: Petitioner, as to the devises in the Second, Third, and Fourth Provisions; The Jeanne Jugan Residence, in Newark, Delaware, as to the devise of $100,000 under the Third Provision; Ava Lewis, as to the devise of $50,000 under the Third Provision; Arielle Lewis, as to the devise of $50,000 under the Third Provision; and Defendants' next of kin, to the extent of any residuary assets, under the intestacy statute.”
“I recommend that Slaughter’s motion to dismiss be granted.”
“Har-Noy is entitled to fees-on-fees for his success on the merits of his advancement suit. Har-Noy is also entitled to prejudgment interest at the legal rate.”
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