Christian Douglas Wright
How Judge Wright decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Section 220 books-and-records disputes he applies the DGCL's 2025 amendments rigorously and literally, including the new statutory bar on ordering 'functional equivalent' records where the statutorily defined records actually exist, while still finding functional equivalents warranted once a company's own default or nonproduction makes their absence plausible.
“The amended statute 'forbids the court' from 'order[ing] the production of [] functional equivalents' if the statutorily defined books and records exist.”
He looks past a stockholder's formally stated investigatory purpose to whether the demand's real substance and timing reveal a personal, non-stockholder motive, especially where a demand was for information the stockholder sought before ever buying stock.
“I find by a preponderance of the evidence that Hamassian's purpose for inspection is to advance his personal interests under contracts with Cineverse, not his interests as a Cineverse stockholder.”
On contested contract language invoking indemnification-style 'defend' obligations, he requires clarifying contractual language before construing 'defend' to mean an ongoing duty to advance fees, and will not stretch that even further to cover a party's own affirmatively brought claims.
“It fails on both parts of USAB's proposed transitive construction: 'defend' does not unambiguously mean 'advance,' nor does it unambiguously mean 'attack' even if it does mean 'advance.'”
Procedural preferences
He keeps Section 220 proceedings within their narrow, summary scope, declining to let a stockholder use post-production discovery about document 'provenance and authenticity' to expand the case beyond the statute's limited inquiry.
“This includes disputes about the provenance or authenticity of those books and records, which require discovery and fact-finding that are beyond the limited scope of Section 220 cases.”
He enforces Court of Chancery Rule 37's presumptive fee-shifting for a granted motion to compel rigorously, rejecting a losing party's argument that its own good-faith litigating position, by itself, defeats fee-shifting.
“[G]ood faith by itself is not relevant under Rule 37(a)(4)(A). ... it is not enough to say ... that their opposition was not vexatious, frivolous, or a willful or negligent violation of discovery obligations.”
He extends real, if bounded, forgiveness to self-represented litigants (accepting late filings, viewing pleadings with forgiving eyes) without relaxing the substantive legal standards or evidentiary burdens they must meet.
“As with the 50% payment/escrow threshold, quarterly submission of fee disputes was part of the original Fitracks procedure.”
Cautions
He holds guardianship petitioners to the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard strictly, crediting a proposed ward's documented physical and cognitive improvement over a family member's sincere but evidentiarily thinner safety concerns.
“[I]mposition of a guardianship must be supported by evidence that is clear and convincing, and not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.”
He is unmoved by procedurally aggressive, high-volume motion practice from self-represented litigants untethered to case law, denying an entire slate of motions built on an unsupported legal premise (here, that a voting proxy divests a stockholder's derivative standing).
“Jones cites no case law in support of this argument. Jones' argument is plainly incorrect.”
In real-property/informal-contract disputes, he requires a genuinely complete, enforceable written agreement -- identifying the property, price, and parties -- before granting specific performance, regardless of the length or good faith of the parties' prior course of dealing.
“[E]ven if the parties had a valid and enforceable written contract to sell the house -- and they did not -- the court cannot grant petitioner the relief she seeks.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Doing so, on this record, establishes all of the elements necessary under our new Section 220 for an order that awards the stockholder nearly all of the records sought.”
“I find by a preponderance of the evidence that Hamassian's purpose for inspection is to advance his personal interests under contracts with Cineverse, not his interests as a Cineverse stockholder. I recommend that Hamassian's inspection demands be denied.”
“This ownership requirement disposes of Ma's inspection demand here. ... I recommend Ma's inspection demand be denied on that basis.”
“The Petition should be DENIED. Petitioner should not be appointed as guardian of the person and property of Mr. J. at this time.”
“For the reasons explained above, the court denies each of Jones' pending motions.”
“This report recommends that all of defendant's motions be denied. ... This report recommends dismissal of the rest of the counterclaim.”
“Respondent Wilson's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the court grants Respondent Wilson's motion for costs but denies his motion for attorney's fees.”
“I find that Maria has stated a claim under Count I (fraudulent transfer), but not as to Count II (aiding and abetting the fraudulent transfer). Accordingly, I recommend that Defendants' Motion be DENIED as to Count I and GRANTED as to Count II.”
“Applying these principles here, I must deny the Motion. ... Plaintiff Androsky Lugo's Motion for Confidential Treatment is denied without prejudice.”
“Having considered the matter once again, I reject Petitioner's argument. ... I conclude ... that I cannot grant the relief requested, so I must deny the Amended Petition.”
“The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Dismissal is appropriate on both grounds asserted by respondent.”
“I adopt defendants' proposed language for paragraph 23. ... Having chosen to tie themselves to this standard, I hold the parties to it.”
Put Judge Wright's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Wright actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Wright's own signed orders and cites them.