Bonnie W. David
How Judge David rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge David
Bonnie W. David became a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery in January 2025 after serving as a Magistrate in Chancery. She previously practiced deal litigation and corporate governance law at Skadden. She earned her undergraduate degree at Boston University and her law degree at the University of Pennsylvania.
Judge David's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge David's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge David decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Polk v. Stewart, she found the plaintiff repudiated the land installment contract first, denied specific performance, and entered a net monetary judgment for the defendants.
“In fact, it was not Defendants, but Plaintiff, who first repudiated the contract.”
In Naples Center for Dermatology v. Trisan, she found the employer had waived its exclusive Delaware forum clause by litigating substantially the same claims in Florida for seven months; she dismissed the later Delaware suit for improper venue.
“Plaintiff clearly and unequivocally relinquished its rights under the Exclusive Jurisdiction Provision by pursuing nearly identical claims in Florida Court for seven months before eventually deciding to bring those claims in Delaware instead.”
In Investview v. UIU Holdings, she dismissed for lack of equitable jurisdiction because the requested 'specific performance' would in substance compel payment under a protection plan, for which money damages offered an adequate remedy.
“In reality, it is not the ability to 'make claims,' but the payment of funds due under the TPP Plan, that customers seek.”
Procedural preferences
In Shareholder Representative Services v. SomaLogic, she denied a motion to compel arbitration because the parties' earnout dispute over the buyer's efforts did not fall within the merger agreement's narrower arbitration clause.
“Defendant's attempt to read a broader scope into Section 10.10(ii) fails to give meaning to all language of the contract.”
In Weil Holdings II v. Alexander, she held a noncompete facially unenforceable because its duration and geographic scope were unreasonable, and declined to rewrite it through blue penciling.
“The Noncompete is facially unenforceable due to its unreasonable duration and geographic scope. ... [T]he Court declines to exercise its discretionary power to blue pencil the Noncompete.”
In Vejseli v. Duffy, she found that Ionic’s directors breached their fiduciary duties by reducing the board size as a defensive measure before a contested election. She separately upheld the board’s rejection of the stockholders’ initial nomination notice under the advance-notice bylaw and ordered a reopened nomination window.
“Ionic’s directors breached their fiduciary duties by reducing the size of the Board, not for a valid corporate purpose, but as an inequitable defensive measure.”
Cautions
As a Magistrate, she was quick to catch a stockholder trying to use a books-and-records demand to get information he could otherwise only obtain through the normal discovery process of a lawsuit he had already filed over the same underlying conduct.
“Using Section 220 inspections to investigate pending plenary claims undermines well-established discovery law.”
In the Niki and Darren trust dispute, she dismissed Darren's counterclaims and crossclaims under the unclean-hands doctrine because he sought relief from a restructuring that he had orchestrated himself.
“Darren seeks relief for a scheme that he orchestrated and then sought to defend. ... In equity, Darren cannot seek relief from individuals who merely carried out his own wishes.”
In BankUnited v. Shulick, she denied a preliminary injunction after finding that the record did not show misuse of confidential client information by the departing executives; Shulick's short client list undercut the bank's allegation.
“Shulick's list included less than a dozen clients, undermining any suggestion that he intentionally brought confidential client information with him to Customers Bank.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons explained above, the Petition fails to allege non-conclusory facts that, if true, would provide good cause to appoint a receiver for the Company under Section 279. Accordingly, I recommend that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and the Petition be dismissed.”
“For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Motion to Dismiss be granted and the 220 Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.”
“To the extent the Complaint purports to assert claims against JG, LLC, they are DISMISSED. ... Count I is DISMISSED. ... Counts III and V are DISMISSED. ... The Motion to Dismiss Count II is DENIED. ... The Motion to Dismiss Count IV is DENIED.”
“To summarize, both Motions are denied.”
“Plaintiff's request for an order of specific performance is, therefore, denied. ... Judgment is entered in Defendants' favor in the amount of $2,130.47.”
“For the reasons explained above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Judgment is entered for Defendant.”
“Balancing all the Cryo-Maid factors, I conclude that Delaware is not the appropriate forum. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) is granted.”
“For the reasons explained above, judgment is entered for Plaintiffs on Count I and aspects of Count IV, and an injunction will issue as set forth herein. Judgment is entered for Defendants on Count III.”
“The Complaint states a claim for violation of the Charter. It does not state a claim for violation of FOIA.”
“Darren's Counterclaims and Crossclaims are therefore dismissed.”
“The Complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to the Superior Court pursuant to 10 Del. C. Section 1902.”
“For reasons explained below, the plaintiff is entitled to targeted discovery into this theory.”
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