Richard J. Leon
How Judge Leon rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Leon decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In APA review he will set aside agency action when the stated basis is outside the governing regulation and the administrative record supplies no satisfactory explanation, as in the SEVIS termination based on a dismissed driving offense.
“The Government has not provided any ‘satisfactory explanation’ for why it terminated plaintiff’s SEVIS record based on a 2022 driving-under-the-influence charge that never resulted in a conviction.”
For class certification under Rule 23(b)(2), he focuses on whether a single injunction can provide cohesive classwide relief; a broad requested injunction is not itself disqualifying when the eventual order can be drafted with Rule 65 specificity.
“the class is sufficiently cohesive that the Court can fashion an injunction which provides the relief sought and complies with Rule 65(d).”
In APA review he will vacate agency action where the agency changed its methodology without acknowledging the change or giving fair notice: a failure-of-reasoned-decisionmaking / due-process theory can win summary judgment for the regulated party even against a technical agency like the FDA.
“the FDA's determination of the regulatory review period for the drug at issue was arbitrary and capricious and violated due process principles because the FDA changed its methodology for determining a drug's regulatory review period without acknowledging that it was doing so or providing fair notice to plaintiffs.”
In FOIA he holds the government to the post-FOIA-Improvement-Act foreseeable-harm standard for Exemption 5: deliberative-process withholdings survive only where the agency shows disclosure would foreseeably harm its internal deliberations (here, a draft OIG report survived after a remand narrowed the dispute to that one document).
“whether the Government can demonstrate that it properly withheld under Exemption 5—the deliberative-process privilege—a draft of the September 2016 Office of Inspector General (‘OIG’) Report because it reasonably foresees that its disclosure would harm its internal deliberations.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces expert-disclosure boundaries. An expert disclosed only on standard of care could not add causation testimony after expert discovery, and excluding the necessary causation evidence led directly to summary judgment.
“Plaintiff did not disclose Dr. Schulman as a causation expert”
He applies Local Civil Rule 7(b) to unopposed motions but may still examine Rule 12(b)(6) merits because the two rules allocate burdens differently.
“Due to the tension between Local Civil Rule 7(b) ... and Rule 12(b)(6) ... courts also typically evaluate the merits”
He scrutinizes settlement attorney-fee components before entering an agreed dismissal: even an unopposed joint settlement will be rejected if he finds the negotiated fee award unreasonable. Counsel should expect their fee request to be examined on its own merits, not rubber-stamped.
“I find that the attorney fees agreed to by the parties in this case are not reasonable, and therefore will DENY the parties' request to incorporate their agreement into a final order of dismissal.”
He resolves jurisdiction first and treats the rest as moot: where a mandamus claim fails for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction he dismisses it and denies the related summary-judgment motions as moot, reaching only the claim that survives (here, replevin). Frame the jurisdictional hook carefully.
“I DISMISS plaintiff's mandamus claim for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DENY as moot plaintiffs partial motion for summary judgment.”
Cautions
This posture-diverse written-opinion sample does not capture every consequential ruling by the judge. His broader record includes the NSA bulk-telephony-metadata litigation, the AT&T-Time Warner merger trial, Guantanamo habeas petitions, and a constitutional challenge to an executive order targeting the WilmerHale law firm.
“I will grant Larry Klayman's and Charles Strange's request for an injunction and enter an order that (1) bars the Government from collecting, as part of the NSA's Bulk Telephony Metadata Program, any telephony metadata associated with their personal Verizon accounts”
He frames his opinions as balancing national security against individual liberty and signals discomfort when forced to dismiss on procedural grounds: a pattern visible from the NSA cases through the Klayman metadata dismissals (dismissed for lack of standing/jurisdiction while voicing concern about the underlying balance).
“This Court, in the final analysis, has no choice but to dismiss these cases for plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate the necessary jurisdiction to proceed. ... I do so today, however, well aware that I will not be the last District Judge who will be required to determine the appropriate balance between our national security and privacy interests during this never-ending war on terror.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth below, I will GRANT defendants' motion to dismiss and DENY AS MOOT plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.”
“the Court will GRANT plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENY the FDA's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that the FDA's determination of the regulatory review period for the drug at issue was arbitrary and capricious and violated due process principles”
“the Court will GRANT plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and DENY the FDA's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment”
“For the following reasons, I will GRANT the Government's motion to dismiss.”
“the defendants' motion is GRANTED and the plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.”
“For the following reasons, Manigault Newman's motion will be DENIED, and the Government's motion will be GRANTED.”
“For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part George's motion.”
“I DISMISS plaintiff's mandamus claim for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and DENY as moot plaintiffs partial motion for summary judgment.”
“I DENY IN PART defendants' summary judgment motion as moot as to the mandamus claim and GRANT IN PART defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's replevin claim.”
“I find that the attorney fees agreed to by the parties in this case are not reasonable, and therefore will DENY the parties' request to incorporate their agreement into a final order of dismissal.”
“the Court will GRANT the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.”
“defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion to excuse compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n) are GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion to excuse compliance with Local Civil Rule 7(n) are GRANTED”
“I GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss”
“DENY plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction”
“DENY plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.”
“I will therefore GRANT plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and appoint plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 272 days (N = 9).
- The available case-level records are not a counted distribution.
- His current docket includes substantial agency-review and government-transparency litigation, a criminal calendar, foreign-sovereign arbitration enforcement, immigration matters, and tort and contract disputes.
- His longer-term caseload has included the NSA bulk-metadata litigation, the AT&T-Time Warner antitrust trial, Guantanamo habeas petitions, and a constitutional challenge involving the WilmerHale law firm.
Draft for Judge Leon with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Leon, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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