Reggie B. Walton
How Judge Walton decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He will enforce a final international arbitral award against a sovereign at the pleadings stage where the defendant cannot contest jurisdiction: a 22 U.S.C. 1650a / ICSID Convention enforcement action gets judgment on the pleadings for the award creditor once any time-bar defense fails and the sovereign concedes subject-matter jurisdiction.
“Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the plaintiff’s motion.”
In FOIA and agency cases he is exacting on jurisdiction and standing: an APA or constitutional challenge that does not clear Article III standing or statutory subject-matter jurisdiction is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) before any merits analysis (Medicare Star-Ratings methodology; pre-enforcement SAVE Act challenge).
“the Court concludes that it must grant the government’s motion to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jusrisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”
Procedural preferences
He issues Fox/Neal-style orders warning pro se litigants of their obligation to respond, and will treat an unopposed dispositive motion as CONCEDED if the plaintiff misses the stated deadline. Do not let a response deadline lapse before him.
“that Order expressly warned the plaintiff that, if he failed to file his opposition by February 3, 2012, the Court would treat the motion as conceded. ... Accordingly, the Court will treat this motion as conceded.”
He grants press/third-party access to sealed records: a media intervenor seeking to unseal court filings (here charging-lien materials) can obtain leave to intervene and access where the public-access interest is shown.
“the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the CIR’s motion.”
Cautions
This written-opinion sample skews defendant/government-favorable, but his higher-profile record cuts differently and should not be over-read: he secured the United States v. Libby perjury/obstruction conviction (2007), declared a mistrial and then accepted an acquittal in United States v. Roger Clemens (2011-2012), ruled FOR the plaintiff rocketry organizations in Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n v. ATF (2009), and was openly skeptical of DOJ/AG Barr over the Mueller-report redactions in 2020 -- ordering an in camera review and calling Barr's public statements 'misleading.'
“On March 5, 2020, Walton described Attorney General William Barr's public statements about the Mueller report as “misleading,” and said that Barr's representations regarding DOJ redactions from the report could not be credited.”
Known to colleagues and the local bar for a 'tough-on-crime' sentencing reputation (a 'long ball hitter'), with decisions described as driven by that philosophy rather than politics -- relevant context for criminal practitioners, though this civil-opinion sample does not measure sentencing.
“Walton is known by local defense attorneys as a “long ball hitter” – a judge willing to impose long sentences in order to deter future crimes.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 6 |
Granted: 6 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment on pleadings N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to intervene N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment rule 52 N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment as matter of law N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the plaintiff’s motion.”
“the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss.”
“the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must deny the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees as to Ms. Gatore.”
“To date, the plaintiff neither has filed an opposition nor requested additional time to do so. Accordingly, the Court will treat this motion as conceded.”
“Upon careful consideration of the CIR’s submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the CIR’s motion.”
“Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the government’s motion.”
“the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiffs’ motion for summary declaratory judgment.”
“the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiffs’ motion for summary declaratory judgment.”
“Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendant’s motion.”
“the Court concludes for the following reasons that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims against the defendants and dismisses these claims consistent with the reasoning articulated in its May 6, 2020 Memorandum Opinion.”
“Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendant’s motion.”
“the Court concludes that it must grant the government’s motion to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jusrisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”
“the Court concludes that it must grant in part and deny in part the defendants’ motion.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From the search_dockets case-level enumeration plus the reasoning-layer sample (NOT a counted distribution): his currently-assigned civil docket is FOIA-heavy (Just Futures Law v. DHS, Delgado v. ATF, The James Madison Project v. DoD), with ERISA (IAM National Pension Fund), Medicare/contract (Poplar Bluff Regional Medical Center v. Kennedy), consumer credit (Brown v. Dep't of Education), other statutory actions, and a criminal calendar (e.g. United States v. Giles). The written-opinion sample is dominated by federal-employment (Title VII / Rehabilitation Act -- Jones, Larson), FOIA/Privacy (Gatore), APA/agency (Zing Health, ConverDyn), tax-disclosure (Silver), immigration/visa (Younes), arbitration-award enforcement (Webuild), and private commercial disputes (Headfirst). Nationally he is associated with United States v. Libby, United States v. Roger Clemens, the FISC, Guantanamo habeas petitions (Mohammon v. Bush), Hatfill v. Ashcroft, and the Mueller-report-redaction litigation.