Randolph D. Moss
How Judge Moss decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He decides threshold jurisdiction before anything else: when a defendant shows the plaintiff cannot establish general or specific personal jurisdiction in D.C., he must dismiss without reaching the merits -- even for a pro se plaintiff who deliberately chose the forum.
“Except under rare circumstances not applicable here, “a federal court . . . may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over . . . the parties.””
He reads res judicata narrowly: a later FOIA suit that seeks different records and raises issues that could not have been litigated in the earlier case is not barred, even after decades of related litigation.
“The IRS’s reliance on the doctrine of res judicata is misplaced. ... First, Plaintiff’s current FOIA request seeks different records than were at issue in the prior litigation.”
On a motion to compel arbitration he applies the summary-judgment standard and enforces a signed arbitration clause the FAA covers, treating uncontroverted declaration evidence of assent as dispositive when the opposition fails to dispute it.
“Under settled principles of contract law and the plain terms of the Federal Arbitration Act ... the FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.””
Procedural preferences
He enforces the Federal Rules' pleading standards strictly, even for pro se litigants: a sprawling, narrative complaint that violates Rules 8 and 10 will be dismissed (with leave to replead), because the defendant cannot fairly be expected to answer it.
“the Court will dismiss Acon-Chen’s complaint, which spans hundreds of pages, on the grounds that it is “excessively long, rambling, disjointed, incoherent, [and] full of irrelevant and confusing material,” in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10.”
He denies late leave to amend that prejudices the other side: a plaintiff who sits on known facts and moves to add claims after discovery closes, on the eve of the summary-judgment deadline, will be turned away.
“Because Hawthorne has been dilatory in seeking leave to amend and because Rushmore would be prejudiced by the Court permitting Hawthorne to add new claims at this late hour, the Court will DENY Hawthorne’s motion.”
He will dismiss for failure to prosecute on his own motion after repeated, warned non-compliance: a plaintiff who ignores multiple court orders over months, despite an explicit dismissal warning, loses the case.
“Dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute is warranted. Although Shem-Tov initially pursued the case with diligence, the Court has not heard from her for almost five months.”
Cautions
When an agency voluntarily suspends the challenged action and seeks remand, he leans toward dismissing rather than retaining jurisdiction -- absent unreasonable-delay, noncompliance, or record-clarification concerns -- because the post-remand action will produce a new record and likely a new complaint.
“Although a close question, the Court agrees with the Corps and FG that dismissal is the most prudent course. ... none of these reasons for retaining jurisdiction is present here”
In an FSIA default-judgment posture he does not rubber-stamp the complaint: the plaintiff must establish its right to relief 'by evidence satisfactory to the court,' and the court independently confirms service and a sovereign-immunity exception before entering judgment against a foreign instrumentality.
“the Court may not enter a default judgment against a foreign state or instrumentality “unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.””
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 6 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 3Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 6 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 4 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for voluntary remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 8, is GRANTED; ... ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, Dkt. 25, is DENIED”
“ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, to Transfer, Dkt. 14, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 13, is DENIED”
“The Court will, accordingly, remand the matter without vacatur for further action consistent with the Corps’ representations before this Court and will dismiss the action in light of the suspension and remand.”
“the Court agrees with the Corps and FG that dismissal is the most prudent course.”
“The IRS moves to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff’s suit is “barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” ... For the reasons that follow, the Court will DENY the motion.”
“Because Hawthorne has been dilatory in seeking leave to amend and because Rushmore would be prejudiced by the Court permitting Hawthorne to add new claims at this late hour, the Court will DENY Hawthorne’s motion.”
“Dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute is warranted. Although Shem-Tov initially pursued the case with diligence, the Court has not heard from her for almost five months.”
“For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with the Department. The Court will, therefore, grant the Department’s motion for summary judgment.”
“The Court, accordingly, concludes that the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate the present dispute. ... The Court will, accordingly, grant GrubHub’s motion to compel arbitration.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court now GRANTS Dabiri’s motion for entry of a default judgment against ABS.”
“The Department moves to dismiss Dixon’s second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. ... For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the Department’s motion.”
“The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but will permit Acon-Chen to file an amended complaint within 21 days of this Order. Defendants may renew their motion to dismiss for insufficient service to the extent they believe they were not properly served.”
“Finally, the Court will DENY Acon-Chen’s motion for summary judgment as premature.”
“As explained below, the Court agrees that it lacks personal jurisdiction over both Defendants. The Court will, accordingly, GRANT both motions to dismiss”
“will DENY Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, Dkt. 29 & Dkt. 38.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sampled recent assignments (filed 2026, all pending) are heavy on REGULATORY/AGENCY-REVIEW and access-to-information matters consistent with a D.D.C. docket: APA/agency review (899 -- Downey v. U.S. State Governors, AFGE v. FMCS), FOIA (895 -- Brady Center v. ATF, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Interior, Center for Food Safety v. EPA), environmental (893 -- Center for Biological Diversity v. Soler), immigration (465/463 -- Bianchi v. DHS, Ramos Villanueva v. LaRose alien-detainee habeas, Aghazadeh Nojeh Dehi v. Rubio), civil rights (440/442 -- Taylor v. Heritage Foundation, Boyd v. Zeldin, Accountability Now USA v. Griess), ERISA (791 -- IAM National Pension Fund v. BAE Systems), FSIA terrorism (Keinan v. Islamic Republic of Iran), a contract matter, and criminal (United States v. Foster). This is a qualitative character sample, NOT a counted nature-of-suit distribution.