Randolph D. Moss
How Judge Moss rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Moss
Randolph Daniel Moss is a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Moss received a commission on November 14, 2014.
Judge Moss's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Moss, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
Request a pre-motion conference before moving for summary judgment; the moving party’s notice may be no longer than six double-spaced pages.
“If a party wishes to move for summary judgment, it must request that the Court schedule a pre-motion conference. To so request, the moving party shall submit a short notice via ECF, not to exceed six double-spaced pages in length,”
Motions
File contested extension motions at least three business days before the deadline absent extraordinary circumstances.
“Absent extraordinary circumstances, contested motions for extension of time shall be filed at least three business days before the relevant deadline.”
Discovery
Confer in good faith over a discovery dispute; if unresolved, arrange a hearing and obtain leave before filing a motion.
“Before bringing a discovery dispute to the Court’s attention, the parties must confer in good faith in an attempt to resolve the dispute informally. If the parties are unable to resolve the discovery dispute, they shall contact the Courtroom Deputy Clerk at (202) 354-3084 to arrange for a hearing with the Court. The parties shall not file any motions relating to a discovery dispute without leave of the Court.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Moss decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Godson v. Johns Hopkins Medicine, Moss dismissed a self-represented plaintiff's medical-care claims without prejudice because the record did not establish general or specific personal jurisdiction over either defendant in D.C.
“Here, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy either test”
In Stonehill v. IRS, he rejected a res judicata defense to a later FOIA suit because the new request sought different records and raised issues that could not have been litigated in the earlier case.
“The IRS’s reliance on the doctrine of res judicata is misplaced. ... First, Plaintiff’s current FOIA request seeks different records than were at issue in the prior litigation.”
In Gonzales v. Grubhub, he compelled arbitration and dismissed the wage suit without prejudice after the worker did not dispute signing a broad arbitration agreement; neither side requested a stay.
“Under settled principles of contract law and the plain terms of the Federal Arbitration Act ... the FAA ‘leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.’”
Procedural preferences
In Acon-Chen v. Buttigieg, he dismissed a lengthy pro se complaint under Rules 8 and 10 while allowing an amended complaint that stated separate claims concisely.
“the Court will dismiss Acon-Chen’s complaint, which spans hundreds of pages, on the grounds that it is ‘excessively long, rambling, disjointed, incoherent, [and] full of irrelevant and confusing material,’ in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10.”
In Hawthorne v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, he denied leave to amend after discovery closed because the plaintiff delayed seeking to add known claims and the amendment would prejudice the defendant.
“Because Hawthorne has been dilatory in seeking leave to amend and because Rushmore would be prejudiced by the Court permitting Hawthorne to add new claims at this late hour, the Court will DENY Hawthorne’s motion.”
In Shem-Tov v. Department of Justice, he dismissed the FOIA case for failure to prosecute after the plaintiff ignored multiple orders and the court had not heard from her for almost five months.
“Dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute is warranted. Although Shem-Tov initially pursued the case with diligence, the Court has not heard from her for almost five months.”
In a public-records case, he granted an agency’s stay because the requester did not oppose it, while expressly reserving how he would evaluate a contested stay justified by the agency’s staffing reduction.
“The Court will, accordingly, grant the stay—but only because it is unopposed.”
Cautions
In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, he granted voluntary remand and dismissed the challenge after the Corps suspended the disputed permit. He called dismissal a close question and found no case-specific reason to retain jurisdiction.
“Although a close question, the Court agrees with the Corps and FG that dismissal is the most prudent course. ... none of these reasons for retaining jurisdiction is present here”
In Law Offices of Arman Dabiri v. Agricultural Bank of Sudan, he confirmed proper service and the commercial-activity exception before entering default judgment against the bank, and denied an unbriefed request for attorneys’ fees without prejudice.
“The Court first concludes that service was accomplished properly and that the FSIA’s commercial activity exemption to sovereign immunity applies.”
In Avignone v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., he denied a union’s Rule 11 sanctions motion after warning counsel about unsupported theories, because the record did not yet show a pattern of intentional harassment and the union had not served a warning letter on the most recent theory.
“the Court is unpersuaded that counsel is engaged in a pattern of intentional harassment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 8, is GRANTED; ... ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint, Dkt. 25, is DENIED”
“ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, to Transfer, Dkt. 14, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 13, is DENIED”
“The Court will, accordingly, remand the matter without vacatur for further action consistent with the Corps’ representations before this Court and will dismiss the action in light of the suspension and remand.”
“the Court agrees with the Corps and FG that dismissal is the most prudent course.”
“The IRS moves to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiff’s suit is ‘barred under the doctrine of res judicata.’ ... For the reasons that follow, the Court will DENY the motion.”
“Because Hawthorne has been dilatory in seeking leave to amend and because Rushmore would be prejudiced by the Court permitting Hawthorne to add new claims at this late hour, the Court will DENY Hawthorne’s motion.”
“Dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute is warranted. Although Shem-Tov initially pursued the case with diligence, the Court has not heard from her for almost five months.”
“For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees with the Department. The Court will, therefore, grant the Department’s motion for summary judgment.”
“The Court, accordingly, concludes that the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate the present dispute. ... The Court will, accordingly, grant GrubHub’s motion to compel arbitration.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court now GRANTS Dabiri’s motion for entry of a default judgment against ABS.”
“The Department moves to dismiss Dixon’s second amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. ... For the reasons that follow, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the Department’s motion.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 23, is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that, within 21 days from the issuance of this Order, Plaintiff Acon-Chen may file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies the Court has identified.”
“Finally, the Court will DENY Acon-Chen’s motion for summary judgment as premature.”
“As explained below, the Court agrees that it lacks personal jurisdiction over both Defendants. The Court will, accordingly, GRANT both motions to dismiss”
“will DENY Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment, Dkt. 29 & Dkt. 38.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 188 days (N = 14).
The reviewed assignments include agency and public-records disputes, employment matters, immigration funding, emergency relief, civil rights, arbitration, and commercial litigation. The selected cases describe matters found in the docket and do not estimate the judge’s full caseload mix.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 19 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 48 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 19 | 48 |
| Sep 2025 | 19 | 50 |
| Mar 2025 | 26 | 47 |
| Sep 2024 | 31 | 53 |
| Mar 2024 | 28 | 51 |
| Sep 2023 | 21 | 55 |
| Mar 2023 | 10 | 59 |
| Sep 2022 | 19 | 47 |
| Mar 2022 | 19 | 43 |
| Sep 2021 | 11 | 34 |
| Mar 2021 | 10 | 26 |
| Sep 2020 | 9 | 18 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the District of Columbia, not for Judge Moss: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 3,347 | 7.7 months |
| Closed with no court action | 876 | 5.4 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 2,449 | 8.8 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 13 | 53.2 months |
| Closed during trial | 9 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 3,347 | 7.7 months |
| Sep 2024 | 3,290 | 6.2 months |
| Sep 2023 | 3,288 | 4.7 months |
| Sep 2022 | 3,044 | 5.6 months |
| Sep 2021 | 3,408 | 4.8 months |
| Sep 2020 | 2,947 | 5.8 months |
| Sep 2019 | 2,963 | 5.1 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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