Loren L. AliKhan
How Judge AliKhan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In statutory-interpretation disputes she gives effect to every provision and refuses readings that make one clause swallow another. Resolving the FRSA/NTSSA election-of-remedies vs. anti-dilution tension, she adopted the Seventh Circuit's reading (which preserves both clauses) over the Sixth Circuit's, dismissing the safety-retaliation claims because the plaintiff had already 'sought protection' via an OSHA Section 11(c) complaint.
“Courts “are guided by the rule that the maximum possible effect should be afforded to all statutory provisions, and, whenever possible, none of those provisions rendered null or void.” ... Had Congress intended the anti-dilution clauses to entirely override the election-of-remedies clauses, it could have removed the election-of-remedies provisions. It did not.”
In First Amendment / separation-of-powers challenges to executive action she follows clearly-established precedent and the weight of parallel district decisions. Confronting the EO targeting Susman Godfrey, she expressly aligned with the Perkins Coie, Jenner & Block, and WilmerHale courts and held the order unconstitutional in full.
“In the ensuing months, every court to have considered a challenge to one of these orders has found grave constitutional violations and permanently enjoined enforcement of the order in full. ... Today, this court follows suit, concluding that the order targeting Susman violates the U.S. Constitution and must be permanently enjoined.”
Procedural preferences
She polices venue rather than letting a misfiled case sit: where all the challenged conduct occurred elsewhere she will grant a Rule 12(b)(3) motion but transfer (not dismiss) to the proper district, preserving the plaintiff's claims.
“the court will grant Secretary Austin’s motion in part and transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.”
On motions to dismiss she will take judicial notice of incorporated-by-reference materials (the very article in a defamation suit, public records, other courts' filings) but strictly limits them to the FACT of publication/existence, refusing to accept their contents for the truth -- and will disregard exhibits that are irrelevant to the claims.
“the court will take judicial notice of the articles as demonstrating the existence of news coverage ... but not for the truth of any statements contained in the articles.”
She resists litigation-mooting maneuvers and assesses standing as of filing: a defendant's after-the-fact 'rescission' of the challenged action will not defeat jurisdiction where the record (here, the White House's own statements) shows the policy lives on.
“the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion, denies Defendants’ motion, and enters a temporary restraining order against Defendants”
Cautions
A defamation plaintiff who is a limited-purpose public figure must plausibly plead ACTUAL MALICE to survive a motion to dismiss; substantially-true statements and statements of opinion are not actionable, and the court will read the source material directly rather than accept the complaint's characterization of it.
“the court concludes that Dr. Mason cannot plead actual malice. And because her tortious interference claim rises and falls with her defamation claim, the court will dismiss the complaint in its entirety.”
The 14 COUNTED motions skew toward high-profile constitutional litigation against the second Trump administration (the NCN funding-freeze TRO, the Susman Godfrey permanent injunction, and the Slaughter FTC reinstatement) sitting alongside ordinary pleading-stage dismissals (Mason, Orozco, Rivera) and an agency FOIA summary judgment (Magassa). This is NOT a population grant rate or a merits tendency. Note also that the Slaughter summary judgment was later STAYED by the Supreme Court (6-3) pending appeal. A step-5 deepen with more routine MTD/MSJ dispositions is recommended before relying on the per-type rates.
“Because the law on the removal of FTC Commissioners is clear, and for the reasons explained below, the court will grant Ms. Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment and deny Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 2Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 3Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for temporary restraining order N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judicial notice N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 180, grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 181, enter judgment for Plaintiff on Counts I through IV and VI through IX of the Amended Complaint, and grant declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.”
“the court will deny Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 180, grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 181, enter judgment for Plaintiff on Counts I through IV and VI through IX of the Amended Complaint, and grant declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.”
“Urban Engineers’ motion to dismiss Counts V and VI, ECF No. 17, is hereby GRANTED.”
“WSP’s motion to dismiss in part, ECF No. 15, is hereby GRANTED as unopposed as to Counts III, IV, and VIII, GRANTED as to Counts V and VI, and DENIED as to Counts I and VII.”
“the court will partially grant the motion for judicial notice and fully grant the motion to dismiss.”
“the court will partially grant the motion for judicial notice and fully grant the motion to dismiss.”
“the court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.”
“the court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment.”
“the court will grant Secretary Austin’s motion in part and transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia.”
“the court will grant the Attorney General’s motion and dismiss Mr. Orozco’s claims that are based on the following technologies (collectively, “the four systems”): Sentinel, Palantir Technologies software (“Palantir”), Global Mission Analytics (“GMAN”) system, and Virtual Private Networking (“VPN”) misattribution software.”
“the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion, denies Defendants’ motion, and enters a temporary restraining order against Defendants pursuant to the terms outlined at the end of this order.”
“the court grants Plaintiffs’ motion, denies Defendants’ motion, and enters a temporary restraining order against Defendants pursuant to the terms outlined at the end of this order.”
“the court will dismiss Mr. Bedoya’s claims as moot, will grant Ms. Slaughter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20, and will deny Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 32.”
“the court will dismiss Mr. Bedoya’s claims as moot, will grant Ms. Slaughter’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20, and will deny Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 32.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From the reasoning-layer sample plus published profiles (NOT a counted distribution): AliKhan, confirmed late 2023, has a 2024-2025 docket mixing routine federal litigation -- employment discrimination/retaliation (Abdelaal; Rivera; Orozco -- Rehabilitation Act), FOIA/APA (Magassa v. TSA), and defamation (Mason v. American Prospect) -- with a cluster of HIGH-PROFILE 2025 challenges to second-Trump-administration action: National Council of Nonprofits v. OMB (federal-funding-freeze TRO), Susman Godfrey LLP v. Executive Office of the President (law-firm Executive Order, permanent injunction), and Slaughter v. Trump (FTC Commissioner removal/reinstatement). Her pre-bench background was appellate litigation (D.C. Solicitor General; O'Melveny appellate group).