Emmet G. Sullivan
How Judge Sullivan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On APA review he will not just remand but VACATE and PERMANENTLY ENJOIN unlawful agency guidance: he set aside HHS's '340B FAQ 33' Medicaid-offset interpretation and enjoined its enforcement, granting the regulated parties' cross-motion for summary judgment.
“ORDERED that plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 26, is GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing, applying, or implementing FAQ 33”
He enforces arbitration agreements under the FAA, including clickwrap 'updated terms' contracts and delegation clauses: where a valid delegation clause exists, he sends threshold arbitrability questions to the arbitrator and stays the case rather than deciding them himself.
“the Court GRANTS Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, ECF No. 18; DENIES Uber’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18; and STAYS proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration.”
Procedural preferences
He strongly resists deciding cases on summary judgment before discovery: when a defendant styles a motion as 'to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment' and relies on materials outside the pleadings, he refuses to convert it under Rule 12(d) and denies it (without prejudice) until the plaintiff has had discovery -- and grants Rule 56(d) discovery requests 'almost as a matter of course.'
“summary judgment is ordinarily appropriate only after the plaintiff has been given an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery. ... the Court will not consider “any matters outside of the pleadings” and will not convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.”
He holds parties to his Standing Order on summary-judgment fact statements: a non-movant who fails to specifically controvert the movant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts has those facts deemed admitted, which can be outcome-determinative.
“Mr. Buitrago fails to address any of the facts the District offers in its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. ... the Court considers Defendant’s statement of material facts undisputed”
He enforces litigants' duty to prosecute and respond: an unopposed dispositive motion is granted as conceded, a FOIA suit the requester abandons is dismissed for want of a live controversy, and a claim left dormant for ~two years is dismissed sua sponte under Rule 41(b)/inherent power.
“This inexcusably prolonged case ends now.”
Cautions
Pro se litigants get liberal construction but no exemption from the rules: a Rule 60(d)(1) 'independent action' filed as a motion in a closed case, or one that merely relitigates already-rejected issues, will be denied -- the benefit 'is not a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
“The failure to file a separate action is fatal to her motion. ... A party cannot use an independent action as a vehicle for the relitigation of issues.”
A defendant's motion to compel arbitration can succeed even on tragic facts: in a wrongful-death case arising from a fatal Uber ride he enforced the clickwrap arbitration agreement and delegation clause, sending the dispute out of court despite the plaintiffs' unconscionability and arbitrability challenges.
“the Court GRANTS Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 2Denied: 4Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 2Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for relief from judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for discovery N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, ECF No. 25, is DENIED”
“FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 26, is GRANTED; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that defendants are permanently enjoined from enforcing, applying, or implementing FAQ 33”
“the Court GRANTS Bacardi’s Motion to Dismiss Cubaexport’s Counterclaim, see ECF No. 156.”
“the Court GRANTS Uber’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, ECF No. 18; DENIES Uber’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18; and STAYS proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration.”
“DENIES Uber’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 18; and STAYS proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration.”
“the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“the Court will deny the defendant’s motion without prejudice and dismiss this action.”
“the Court will grant the defendant’s motion as conceded and dismiss this action.”
“the Court DENIES without prejudice the Motion to Dismiss.”
“the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 9; and GRANTS Mr. Lapotsky’s request to take discovery pursuant to Rule 56(d).”
“GRANTS Mr. Lapotsky’s request to take discovery pursuant to Rule 56(d).”
“Defendants’ motion will be denied, and this case will be dismissed instead. ... the Court will dismiss this action because no actual controversy exists.”
“the Court hereby DENIES Ms. Fleming’s motions.”
Employment-discrimination suit in which the Court had previously granted the defendant summary judgment on all but one Rehabilitation Act claim. The surviving claim then stalled: the plaintiff never filed her promised motion for reconsideration and the case sat inactive for nearly two years. The Court dismissed the remaining claim SUA SPONTE under its inherent power / Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute -- no party motion was ruled on in this order. Recorded as a sua sponte non-motion disposition (order read, excluded from motion stats). Grounding quote below. Signed EMMET G. SULLIVAN; docket (EGS). Read via get_case(include_text).
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From the reasoning-layer sample (NOT a counted nature-of-suit distribution), his civil docket is agency- and employment-heavy with a commercial tail: Title VII / ADA / Rehabilitation Act employment discrimination (Buitrago, Lapotsky, Andrews), Freedom of Information Act (Cardona, Fleming), APA agency review (Texas Children's Hospital v. Azar -- 340B/Medicaid), Lanham Act trademark (Bacardi v. Cubaexport -- HAVANA CLUB), FAA arbitration in a tort/wrongful-death posture (Christian v. Uber), and removed common-law tort (Boser medical malpractice; Galindo FTCA). Many filings name the United States or a federal agency/officer as defendant, consistent with a D.D.C. docket. He is also nationally associated with high-profile criminal and emergency-injunction matters (US v. Stevens, US v. Flynn, Title 42, 2020 USPS ballot sweeps) that fall outside this civil MTD/MSJ sample.