Ellen Segal Huvelle
How Judge Huvelle rules, drawn from 6 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Huvelle no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Huvelle
Ellen Segal Huvelle was a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Huvelle received a commission on October 26, 1999. Judge Huvelle assumed senior status on June 3, 2014 and retired on August 1, 2025.
How Judge Huvelle decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In T.H.’s IDEA case, she treated exhaustion as a nonjurisdictional defense and placed the burden of proving nonexhaustion on the District.
“because this Court concludes that IDEA’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, the District carries the burden of pleading and proving plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust. ... the fact that plaintiffs did not make any allegations with respect to exhaustion is fatal to the District’s motion, not plaintiffs’ lawsuit.”
In the PACER-fees case, she found the challenge to the fee schedule distinct from an earlier billing dispute and declined dismissal under the first-to-file rule.
“plaintiffs here challenge the legality of the fee schedule. These are separate issues, and a finding of liability in one case would have no impact on liability in the other case. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss the suit based on the first-to-file rule.”
Procedural preferences
In the same PACER-fees case, she denied the government’s alternative summary-judgment motion because it offered no grounds for judgment.
“it has not offered any grounds upon which summary judgment should be granted if the motion to dismiss is denied. ... Therefore, the Court will deny defendant’s unsupported motion for summary judgment.”
In Richardson’s FOIA suit, she gave the self-represented plaintiff notice of the consequences of not opposing summary judgment, then granted the agency judgment because its further processing supplied the relief sought.
“plaintiff was advised that ‘any factual assertions in the movant’s affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion.’ ... Due to plaintiff’s failure to respond to defendant’s motion, it is undisputed that defendant has conducted the ‘further processing’ required by the OIP remand order.”
Cautions
In Ali Jaber v. United States, she dismissed a challenge to a 2012 Yemen drone strike because binding circuit precedent treated the claims as nonjusticiable political questions.
“Although plaintiffs’ argument may have some intuitive appeal, their claims are squarely foreclosed by D.C. Circuit precedent, and therefore, the Court must dismiss them.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed above, defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendant has also moved for summary judgment, but it has not offered any grounds upon which summary judgment should be granted if the motion to dismiss is denied. ... Therefore, the Court will deny defendant’s unsupported motion for summary judgment.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that the District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is DENIED.”
“Before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ... For the reasons stated herein, that motion will be granted. ... defendant has satisfied this standard. ... defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment [#23] is GRANTED IN PART, and plaintiff’s claim concerning retaliation is dismissed; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment [#23] is otherwise DENIED IN PART, and plaintiff may proceed with his claims concerning race and age discrimination”
“ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#57] is GRANTED, and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. This is a final appealable order.”
“ORDERED that petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [1] is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- From a case-level enumeration of the judge's assigned cases (NOT a counted distribution): her D.D.C. civil docket runs heavily to suits against the federal government and the District, Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act cases, Administrative Procedure Act / agency-review challenges, employment-discrimination claims, ERISA collections, immigration mandamus, and habeas petitions, alongside diversity contract, trademark, copyright, and personal-injury matters.
- Case durations in the sampled cohorts ran from a few weeks for quickly-resolved or remanded matters to about two years for fully-litigated agency-review cases.
Pending matters in the official report
Judge Huvelle was last listed in the Civil Justice Reform Act report as of September 30, 2023.
| Motions pending more than six months | 1 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2023 | 1 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 1 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
A historical record
Judge Huvelle no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.