Ellen Segal Huvelle
Judge Huvelle no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Huvelle decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She resolves whether a statutory exhaustion or procedural bar is jurisdictional before placing the burden of proof: applying the Supreme Court's 'clear statement' bright line, she treats a requirement as a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule (an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove) unless Congress clearly labeled it jurisdictional. A defendant who cannot show the failure on the face of the complaint loses the motion.
“because this Court concludes that IDEA’s administrative-exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, the District carries the burden of pleading and proving plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust. ... the fact that plaintiffs did not make any allegations with respect to exhaustion is fatal to the District’s motion, not plaintiffs’ lawsuit.”
On a first-to-file challenge she looks to whether the two suits' facts and issues 'substantially overlap' rather than whether the parties are the same: she let the PACER-fees class action proceed because it attacked the legality of the fee schedule itself, a distinct question from the earlier suit's challenge to a byte-counting billing error.
“plaintiffs here challenge the legality of the fee schedule. These are separate issues, and a finding of liability in one case would have no impact on liability in the other case. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss the suit based on the first-to-file rule.”
Procedural preferences
She will not grant summary judgment on a bare or unsupported motion: even where she denied the companion motion to dismiss, she refused the government's alternative summary-judgment motion because it 'offered no grounds' on which judgment could be entered. The movant must actually carry the Rule 56 showing.
“it has not offered any grounds upon which summary judgment should be granted if the motion to dismiss is denied. ... Therefore, the Court will deny defendant’s unsupported motion for summary judgment.”
With pro se litigants she enforces the Rule 56 / Local Rule 7 framework but only after the required Neal/Fox notice of the consequences of not responding; where the unopposed agency declaration shows the relief sought has already been provided, she grants judgment on the undisputed record rather than for mere default.
“plaintiff was advised that ‘any factual assertions in the movant’s affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion.’ ... Due to plaintiff’s failure to respond to defendant’s motion, it is undisputed that defendant has conducted the ‘further processing’ required by the OIP remand order.”
Cautions
This thin written-order sample (2005-2017) skews toward government-defendant civil litigation and does NOT capture several of this judge's nationally known matters, which should be read alongside it: she accepted lobbyist Michael Scanlon's 2005 guilty plea in the Jack Abramoff investigation, ruled on Guantanamo detainees' habeas petitions (e.g. Kurnaz and Ameziane), presided over the landmark PACER-fees class action, dismissed Oleg Deripaska's libel suit against the Associated Press, and held that a U.S. drone strike raised a non-justiciable political question.
“In February 2016, Huvelle found that the next friend of Yemenis killed in a U.S. drone strike could not sue under the Torture Victims Protection Act nor the Alien Tort Statute because the attack raised a political question.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed above, defendant’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendant has also moved for summary judgment, but it has not offered any grounds upon which summary judgment should be granted if the motion to dismiss is denied. ... Therefore, the Court will deny defendant’s unsupported motion for summary judgment.”
“it is hereby ORDERED that the District’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is DENIED.”
“Before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment. ... For the reasons stated herein, that motion will be granted. ... defendant has satisfied this standard. ... defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
“ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment [#23] is GRANTED IN PART, and plaintiff’s claim concerning retaliation is dismissed; and it is FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment [#23] is otherwise DENIED IN PART, and plaintiff may proceed with his claims concerning race and age discrimination”
“ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [#57] is GRANTED, and it is FURTHER ORDERED that the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. This is a final appealable order.”
“ORDERED that petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [1] is DENIED and this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From a case-level enumeration of the judge's assigned cases (NOT a counted distribution): her D.D.C. civil docket runs heavily to suits against the federal government and the District -- Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act cases, Administrative Procedure Act / agency-review challenges, employment-discrimination claims, ERISA collections, immigration mandamus, and habeas petitions -- alongside diversity contract, trademark, copyright, and personal-injury matters. Case durations in the sampled cohorts ran from a few weeks for quickly-resolved or remanded matters to about two years for fully-litigated agency-review cases.
A historical record
Judge Huvelle no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.