Christopher R. Cooper
How Judge Cooper decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In FOIA he independently tests the agency's showing even when the requester concedes or fails to respond: he treats an unopposed motion as conceded under Local Rule 7(b) but still reviews the declarations on the merits before granting summary judgment.
“Hearing no response from Guarascio despite the Court’s order warning him of the consequences of staying mum, the Court will now treat the issues on which it previously reserved judgment as conceded. Yet, for the sake of completeness, the Court will delve into Mr. Seidel’s declaration and explain why the Bureau is entitled to summary judgment regardless.”
He resolves threshold jurisdictional and statutory defects before the merits: a diversity suit between two foreign parties is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) regardless of how the motion was framed, and he polices his own subject-matter jurisdiction with outside-the-pleadings materials.
“For the reasons explained below, the Court will dismiss the case. It will do so, however, because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”
He reads agency-enforcement statutes as Congress wrote them and declines agency invitations to bypass the statutory remedy: he refused the FEC's proposed 'voluntary remand' workaround and applied the FECA 30-day contrary-to-law mechanism instead.
“The Court declines the FEC’s invitation to upset the statutory scheme that Congress designed. Because the commissioners’ failure to explain their votes was clearly unlawful, and the FEC has not justified departing from the path laid by the statute, the Court will grant CREW’s motion for summary judgment.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces the consequences of non-response: an unopposed dispositive motion (summary judgment or a motion to compel arbitration) will be granted as conceded under Local Rule 7(b) / a Fox-Neal order, though he typically confirms the merits as well.
“Although the Court instructed Moyler that if he failed to respond to Securitas’s motion, the Court may deem the matter conceded, Moyler has not opposed the motion. ... Accordingly, the Court will grant Securitas’s motion as conceded and because, on the Court’s own review of the materials submitted by Securitas, Moyler agreed to arbitrate the claims he now raises.”
He screens pro se complaints rigorously under Rule 8(a) and 28 U.S.C. sec.1915(e): a rambling complaint that does not give fair notice of a colorable claim, or that seeks to compel a criminal investigation, is dismissed on initial review.
“the complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) ... When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated ...” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. ... the complaint, and this matter, are dismissed without prejudice.”
Cautions
Summary judgment is not a sure thing for an employer before him: where a discrimination plaintiff puts the proffered nondiscriminatory justification in genuine dispute (here, an alleged overheard racial remark and a contested account of who set a lowball salary), he will deny the employer's MSJ and send it to a jury.
“Based on the evidence before the Court, a reasonable fact finder could reject Amtrak’s proffered justification for Kroon’s salary offer and instead find that Amtrak lowballed Kroon because of her race. Accordingly, the Court will deny Amtrak’s motion.”
A preliminary injunction or emergency-processing demand must clear the full equitable standard: in FOIA he denied a PI to compel immediate processing where the requester showed no irreparable harm and the request was overly burdensome.
“The Court will deny Zorn’s motion because he has not demonstrated irreparable harm, his request is overly burdensome, and the equities do not support granting extraordinary relief.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 10 |
Granted: 6Denied: 3Moot / procedural: 1 | 60% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDERED that [14] Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.”
“ORDERED that [21] Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Summary Judgment and a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“For the forgoing reasons, the Court will grant the FBI’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining issues.”
“For the reasons explained below, the Court will dismiss the case. It will do so, however, because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”
“It will also deny Nwosu leave to amend, deny Nwosu’s motion for sanctions, deny as moot the Four Seasons’ motion to strike Nwosu’s jury demand, and grant the Four Seasons’ motion to strike Nwosu’s notice of interlocutory appeal.”
“Heads or tails, the Department wins.”
“The Court needn’t pass on Hooker’s supposition that the official copy of the EEOC dismissal order he ultimately received is the record he originally sought. Either way, the agency is entitled to summary judgment.”
“the Court will grant CREW’s motion for summary judgment, declare the FEC’s dismissal contrary to law, and deny the FEC’s motion for voluntary remand.”
“the Court will affirm the Board’s dismissal, deny Atrium’s motion for summary judgment, and grant the government’s cross-motion.”
“the Court will affirm the Board’s dismissal, deny Atrium’s motion for summary judgment, and grant the government’s cross-motion.”
“Based on the evidence before the Court, a reasonable fact finder could reject Amtrak’s proffered justification for Kroon’s salary offer and instead find that Amtrak lowballed Kroon because of her race. Accordingly, the Court will deny Amtrak’s motion.”
“The Court will deny Zorn’s motion because he has not demonstrated irreparable harm, his request is overly burdensome, and the equities do not support granting extraordinary relief.”
“Because McCallister has identified no evidence indicating that the Service’s reasons for transferring her were pretextual, nor any proper comparator who received more favorable treatment, the Court will grant the motion.”
“The Court will therefore grant Securitas’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and stay the case.”
“The FBI’s Glomar response was proper. The Court will, accordingly, grant the FBI’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss the case.”
“Citing SafeLaunch’s lack of participation in this case since the withdrawal of its counsel, Safex moves for a default judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant its motion in part and deny it in part.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sampled recent assignments (20 dockets filed 2026, all pending) are dominated by agency-facing litigation: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (895 -- Government Accountability Project v. EPA, Iranian American Legal Defense Fund v. State, DCcitizens.com v. NPS) and ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT review (899 -- Dardarian v. DoD, National Arbor Day Foundation v. USDA, Scheeren v. Dep't of Education), plus civil rights (440/442/448 -- Lattimore v. AG, Maloney v. EOP, Wilson v. D.C., Brown v. Washington University), immigration / alien-detainee habeas (463/465 -- Alvaro Matias v. LaRose, Narayanasamy v. Emmel, Klayman v. DHS), a Medicare-recovery contract (Crossroads Community Hospital v. Kennedy), motor-vehicle (Norris v. WMATA), RICO (D.C. v. Razjooyan), and a miscellaneous matter (In re Edward R. Martin, Jr.). This is a qualitative character sample, NOT a counted nature-of-suit distribution; the heavy FOIA/APA share is consistent with the FOIA- and agency-heavy reasoning-layer sample.