William Davis Shipman
Judge Shipman no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Shipman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He found infringement when the accused mechanism reached the same result through a substantially equivalent arrangement.
“The same result is reached in both cases, and I am of the opinion that the defendants’ mechanism is substantially an equivalent for the plaintiffs’, and infringes the third and fifth claims in the latter’s patent. Let judgment be entered for the plaintiffs for one dollar damages and costs.”
He protected a registered trademark nationwide where the accused wording and device were identical or deceptively similar.
“The defendants have clearly infringed this right by using the words and device of the plaintiffs, both in the exact form, and in such near resemblance as is calculated to deceive. They have done this by so marking the shirts made by them, and by the labels used on their packages and packing boxes. A perpetual injunction must, therefore, issue, restraining them from any use of this trade-mark, either in the identical form in which it is registered in the patent office, or in any form in which it may be calculated to deceive, by confounding the goods manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs with shirts made and sold by the defendants.”
He recognized passenger salvage only for extraordinary service beyond the ordinary duties expected aboard a ship.
“these services, in order to constitute him a salvor, must be of an extraordinary character and beyond the line of his duty, and not mere ordinary services, such as pumping and aiding in working the ship by usual and well-known means.”
Cautions
He dismissed a private salvage claim against a sovereign-owned transport because no statute conferred jurisdiction over the vessel.
“On the whole, therefore, I conclude that the court has no jurisdiction over the Thomas A. Scott, even assuming her to be merely a transport. Site is exclusively owned, by the sovereign power, and therefore is not amenable to the judicial tribunals at the suit of private parties. The libel must, therefore, be dismissed as the cause now stands. But, inasmuch as the government may be desirous of making compensation to the salvors in case they are able to prove a meritorious claim for salvage, I will withhold the decree for the pres ent, until the attorney can advise with the proper department, and take its direction in the matter.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The facts in this case are a complete answer to any suit against the defendants in the character in which they are sued, founded on the cause of action here involved, and are, therefore, a bar to this suit. There must be a judgment for the defendants, but without costs.”
“This libel must be dismissed. It is now well settled that in order to subject a vessel, through process in rem, for loss of goods agreed to be carried on freight, the goods must have been delivered and received on board. Dill v. The Bertram [Case No. 3.910]. The goods in this case were not so delivered and received on board, and no liability for their loss is thrown on the vessel. Whether there is a personal liability resting upon those in charge of the vessel in consequence of any failure of duty on their part need not be determined. That question is not before the court Libel dismissed, with costs.”
“SHIPMAN, District Judge, without hearing the counsel for the libellants said he was inclined to the opinion that the respondent was correct in his construction of the charter party, but that as he had not objected to the bill on that ground when first presented, the transaction between the parties was a fixing of the amount to be paid as in the bill stated, less the hogsheads to be deducted, and he gave a decree for the amount claimed by the libellants.”
“This court has no jurisdiction whatever over controversies between parties, all of whom, plaintiffs as well as defendants, are citizens-of states other than that in which the suit is brought. This suit is therefore coram non judice, and a judgment upon its merits would be a nullity. Let an order be entered dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction, without costs.”
“This luffing was a mistake for which the Queen of the South should be held responsible. Decree for libelants, with a reference.”
“The jury accordingly rendered a verdict for the United States for $6,000 and interest from August 5, 1861.”
“There was no excuse for this, and she is therefore adjudged in fault, and must be held responsible. Decree for libelants, with an order of reference.”
“It is sufficient tot say that I adhere to this view of the law. Whether I should, in a case presented, go further, and concur with the views expressed by Judge Hall in Re Wells, Jr., [Case No. 17,387,] need not now be determined. It follows that a decree declaring the respondents bankrupts must issue.”
“Let the report be referred back to the commissioner to be corrected in the particulars named, in conformity with this opinion.”
“No title ever vested in the defendant, for the condition was never performed. No act of the plaintiffs was necessary to revest in them the 'title with which they had never parted. The plaintiffs never accepted this note in payment. They, indeed, offered to accept it, but only on a condition with which the defendant refused to comply. The title and right of possession of this wool remained, therefore, in the plaintiffs, and judgment must be rendered for them.”
“And I think it shows with reasonable certainty that the steamer was at fault in not giving the schooner sufficient room, under the circumstances, to pass safely to the southward of her. Decree for libelants, with a reference.”
“The libel should therefore be dismissed with costs. Let a decree be entered accordingly.”
A historical record
Judge Shipman no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.