Scott T. Varholak
How Judge Varholak rules, drawn from 12 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Varholak decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage he holds plaintiffs to element-level specifics and statutory thresholds: a claim that omits a required element (e.g. the CFAA's $5,000 loss, or detail identifying the trade secret) fails, but the deficiency is treated as curable.
“the CFAA claim failed because Plaintiff failed to plead a loss of at least $5,000 stemming from the alleged unauthorized access ... because it is possible that Plaintiff could plausibly plead such claims, the magistrate judge recommended that each of them be dismissed without prejudice.”
In immigration-detention cases, he reads the statutory categories separately and rejects an interpretation that would make the discretionary-detention provision largely unnecessary for people who entered without inspection and later lived in the United States.
“To hold otherwise would collapse the statutory distinction between Sections 1225 and 1226 and render Section 1226 largely superfluous as applied to noncitizens who entered this country without inspection.”
When detention was initially imposed under the wrong statutory provision, he required the government to justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence at a prompt bond hearing.
“the Court therefore finds that the Government shall bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence at Petitioner’s bond hearing.”
Procedural preferences
Will NOT resolve a fact-dependent affirmative defense on a 12(b)(6) motion: where an element (e.g. RFRA's least-restrictive-means) requires a developed record, he recommends denying dismissal of that claim and letting it proceed to discovery.
“he determined that the second element of this affirmative defense -- whether there are less restrictive means of furthering those interests -- is fact dependent and thus inappropriate for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.”
Cautions
Amendment-friendly: he routinely recommends dismissal WITHOUT PREJUDICE and, for pro se litigants, defines a limited path to replead the one theory that might survive, so a dismissal on his recommendation is frequently not the end of the case.
“dismissing Plaintiff David Antonio Ruffin's Amended Complaint, without prejudice; and allowing Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint for the limited purpose of asserting a First Amendment claim”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court ACCEPTS the Recommendation (ECF No. 45), GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), and directs the Clerk to CLOSE this case.”
“the Court AFFIRMS and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Varholak's Recommendation to grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion, ECF No. 94. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF No. 38, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“The Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak [Doc. 77] is ADOPTED; (2) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 29] is GRANTED; (3) The Amended Complaint [Doc. 7] is DISMISSED without prejudice”
“the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing”
“ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) [Docket No. 53] is GRANTED.”
“ORDERED that Defendants’ Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 54] is GRANTED.”
“ORDERED that the defendant Roundpoint’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint [Docket No. 8] is GRANTED.”
“ORDERED that defendant loanDepot’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 18] is GRANTED.”
“ORDERED that defendant Sayer Law’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 29] is GRANTED.”
“that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED;”
“that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing;”
“that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing;”
“that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing;”
“that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED IN PART;”
“For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED: (1) that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [#1] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing;”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The selected cases do not form a representative duration cohort, so no case-duration distribution is reported. Referral matters and consent cases are kept distinct when interpreting the outcomes.
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