Alfred Albert Arraj
Judge Arraj no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Arraj decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He found purposeful Colorado-directed financing activity sufficient for personal jurisdiction.
“the defendant negotiated a loan with the plaintiff specifically to be used for a Colorado business undertaking.”
He reserved comparative-negligence allocation for a jury unless undisputed facts permit only one inference.
“only in the clearest of cases where the facts are undisputed and reasonable minds can draw but one inference from them should this issue be determined as a matter of law.”
He viewed impleader as particularly useful for resolving comparative-fault and contribution issues in one proceeding.
“The use of Rule 14 to seek relief from joint tortfeasors is particularly appropriate in Colorado”
Procedural preferences
At summary judgment he required competent evidence rather than conclusory assertions.
“Conclusory statements are not enough.”
He applied specific statutory displacement language even when a different statute arguably pointed another way.
“the premises liability statute, which expressly abrogates common law claims, would prevail even if the two statutes did conflict.”
He denied summary judgment when material facts concerning statutory defenses remained disputed.
“because numerous factual issues relating to LPC’s defenses remain in dispute, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on its third claim for relief will be denied.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The plaintiffs motion to remand is DENIED.”
“The defendants’ motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service is DENIED.”
“The defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is DENIED.”
“The motion to amend the judgment will be granted”
“ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint is granted; and it is further”
“ORDERED that the defendants motion to dismiss the third and fifth claims set forth in plaintiffs complaint is GRANTED.”
“The Clerk shall enter judgment that this action be dismissed with prejudice; defendants shall recover their costs upon the filing of a bill of costs within ten days.”
“ORDERED that defendant’s motion for' summary judgment is DENIED.”
“ORDERED that third-party defendant’s motion to dismiss the third-party complaint is hereby denied.”
“GTE’s motion for summary judgment on Burrill’s second claim for relief will be DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 59(e) or in the Alternative Relief From Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is GRANTED to the extent that defendant shall be ordered to expunge from the personnel records of plaintiff any notation that adversely affects his rights for consideration for rehire;”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s Motion to Amend Judgment or For a New Trial be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 411(b) claim be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 411(a) claim, to the extent plaintiff seeks statutory damages and attorney’s fees be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.”
“Accordingly, this case is remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings as may be consonant with this opinion.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The located electronic cohort includes tort, contract, trademark, ERISA, interstate-commerce, and stockholder matters from the final decade of Arraj's tenure.
A historical record
Judge Arraj no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.