Gonzalo P. Curiel
How Judge Curiel decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Social Security appeals he will not merely remand for further proceedings where the record compels disability -- he applies the credit-as-true rule and remands for an immediate award of benefits, ending the agency loop rather than prolonging it.
“the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, REVERSES the ALJ's decision and REMANDS the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award of benefits.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) RICO mail/wire-fraud claim he treats allegations of continuing conduct despite known complaints -- and of governmental investigations / BBB ratings -- as probative of intent to defraud, and will not strike them as 'mere puffery' at the pleading stage (Cohen v. Trump / Trump University).
“the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to strike the paragraphs of the Complaint containing statements considered by Defendant to constitute “mere puffery.””
Procedural preferences
On class-action settlement approval he scrutinizes the form of relief under CAFA: he distinguishes 'credit vouchers' (redeemable like cash, no further purchase required) from 'coupons' (a discount on a larger purchase), declining to apply 28 U.S.C. 1712's coupon-settlement restrictions, and cross-checks the fee award with a lodestar even where the request is unopposed.
“the Court adopts the approach of the line of federal district court cases distinguishing credit vouchers, which require no additional purchase to redeem and therefore operate like cash, from coupons ... Accordingly, the Court does not view this settlement as a 'coupon settlement' requiring the application of 28 U.S.C. 1712.”
He gives plaintiffs room to cure: even when granting a 12(b)(6) dismissal he typically dismisses WITHOUT prejudice and grants a fixed leave-to-amend window (e.g. 30 days), rather than ending the case (Said v. County of San Diego; Porter v. Gore; BofA MDL).
“Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty (30) days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted above.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 8 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 3Denied: 4 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Class settlement approval N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Attorneys fees N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Reconsideration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, REVERSES the ALJ's decision and REMANDS the case to the Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award of benefits.”
“For the reasons explained above, MTC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Murillo's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and request for punitive damages is DENIED.”
“Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss.”
“The unopposed motion for final approval of class action, (Dkt. No. 29), is GRANTED; ... This action, including all individual and Class claims resolved in it, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE”
“The unopposed motion for attorney's fees, (Dkt. No. 28), is GRANTED. The Court awards $155,000.00 to Class Counsel and $3,000.00 to Named Plaintiff Lauren Chaikin”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. No. 9), is DENIED”
“Defendant's Motion to Strike, (Dkt. No. 10), is DENIED.”
“the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary judgment.”
“the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary judgment.”
“the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.”
“the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part”
“Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss as to all causes of action.”
“The Court also DENIES Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages as to the County”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part (as to the state-law claims) and denied in part (as to the First Amendment claims). The dismissal as to the state law claims are without prejudice; if Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, she must do so no later than within 30 days of this order.”
“the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend and GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration with leave to amend.”
“Based on the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 357 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 50 days (N = 6).
Broad general-civil docket of an experienced San Diego district judge (active 2012-2023, senior since 2023-09-07 but STILL drawing fresh assignments -- 2026-filed cases appear under his name). Sampled nature-of-suit mix skews to consumer/access litigation (ADA Title III access, FDCPA/TCPA), securities, prisoner civil rights (sec.1983), employment, contract/diversity, plus a heavy 2026 alien-detainee 28 U.S.C. 2241 HABEAS surge flooding his current direct docket. The lone Fallbrook water-rights adjudication (3:51-cv-01247, ~72yr) recorded in the prior build is an anomaly, not representative. NOT a grant rate -- caseload composition only.