Todd M. Hughes
How Judge Hughes decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In inter partes and reexamination review he holds the burden where the statute places it: a challenger who argues that a claim limitation should be read as a means-plus-function term, but offers no evidence that a skilled artisan would understand it that way, has not carried its burden, and the presumption against that reading stands. A conclusory assertion is not proof.
“Apple argued that the limita- tions must be construed under § 112, ¶ 6, but provided no evidentiary support for that position. Accordingly, Apple failed to carry its burden, and the presumption against the application of § 112, ¶ 6 to the disputed limitations remained unrebutted.”
He treats a claim-construction question already litigated and lost as settled: where the same parties fully and fairly litigated the meaning of a term in an earlier proceeding involving a related patent with identical lexicography, collateral estoppel forecloses relitigating it, and a later tribunal cannot adopt a different construction.
“It follows, therefore, that collateral estoppel protects Nestlé and obviates the need to revisit an issue that was already resolved against Steuben Foods.”
Procedural preferences
He reads 'prevailing party' through the lens of finality: a defendant is not a prevailing party entitled to fees where the suit ended in a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, because such a dismissal takes effect on its own without a court order and produces no final court decision carrying the judicial imprimatur that a fee award requires. A mere stay does not supply it.
“A stay, standing alone, is simply not a final court decision capable of establishing the judicial imprimatur re- quired for a litigant to emerge as the prevailing party un- der § 285.”
He applies issue exhaustion with a careful line: an appellant who merely points to evidence already in the record to support a claim he properly preserved is not raising a new legal argument, so a reviewing court errs when it invokes exhaustion to refuse to consider that evidence.
“The mere citation of evidence already contained in the record to further support that claim is not a new legal argument for purposes of issue exhaustion.”
Cautions
On patent eligibility he looks past the hardware to what a claim actually does: implementing routine, long-practiced steps -- such as the data collection and analysis banks have always performed -- on a generic handheld device does not make the claim any less abstract, and without a genuine inventive concept the claim is ineligible.
“The addition of a handheld mobile device to carry out these routine steps does not make the claim any less ab- stract.”
In veterans cases he reads the governing regulation on its own terms: a presumption keyed to statutory 'active military, naval, or air service' reaches only claimants who attained veteran status, and a claimant must supply credible evidence that the specific claimed in-service event happened to him, not merely that some qualifying event occurred.
“Accordingly, § 3.304(f) required Mr. Kays to submit credible evidence that he was involved in search and rescue activities and not simply that a civilian helicopter crash occurred.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Federal Claims. AFFIRMED”
“For the reasons set forth above, the petition for review is denied. PETITION DENIED”
“Because the principles of issue exhaustion support the Veterans Court’s determina- tion, we affirm.”
“Accordingly, because the Veterans Court applied the proper standard of review, and because § 3.304(f) requires credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred as claimed by the veteran, we affirm. AFFIRMED”
“Because the implicit denial rule applies to both formal and informal claims, and its use does not violate the notice provision of the VA’s due process regulation, the judgment of the Veterans Court is affirmed. AFFIRMED”
“Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Veterans Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED AND REMANDED”
“Because it did not misinterpret 38 C.F.R. § 3.318, the judgment of the Vet- erans Court is affirmed. AFFIRMED”
“Because the VA’s 1993 decision exhausted any duty it had to reconsider Mr. Blubaugh’s claim under § 3.156(c) in view of his DA Form 20, the judgment of the Veterans Court is affirmed. AFFIRMED”
“Accordingly, we reverse the Board’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED”
“Therefore, we affirm the Board’s decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. AFFIRMED”
“For the reasons above, we affirm the Board’s dismis- sal of Mr. Williams’s and Mr. Winns’s cases for lack of jurisdiction. AFFIRMED”
“We conclude that the revocation of the extension offer by the FDIC did not constitute a “removal” under § 7512. Thus, this court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Reddick’s appeal. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed. DISMISSED”
Put Judge Hughes's record to work
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Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Hughes's own signed orders and cites them.