Timothy B. Dyk
How Judge Dyk rules, drawn from 33 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Dyk decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He resolves statutory questions with close textual work, reading a disputed word in light of the surrounding provisions and the statute as a whole and treating the ordinary meaning of a term as controlling. In technical regulatory schemes he identifies the specific referent of an ambiguous term and holds to it, rather than defaulting to whichever reading a party prefers.
“The sole issue on appeal is whether PTE for a reissued patent should be calculated based on the is- sue date of the original patent or the reissued patent; in other words, whether the reference to ‘the patent’ in sub- section 156(c) is to the original patent or the reissued pa- tent. ... We hold that, in the context of reissued patents, the reference to ‘the patent’ in subsection 156(c) is to the original patent.”
He polices the boundary between eligible inventions and abstract ideas with a firm, doctrinally grounded rule: dressing up a known technique in a new setting does not make it patentable. He treats the application of an existing tool to a fresh field of use or database as a paradigm of ineligibility, not innovation.
“We have long recognized that ‘[a]n abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the invention to a particular field of use or technological environment.’”
In reviewing a trademark refusal, Dyk required the agency board to articulate a coherent failure-to-function standard rather than rely on intuition. Inconsistent past treatment and an unexplained evidentiary threshold prevented reasoned review even for a widely used expression.
“The Board’s reasoning sounds in fact very much as though it has taken an ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to failure-to-function refusals.”
In evaluating pension-benefit reductions as a regulatory taking, Dyk examined objectively reasonable expectations in light of the industry's history of regulation and repeated legislative intervention. A claimant should address what change could have been anticipated when the asserted property interest arose.
“Where these three factors are satisfied, plaintiffs lack a reasonable expectation to be free of the challenged government conduct.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces briefing and preservation rules strictly: an argument omitted from the opening brief and raised only in reply is forfeited and will go unaddressed, regardless of how it might have fared if timely presented.
“any argument that the Kickstarter campaign further disclosed the subject matter of the sale is forfeited because it was not raised in the opening brief.”
Dyk tested each asserted trade secret and confidentiality theory before allowing willfulness findings, royalties, exemplary damages, or an injunction to stand. Remedies dependent on misappropriation fall with the underlying proof that the information was legally protectable and contractually confidential.
“the jury’s trade-secret and breach-of-contract determinations were not supported by substantial evidence because each of the four asserted trade secrets was not protectable under California law and not confidential information under the NDA.”
Cautions
He enforces the limits on the court's own appellate jurisdiction rigorously. Where a lower tribunal has remanded for clarification rather than finally resolved the question presented, he treats the decision as non-final and declines to review it, refusing to let a party manufacture appellate jurisdiction by recasting an ordinary remand as a denial of a right to a decision without remand.
“In light of our decisions in Chavez and Adams, there can no longer be a colorable ar- gument here that remands for clarification are improper or that Mr. Ravin is entitled to a decision without remand. We therefore lack jurisdiction.”
He holds appellants to Article III standing even where a statute grants a right to appeal an agency ruling: a party that has no product on the market and faces only a speculative, hypothetical risk of suit lacks the concrete injury needed to appeal, and its appeal will be dismissed however strong its position on the merits.
“Because JTEKT lacks standing to appeal, we dismiss the appeal.”
In a patent-damages appeal, Dyk would not replace the royalty theory actually tried with a different causation theory that might have supported foreign-sales recovery. The jury instructions and verdict theory must preserve the legally valid route to the requested damages.
“We cannot reform the damages theory actually presented to the jury in favor of an alternative that was not, even if the alternative would have been legally valid.”
In a trade-secret case, Dyk treated generalized subjective testimony as insufficient to overcome objective evidence that the claimant knew or should have known the facts supporting misappropriation before the limitations cutoff. A plaintiff should document specific discovery facts and plead any concealment theory expressly.
“such generalized, conclusory testimony reflecting the subjective view of the witness (the opinion or ‘thinking’ of the witness) is insufficient evidence to support the verdict.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We affirm because the patents are directed to the abstract idea of using a generic machine learning technique in a particular environment, with no inventive concept. AFFIRMED”
“We vacate the judgment. We conclude that the as- serted claims are abstract at step one of the Alice analysis and that further proceedings on remand are required as to step two.”
“We thus affirm the district court’s holding that the PTO correctly calculated the RE’733 patent’s PTE.”
“We affirm the Board’s determination that claims 1–3 and 5–7 are unpatentable and reverse the Board’s determina- tion that claim 4 is not unpatentable.”
“We accordingly affirm as to Shockwave’s direct appeal and re- verse as to CSI’s cross-appeal.”
“We reverse, vacate, and re- mand.”
“We reject many of Mr. Brunetti’s arguments but nonetheless con- clude that the decision of the Board lacks sufficient clarity, and, accordingly, we vacate and remand for further pro- ceedings.”
“We vacate and remand.”
“We affirm the judgment of invalidity as to the asserted claims of the ’320 patent and the award of attorney’s fees. We also affirm the judgment of infringement as to the asserted claims of the ’855 patent.”
“We affirm the judgment of no in- validity, affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, and remand the judgment as to direct infringement. We va- cate and remand for a new trial on indirect infringement, compensatory damages, willful infringement, enhanced damages, and attorney’s fees.”
“The district court granted the PTO’s motion to dismiss, and Odyssey appealed. We affirm.”
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