Richard Linn
How Judge Linn decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He grounds patent claim construction in the intrinsic record, giving an undefined claim term its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by a person of ordinary skill and declining to broaden a term absent notice in the specification or prosecution history that the inventor intended a broader meaning.
“a claim term should not be read to encompass a broader definition in the absence of something in the written description and/or prosecution history to provide explicit or implicit notice to the public -- i.e., those of ordinary skill in the art -- that the inventor intended a disputed term to cover more than the ordinary and customary meaning revealed by the context of the intrinsic record.”
He insists that anticipation requires a single reference to disclose every element arranged or combined the same way as in the claim, refusing to let a fact-finder assemble a claimed invention by picking and combining separate teachings within one document -- differences, however slight, go to obviousness, not anticipation.
“unless a reference discloses within the four corners of the document not only all of the limitations claimed but also all of the limitations arranged or combined in the same way as recited in the claim, it cannot be said to prove prior invention of the thing claimed and, thus, cannot anticipate under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 102.”
Procedural preferences
He reads the standard of review as a real constraint, upholding agency and jury fact-findings that are supported by substantial evidence and reversing only where the tribunal committed legal error rather than merely reaching a debatable factual result.
“Because substantial evidence supports the jury verdict, we affirm the district court's denial of Microsoft's motion for JMOL of invalidity by anticipation.”
He allocates the burden of persuasion to the party seeking to disturb the status quo, holding that when a license forecloses an infringement counterclaim, the declaratory-judgment plaintiff -- not the patentee -- must prove its entitlement to relief.
“Because the declaratory judgment plaintiff is the only party seeking the aid of the court in the circumstances presented here, that party must bear the burden of persuasion.”
In the uniquely pro-claimant veterans-benefits system, he construes statutory deadlines with equitable flexibility, holding that a claimant's good-faith misfiling at the office where his claim originated tolls the appeal period rather than defeating review.
“Because Jaquay's misfiled request for reconsideration with the VA regional office from which his claim originated equitably tolled the judicial appeal period for filing his notice of appeal to the Veterans Court, the Veterans Court's dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded.”
Cautions
He tests the written-description requirement against the four corners of the specification, holding that a disclosure teaching one configuration does not convey possession of an undisclosed alternative, even one the disclosure might render obvious.
“The knowledge of ordinary artisans may be used to inform what is actually in the specification, but not to teach limitations that are not in the specification, even if those limitations would be rendered obvious by the disclosure in the specification.”
He requires a party attacking a patent to carry its statutory burden with the demanding proof the law assigns, holding that an interference-context rule for resolving a range of possible invention dates does not displace the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard needed to invalidate an issued patent.
“Evidence establishing that there might have been a prior conception is not sufficient to meet the clear and convincing burden needed to invalidate a patent.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because substantial evidence supports the Commission's holding that all asserted claims are invalid for lack of written description, we affirm.”
“The judgment that claims 11 and 12 of the '890 patent are invalid is AFFIRMED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
“Because Carsem failed to prove prior invention in the United States by clear and convincing evidence, this court reverses the Commission's determination that the '277 Patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 102(g)(2).”
“Because the district court abused its discretion by awarding fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927, we reverse.”
“Because the mandate rule forecloses the relief that Becton seeks, we affirm.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Because the Board's determinations to institute IPRs in this case are final and nonappealable under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 314(d), this court lacks jurisdiction and dismisses the appeals.”
“For the reasons set forth below, we affirm-in-part, vacate-in-part, reverse-in-part, and remand.”
“Because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Taiwanese company purposefully directed any activities beyond merely sending notice letters at residents of the forum and that the declaratory judgment action arose out of or related to those activities, we affirm the district court's dismissal of all claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
“Because the Board erred in construing the means-plus-function limitation of claims 11 and 21 and because there is no permissible construction, this court affirms the rejection of claims 11 and 21 on the alternative ground of failure to satisfy the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. Sec. 112 para. 2.”
“AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED”
Put Judge Linn's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Linn actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Linn's own signed orders and cites them.