Kathleen P. March

“Judgment on this adversary proceeding, for Plaintiff and against Debtor, has been signed by the Court this date as a separate document.”

“OPINION RE ORDERS GRANTING LAM MOTIONS IN PART AND DENYING LAM MOTIONS IN PART”

“This Opinion constitutes this Court’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on this Court’s Order of this same date (1) Granting Remand Pursuant to This Court’s Order to Show Cause Why Removed Action Should Not Be Remanded, and (2) Denying Plaintiff Mitchell’s Motion to Transfer Venue of Removed Lawsuit to the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California.”

“This Court finds that Debtors’ bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), on the ground that Debtors’ petition was filed in ‘bad faith’. Alternatively, this Court dismisses this ease pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1), on the ground that ‘the interests of creditors and the debtor[s] would be better served by dismissal.’”

“The Court overrules the Creditors’ Committee’s objection to 34 of the 6,977 claims filed by the limited partners; and sustains the objection as to the remaining 6,943 claims filed by the limited partners here objected to, as follows:”

“Regarding the remaining 34 claims, which were not disallowed pursuant to the Creditors’ Committee’s objection, the Court denies the motion to subordinate as to 31 of the 34 claims, and grants the motion to subordinate as to 3 of the 34 claims, as follows:”

“For all these reasons, the Court grants the Committee’s motion to transfer the substantive question regarding the proper scope of the subpoena to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, for all further proceedings regarding the scope of the subpoena.”

“The portion of Plaintiff Miller’s motion seeking summary judgment that all the businesses, real property and personal property were community property as of the date of the petition is denied, with one exception. The exception is that the Court grants summary adjudication in favor of Plaintiff Miller and against defendant Walpin holding that the interests that Miller and Walpin had in the businesses Roloke Co., Pleasing Patients and Wishing You Well were community property on the date the bankruptcy case was filed, subject to Plaintiff Miller and Defendant Walpin’s claims against the community for contributions made to these three businesses post-separation.”

“Because Defendant Walpin’s motion for summary judgment asks the Court to rule that none of Defendant’s property became property of the estate pursuant to Section 541(a)(2), Defendant Walpin’s motion is denied.”

“Substantive consolidation of the five debtors’ estates, with terms of substantive consolidation to be as itemized in Part I, Subpart D, Items 564-66 supra, is hereby ordered in each of the five cases, pursuant to the motions to substantively consolidate brought by each of the five debtors in possession.”

“For all of these reasons, the present Chapter 7 case meets the ‘good faith’ test. Under these circumstances, it makes much more sense to liquidate Debtor in an orderly way under Chapter 7, with classes of creditors to be paid pro rata pursuant to the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, than to deny bankruptcy protection to the Debtor, merely because the original Chapter 11 case is still open.”

“Based upon the foregoing I find and conclude that debtor is not entitled to summary judgment under either Section 523(a)(8)(A) or 523(a)(8)(B).”

“The Court grants summary judgment in favor of plaintiff Sophos against Mr. Hibbs, holding that the federal copyright infringement judgment in favor of Sophos is nondis-chargeable.”

“Mr. Hibbs’ cross-motion seeking summary judgment of dischargeability is denied.”

“The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Hibbs against plaintiff Sophos, holding that the federal copyright infringement judgment in favor of Sophos is dis-chargeable as to debtor Mrs. Hibbs.”

“Sophos’ cross-motion for summary judgment against Mrs. Hibbs is denied.”

“The trustee’s objection is overruled regarding debtor’s right to claim a homestead exemption in the dwelling, but is partially sustained regarding the amount of the exemption, since the proper amount of the exemption is $30,000.00, not the $45,000.00 claimed.”

“Because the Court has held that neither the ownership interest nor the beneficial interest in the annuity is exempt, for the reasons stated in part III C, supra, this Court does not need to reach, and does not reach, the questions of (1) whether the conveyance is fraudulent under either California Civil Code § 3439.04(a) or (b); or (2) whether, if the annuity were held to have been purchased by a conveyance that was fraudulent, that fact, or debtor’s whole course of conduct, would constitute actual fraud or extrinsic fraud so as to constitute a sufficient ground to deny the exemption.”