William Alan Fletcher
How Judge Fletcher rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Fletcher
William A. Fletcher is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Fletcher received a commission on October 9, 1998. Judge Fletcher assumed senior status on January 24, 2022.
Judge Fletcher's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Fletcher's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Fletcher decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Requires a particularized showing before restricting access to discovered information.
“A district court must find ‘good cause’ before issuing a protective order restricting access to discovered information.”
In Gemini Technologies v. Smith & Wesson, Fletcher held that the contract’s forum-selection clause was unenforceable because it conflicted with an Idaho statute expressing a strong state public policy, and remanded for ordinary forum non conveniens analysis.
“We hold that the forum-selection clause at issue here contravenes the strong public policy announced by Idaho Code § 29-110(1) and is therefore unenforceable.”
In a criminal case, Fletcher required evidence satisfying the precise statutory meaning of an essential value element. Proof that property had archaeological importance could not substitute for proof of value under the charged theft statute.
“Because the government introduced no evidence other than ‘archaeological value’ to prove that Ligón and Mizell stole something of ‘value’ belonging to the government in violation of § 641, the district court should have granted their motions for acquittal.”
In a Chapter 13 case, Fletcher read a later statutory provision as a targeted exception permitting modification of a short-term home-secured claim. A plan proponent should tie the proposed treatment to the claim's payment schedule and the exception's specific text.
“§ 1322(c)(2), enacted after Nobelman was decided, creates an exception to § 1322(b)(2) for claims that are paid off during the life of the bankruptcy plan.”
Fletcher treated allegations of fabricated evidence and other bad-faith police conduct as capable of reopening probable cause despite an earlier preliminary-hearing determination. A civil-rights plaintiff should identify the specific misrepresentation or manipulation rather than merely relitigate the prior finding.
“Scafidi’s allegations of ‘fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith’ create a triable issue of material fact as to probable cause.”
In United States v. Henrikson, Fletcher held that the death-results element of the murder-for-hire statute did not inherit the intent requirement of another element, so the offense was not categorically a crime of violence; he directed vacatur of two convictions.
“we believe it is improper to ‘carry forward’ the mens rea requirement of some elements of § 1958(a) to the separate death-results element.”
Procedural preferences
In Bolin v. Baker, Fletcher reversed denial of a habeas stay and remanded because the district court had applied the wrong standard to Bolin’s request to exhaust claims in state court.
“We reverse and remand for the court to apply the proper standard in ruling on Bolin’s Rhines motion.”
In Nevin v. Colvin, Fletcher held that an administrative law judge could reopen an earlier disability determination after two years only for fraud or similar fault under the governing regulations, and directed an award on Nevin’s second benefits application.
“Under the regulations, the only ground on which the ALJ could have reopened after two years lapsed was ‘fraud or similar fault.’”
When enforcing a foreign judgment, Fletcher treated a voluntary merits appearance as a waiver of personal jurisdiction even though the defendant also preserved a jurisdictional objection. A party seeking to contest jurisdiction should limit its participation to that defense until the issue is resolved.
“We hold that Rejuvi waived its personal jurisdiction defense under the Uniform Act by voluntarily appearing in the South Australian district court in an attempt to set aside the 2016 default judgment.”
In Asuncion v. Hegseth, Fletcher held that the filing period began when counsel could access the agency’s decrypted decision, and that counsel’s documented efforts also supported equitable tolling; he reversed dismissal as untimely.
“We hold that the 90-day limitation period did not begin until Luiz could realistically be held responsible for having access to the FAD and learning what the agency had decided.”
In Ibarra-Perez v. United States, Fletcher separated the jurisdictional question from the merits: the appeal concerned whether the district court could hear the claim, rather than whether Ibarra-Perez would ultimately prevail.
“The merits of Ibarra-Perez’s case are not before us. The question before us is whether the district court has jurisdiction to decide those merits.”
Cautions
In Johnson v. Myers, Fletcher affirmed denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment because, viewing disputed facts in the plaintiffs’ favor, officers shot a man who had stopped, raised his hand in response to their command, and had not threatened them.
“Viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Appellees, Officers Myers and Beecroft are not entitled to qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment.”
In a consumer-arbitration appeal, Fletcher required a plaintiff to establish standing for each challenged fee and remanded when the trial court had not addressed whether she actually paid one of them. Pleading a class theory does not replace concrete proof that the named plaintiff suffered the particular charge.
“The district court did not address the issue of Spruell’s standing to challenge the $1.99 expedited payment fee in its order denying RAC’s motion to compel arbitration. We remand to allow the district court to do so.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The decision of the Benefits Review Board is AFFIRMED.”
“We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.”
“AFFIRM the decision of the district court.”
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