Susan P. Graber
How Judge Graber rules, drawn from 52 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Graber
Susan Graber is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Graber received a commission on March 19, 1998. Judge Graber assumed senior status on December 15, 2021.
Judge Graber's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Graber's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Graber decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an immigration reopening case, Graber began with the regulation's grammar and ordinary meaning. Because the applicant sought reconsideration of the same asylum basis and attached the original application, the text did not require a newly completed application.
“The plain and unambiguous text of § 1003.2(c)(1) does not require someone in Petitioner's shoes to attach a new application for relief to a motion to reopen.”
In applying the categorical approach to a California carjacking conviction, Graber examined the minimum force sufficient under state decisions. Because the offense could be committed with force below the federal violent-force threshold, it did not categorically qualify as a crime of violence.
“California's carjacking statute thus does not require the violent force that Johnson demands of a crime of violence.”
In a warrantless-entry case, Graber assessed whether a pursuit remained continuous by examining both the officers' knowledge of the suspect's location and whether they kept acting promptly after losing sight of him. A nine-minute search and coordination period did not break the chase on the undisputed record.
“In sum, on this record there is no genuine issue of material fact suggesting that the continuity of the chase was broken before Underhill entered Plaintiff's home.”
In Davis, Graber separately reasoned that Strickland applied to formal noncapital sentencing with findings that set the sentence.
“In my view, the best way to read the Supreme Court’s two cases together is to say that Strickland applies to a noncapital sentencing that is ‘formal’ and that involves findings or con- clusions that provide a standard for the imposition of sen- tence.”
Procedural preferences
In a disability-benefits appeal, Graber required the hypothetical presented to the vocational expert to match the claimant's assessed limitations precisely. Dropping the word 'short' from a limitation to short, simple instructions materially expanded the hypothetical person's capacity and was not harmless.
“We hold only that, because the ALJ omitted the qualifying adjective ‘short’ when posing the question to the vocational expert, thereby describing a hypothetical person with greater functional capacity than Claimant possesses, the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational expert's testimony, and the error was not harmless.”
In Dela Cruz, Graber concurred in denying the petitions while noting that the immigration board retained discretion to reopen proceedings on its own motion.
“I write separately to point out that the BIA may reopen a proceeding, sua sponte, at any time.”
In Carson, Graber partly dissented because she found the district court had not adequately explained the hourly rate used in its attorney fee award.
“But I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the district court sufficiently explained its determination of the hourly rate, and from its conclusion that there was no evidence of any other applicable rate.”
Cautions
In a vagueness challenge to an immigration statute, Graber followed directly controlling precedent despite later decisions that questioned some of its reasoning. A three-judge panel could distinguish those later cases but could not treat the on-point holding as displaced.
“First, we are obliged to follow on-point Supreme Court precedent—here, Jordan—even if later Supreme Court cases cast some doubt on its general reasoning.”
In a Social Security appeal, Graber held that an administrative law judge had to explain the rejection of a partner’s lay account of the claimant’s physical limitations. The absence of any reason was harmful where the account supplied details that could affect the disability decision.
“Here, the ALJ gave no reason, germane or otherwise, and thereby legally erred. The error was not harmless.”
In Harris, Graber dissented from the sentencing ruling because an alternative view of the facts did not itself make the district court’s findings clearly erroneous.
“But that is not the question that we must answer. As noted above, we must uphold the district court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and the existence of an alternative view does not make findings clearly erroneous.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Reviewing de novo ... we uphold the statute against this Second Amendment challenge.”
“We now deny the petition for review.”
“On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the panel granted Pedro Madrigal-Barcenas' petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision finding him inadmissible on the ground that his Nevada state law conviction for possessing drug paraphernalia constituted a conviction for violation of a law relating to a controlled substance.”
“We review de novo ... and reverse and remand. We hold that federal, rather than California, privilege law applies.”
“Petition GRANTED; REMANDED.”
“Petition DISMISSED as to the United States Merit Systems Protection Board; as to the United States Department of the Army, petition DENIED in part, GRANTED in part, and REMANDED.”
“Affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant in an action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, the panel held that the plaintiff consented to receive quality assurance calls when she signed a health insurance enrollment form.”
“Petition DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part.”
“Petition DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.”
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