Richard A. Paez
How Judge Paez rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Paez decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a sentencing-enhancement case, Paez interpreted an undefined weapons term by its statutory neighbors and modern military usage. Reading "missile" to include any thrown object would give the statute unintended breadth, while the surrounding references to bombs, rockets, and mines supported a self-propelled-device definition.
“Applying the well-established doctrine of noscitur a sociis—the principle that ‘a word is known by the company it keeps’—we conclude that the definition of missile in the statute should be the modern military definition rather than the overbroad generic definition.”
In a federal construction-payment case, Paez kept the remedial right uniform across states. California's contractor-license restriction could govern state collection actions but could not condition or nullify the subcontractor remedy Congress created for federal projects.
“We therefore hold that the limitation in California Business and Professions Code § 7031(a) on the right of a non-licensed contractor to maintain an action for collection of unpaid services does not apply to an action under the Miller Act.”
In an asylum case, Paez required the agency to confront highly probative evidence rather than rely on a catchall assurance that the record was considered. The attackers' words, a contemporaneous police report, and the police's admission that they could not protect the applicant materially bore on nexus and government control.
“Where the BIA fails to consider highly probative record evidence, its ‘decision cannot stand.’”
In a witness-retaliation case, Paez treated intervening Supreme Court reasoning as abrogating a circuit rule that limited claims to parties hampered in presenting a case. Employment retaliation against a nonparty witness was a cognizable injury because protecting witnesses from intimidation was the statute's target.
“A plaintiff asserting conspiracy under section 1985(2) need not show that the party in the original proceeding was hampered in presenting an effective case; interference with a witness’s employment is a cognizable injury for section 1985(2) purposes.”
Procedural preferences
In a bench-trial case, Paez held that issuing guilt only in writing could not substitute for announcing the finding in a public proceeding. Public access to a docketed order did not preserve contemporaneous observation or the accountability served by the Sixth Amendment's public-trial guarantee.
“The requirement that findings of guilt be announced in open court vindicates core constitutional and human values.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We affirm the district court's denial of Close's and the other habeas petitions. ... AFFIRMED.”
“we hold that the definition of a missile under 26 U.S.C. Section 5845(f) and U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(3)(A) is a self-propelled device designed to deliver an explosive. Therefore, the district court erred ... VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing.”
“we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to Candelaria and CCIC. Because the California licensing requirement is not a defense to a claim under the Miller Act ... REVERSED AND REMANDED.”
“For the reasons stated above, we grant Chandra's petition and remand to the BIA for further proceedings. PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.”
“The district court's dismissal order is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hertler's postrevocation sentence of twenty months of supervised release. AFFIRMED.”
“It was error for AETNA and the district court to conclude that LeGras's administrative appeal was untimely. We reverse and remand ... REVERSED AND REMANDED.”
“The Tulalip did not meet its burden to show that the contested areas in this subproceeding should be excluded from Suquamish's usual and accustomed fishing grounds. Therefore, we affirm the district court's judgment. AFFIRMED.”
“As Acevedo makes no other challenge, we deny the petition. PETITION DENIED.”
“The judgment is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.”
“We ... deny the application as unnecessary and transfer the matter to the district court with instructions to treat Clayton's habeas petition as a first petition.”
“Although the bankruptcy court correctly found that the Meyers engaged in fraudulent transfers and, therefore, actual fraud, to DZ Bank's detriment, the court limited relief to $123,200 ... This was error. ... REVERSED and REMANDED.”
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