Richard A. Paez

In a sentencing-enhancement case, Paez interpreted an undefined weapons term by its statutory neighbors and modern military usage. Reading "missile" to include any thrown object would give the statute unintended breadth, while the surrounding references to bombs, rockets, and mines supported a self-propelled-device definition.

“Applying the well-established doctrine of noscitur a sociis—the principle that ‘a word is known by the company it keeps’—we conclude that the definition of missile in the statute should be the modern military definition rather than the overbroad generic definition.”

In a federal construction-payment case, Paez kept the remedial right uniform across states. California's contractor-license restriction could govern state collection actions but could not condition or nullify the subcontractor remedy Congress created for federal projects.

“We therefore hold that the limitation in California Business and Professions Code § 7031(a) on the right of a non-licensed contractor to maintain an action for collection of unpaid services does not apply to an action under the Miller Act.”

In an asylum case, Paez required the agency to confront highly probative evidence rather than rely on a catchall assurance that the record was considered. The attackers' words, a contemporaneous police report, and the police's admission that they could not protect the applicant materially bore on nexus and government control.

“In concluding that Meza Diaz had not presented any evidence of a link between the home invasion and her family history, the agency failed to consider the attackers’ statement or the additional evidence presented in the police report in making its nexus determination.”

In a witness-retaliation case, Paez treated intervening Supreme Court reasoning as abrogating a circuit rule that limited claims to parties hampered in presenting a case. Employment retaliation against a nonparty witness was a cognizable injury because protecting witnesses from intimidation was the statute's target.

“A plaintiff asserting conspiracy under section 1985(2) need not show that the party in the original proceeding was hampered in presenting an effective case; interference with a witness’s employment is a cognizable injury for section 1985(2) purposes.”

In Codoni, Paez held that the Clean Air Act preempted state-law claims about aircraft emissions where the plaintiffs did not allege a violation of federal emission standards. A state-law theory parallel to federal standards required at least a pleaded federal violation; the complaint did not supply one.

“a plaintiff seeking to enforce federal standards with state law claims must at least allege a violation of federal law.”