Morgan Christen
How Judge Christen rules, drawn from 39 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Christen decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a firearm-predicate case, Christen applied the categorical approach to the least conduct covered by Montana's assault statute rather than the defendant's actual conduct. Because state law defined bodily injury to include purely emotional harm, the offense did not necessarily require the physical-force element in the federal definition.
“Because Montana’s PFMA statute can be violated by inflicting emotional rather than physical injury, we conclude that it does not ‘ha[ve], as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force.’”
In a marital-privilege case, Christen kept the communications privilege analytically distinct from the testimonial privilege. The government offered no convincing basis to import a narrow sham-marriage exception where the protected communications occurred during a valid marriage and the exception's established rationale did not fit.
“The government bears the burden to persuade us that the sham marriage exception should be extended, and it has offered no convincing reason to modify this longstanding rule.”
In a prosthetics-coverage case, Christen read an amendment together with the offer-of-coverage language the legislature retained. Requiring replacement devices within whatever coverage a plan offered did not silently convert the provision into a mandate to cover every medically necessary type of prosthesis.
“The legislature’s decision to retain the requirement that plans ‘shall offer coverage’ subject to mutually agreeable terms and conditions is consistent with PacifiCare’s view that the 1991 amendment is limited to requiring that, whatever prosthetics coverage is offered by a plan, it must include original and replacement devices.”
In her Thakur concurrence, Christen treated the nature of the claim as controlling under the Tucker Act; a grant-based claim did not become noncontractual merely because the plaintiff lacked privity with the government.
“NIH tells us that such a claim is contractual, and the claim does not become non-contractual in nature merely because it is brought by a party that is not in privity with the government.”
In the en banc longshore dispute, Christen prioritized the statutory mechanism for conclusively assigning disputed work and rejected a defense that would let a union circumvent the Board’s assignment.
“Allowing the ILA work-preservation defense to defeat a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge for failing to abide by a § 10(k) decision would frustrate the scheme Congress enacted to conclusively resolve jurisdictional disputes.”
Procedural preferences
In a railroad retaliation trial, Christen measured the jury instruction against the statute's burden rather than an employer's honest-belief defense. A worker proved retaliatory intent by showing that protected activity contributed in any way to the adverse action; no separate intent showing was required.
“There is no requirement, at either the prima facie stage or the substantive stage, that a plaintiff make any additional showing of discriminatory intent.”
Cautions
In an extradition case, Christen limited judicial review of a torture determination to competent evidence that the authorized executive official made the determination required by regulation. Once compliance was shown, separation of powers and the rule of non-inquiry foreclosed review of the decision's substance.
“The doctrine of separation of powers and the rule of non-inquiry block any inquiry into the substance of the Secretary’s declaration.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Reversing the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss a civil rights complaint and remanding, the panel held that government officials are absolutely immune from civil liability for the decision not to extradite or to request only limited extradition of a criminal defendant.”
“Due to an intervening change in the law, we vacate the entire sentence imposed by the district court, and remand for re-sentencing.”
“We grant the petition and remand this case to the Board.”
“Appeal No. 12-55715 is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART. Appeal No. 12-56796 is DISMISSED.”
“For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order granting summary judgment for PacifiCare.”
“Affirming a sentence, the panel held that attempted robbery under California Penal Code Section 211 is a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act ... AFFIRMED.”
“The panel vacated a sentence and remanded for resentencing ... because, in light of a post-sentencing amendment to the application notes to U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1, the Government improperly withheld a motion for a third-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.”
“The panel reversed the district court's order denying Mark Foley's motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the 2004 denial of his habeas corpus petition ... The panel remanded for further proceedings.”
“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291 and we reverse Boitano's felony convictions.”
“The panel affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus under the Administrative Procedure Act ... AFFIRMED.”
Draft for Judge Christen with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Christen, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Christen's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace