M. Margaret McKeown
How Judge McKeown rules, drawn from 49 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge McKeown decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She rejects statutory readings that disregard enacted text or make another provision superfluous.
“Ragasa’s contrary view rests on an interpretation of the statute that ignores the statutory text and renders Section 320(b) superfluous.”
In contract and insurance interpretation, she begins with the ordinary meaning of the operative language and lets the chosen word control the coverage analysis.
“Does ‘any’ mean ‘any,’ or does ‘any’ mean ‘any one’? The answer to this seemingly simple question dictates the result in this insurance coverage case, which arises from the alleged sexual abuse of adolescent males by priests in the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix (‘the Diocese’).”
For online arbitration terms, she requires reasonable notice and an unambiguous manifestation of assent before treating the user as bound.
“Because Huuuge did not provide reasonable notice of its Terms of Use (‘Terms’), Wilson did not unambiguously manifest assent to the terms and conditions or the imbedded arbitration provision.”
For public access to electronic court filings, she treats receipt of the complaint—not completion of clerk processing—as the point when the right attaches and requires the state to justify any resulting delay under rigorous scrutiny.
“We reaffirm that the First Amendment right of public access to judicial documents attaches at the time that a complaint is filed by the litigant—or put differently, is received by the court—and not when the document is deemed filed or accepted by court administrative rule.”
Procedural preferences
She treats consent as a strict limit on a magistrate judge's authority to enter judgment, invalidating a judgment entered without both parties' consent.
“Because the magistrate judge entered judgment on behalf of the district court without the parties’ consent, the judgment was invalid.”
She does not extend the liberal construction afforded unrepresented laypeople to practicing attorneys who appear on their own behalf.
“That logic does not apply to practicing attorneys, nor should the grace extend to them.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Under the circumstances of this case, affirmative consent was required for the magistrate judge to proceed and thus he exceeded his authority under the ‘additional duties’ clause of the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.”
“Thus, because the ADEA does not apply to the Tribe’s employment relationship with Grant, we conclude that the Tribe need not comply with the subpoena. ... We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.”
“We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Lin’s habeas petition. This result does not, however, mean that Lin will be released automatically. Instead, on remand Lin will be entitled to supervised release if he can demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of his removal to China in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
“Because the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings and did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement, we affirm.”
“Because the juvenile is Indian by blood and easily meets three of the most important factors used to evaluate tribal recognition laid out in United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), he is an ‘Indian’ under § 1153, and we uphold his conviction.”
“We join our sister circuits in holding that ... upon revocation of an initial term of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) does not bar the imposition of a subsequent lifetime term of supervised release, even when accompanied by a term of imprisonment.”
“Because the government has not carried its burden of proving Ragasa’s removability by clear and convincing evidence, we grant the petition and vacate the order of removal. ... PETITION GRANTED.”
“Because Nevada has rejected the prison mailbox rule for the filing of state habeas corpus petitions, the state petition was not ‘properly filed’ and petitioner was not entitled to tolling until the date that the state district court filed the pro se state habeas petition ...”
“Because the magistrate judge entered judgment on behalf of the district court without the parties’ consent, the judgment was invalid. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to vacate the invalid judgment and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We reverse the district court’s judgment in favor of the Diocese, and vacate and remand its grant of attorneys’ fees and taxable costs.”
“The panel dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction an appeal from the district court’s order dismissing claims arising when financial institution ANB Financial failed. ... because the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, that court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”
“[We] reversed the district court’s denial of appellant’s anti-SLAPP motion to strike claims because appellee Michael Schwern failed to establish a prima facie case supported by substantial evidence of his claims of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with economic relations.”
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