M. Margaret McKeown
How Judge McKeown rules, drawn from 62 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge McKeown
M. Margaret McKeown is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge McKeown received a commission on April 8, 1998. Judge McKeown assumed senior status on September 15, 2022.
Judge McKeown's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge McKeown's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge McKeown decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Ragasa v. Holder, McKeown rejected Ragasa’s reading of the immigration statute because it ignored the text and made Section 320(b) superfluous, but granted his petition because the government had not proved that his conviction involved a federally listed controlled substance.
“Ragasa’s contrary view rests on an interpretation of the statute that ignores the statutory text and renders Section 320(b) superfluous.”
In Interstate Fire & Casualty v. Diocese of Phoenix, McKeown applied the insurance policy’s wording under Arizona law and held that the assault and battery exclusion barred coverage even for innocent co-insureds.
“Does ‘any’ mean ‘any,’ or does ‘any’ mean ‘any one’? The answer to this seemingly simple question dictates the result in this insurance coverage case, which arises from the alleged sexual abuse of adolescent males by priests in the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Phoenix (‘the Diocese’).”
In Wilson v. Huuuge, McKeown affirmed denial of the app developer’s motion to compel arbitration because its terms were buried in the app’s settings and Wilson had neither reasonable notice nor manifested assent.
“Because Huuuge did not provide reasonable notice of its Terms of Use (‘Terms’), Wilson did not unambiguously manifest assent to the terms and conditions or the imbedded arbitration provision.”
For public access to electronic court filings, she treats receipt of the complaint—not completion of clerk processing—as the point when the right attaches and requires the state to justify any resulting delay under rigorous scrutiny.
“We reaffirm that the First Amendment right of public access to judicial documents attaches at the time that a complaint is filed by the litigant—or put differently, is received by the court—and not when the document is deemed filed or accepted by court administrative rule.”
In the tribal sports-contract dispute, McKeown read federal commodities and tribal gaming statutes together. Exchange regulation did not foreclose a separate claim about gaming offered on tribal land, so counsel defending these contracts should address both statutory regimes.
“In short, the CEA may grant the Commission sole sway over its own field, but it neither negates IGRA nor bars federal courts from hearing a claim under it.”
In Courthouse News Service, McKeown separately argued that delays in public access to filed complaints should face strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.
“The right therefore falls within the heart of the First Amendment’s coverage. And because it exists in that heartland, potential violations of the right should be evaluated under strict scrutiny.”
In Grocery Outlet, McKeown concurred in affirming the preliminary injunction but concluded that trademark abandonment should be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than a higher standard.
“The statute does not impose a burden beyond the traditional pre- ponderance of the evidence standard applicable in civil mat- ters.”
Procedural preferences
In Allen v. Meyer, McKeown remanded with instructions to vacate a magistrate judge’s judgment because the judge had entered it without consent from both parties.
“Because the magistrate judge entered judgment on behalf of the district court without the parties’ consent, the judgment was invalid.”
She does not extend the liberal construction afforded unrepresented laypeople to practicing attorneys who appear on their own behalf.
“That logic does not apply to practicing attorneys, nor should the grace extend to them.”
In disability review, McKeown required the agency to account for the claimant’s full work history and daily activity evidence before using those facts to discount her testimony. Continued work during a worsening condition did not itself undermine her claim.
“a past ability to work through pain can be entirely consistent with testimony of worsening impairments that become disabling over time.”
In Martinez, McKeown questioned appellate jurisdiction over denial of a California anti-SLAPP motion before final judgment absent district-court certification.
“In sum, because anti-SLAPP motions to strike require the court to assess the merits of a plaintiff’s claims and are not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, I join many of my colleagues and two of our sister circuits in concluding that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider denials of such motions on interlocutory appeal absent certification from the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”
In Palmer, McKeown partly dissented because the district court had conditioned remote witness testimony on the prisoner’s waiver of a jury trial.
“Because the district court presented Palmer with an unconsti- tutional condition, I respectfully dissent.”
Cautions
In Valdez-Novoa, McKeown dissented because she concluded the panel demanded too much proof of prejudice from an immigration judge’s failure to advise the defendant about voluntary departure.
“I write separately because the majority elevates our benchmark for prejudice, the ‘plausibility’ inquiry, to the higher standard of either preponderance or probability. Because it is plausible that the IJ would have exercised discretion to grant voluntary departure, I would reverse the district court’s judgment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Under the circumstances of this case, affirmative consent was required for the magistrate judge to proceed and thus he exceeded his authority under the ‘additional duties’ clause of the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.”
“Thus, because the ADEA does not apply to the Tribe’s employment relationship with Grant, we conclude that the Tribe need not comply with the subpoena. ... We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.”
“We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of Lin’s habeas petition. This result does not, however, mean that Lin will be released automatically. Instead, on remand Lin will be entitled to supervised release if he can demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of his removal to China in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
“Because the district court did not clearly err in its factual findings and did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement, we affirm.”
“Because the juvenile is Indian by blood and easily meets three of the most important factors used to evaluate tribal recognition laid out in United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), he is an ‘Indian’ under § 1153, and we uphold his conviction.”
“We hold that upon revocation of an initial term of supervised release, § 3583(h) does not bar the imposition of a subsequent lifetime term of supervised release, even when accompanied by a term of imprisonment. AFFIRMED.”
“Because the government has not carried its burden of proving Ragasa’s removability by clear and convincing evidence, we grant the petition and vacate the order of removal. ... PETITION GRANTED.”
“Because Nevada has rejected the prison mailbox rule for the filing of state habeas corpus petitions, the state petition was not ‘properly filed’ and petitioner was not entitled to tolling until the date that the state district court filed the pro se state habeas petition ...”
“Because the magistrate judge entered judgment on behalf of the district court without the parties’ consent, the judgment was invalid. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to vacate the invalid judgment and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We reverse the district court’s judgment in favor of the Diocese, and vacate and remand its grant of attorneys’ fees and taxable costs.”
“subject-matter jurisdiction from the start, this case must be dismissed.”
“In sum, because Schwern failed to establish a prima facie case through substantial evidence, Plunkett was entitled to relief under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP law. We reverse and instruct the district court to grant Plunkett’s motion to strike.”
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