Lawrence J. C. VanDyke
How Judge VanDyke rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge VanDyke decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a removal-jurisdiction case, VanDyke applied the statute to the action actually challenged rather than the label attached to the claim. A request to halt execution of an existing removal order fell within Congress's express bar on review of the Attorney General's decision to execute such orders.
“The execution of his removal order is precisely what Matias challenges here.”
In a wrongful-foreclosure removal case, VanDyke confined the removal statute to parties named as defendants. Practical convenience could not justify a judge-made real-party exception that the text omitted and that created uncertainty about when an unnamed party's removal deadline would begin.
“If Congress meant to allow a ‘real party defendant in interest’ to remove an action on behalf of a named defendant, it could have written the statute that way.”
In a California indemnity case, VanDyke reconsidered an older circuit interpretation after later state appellate decisions uniformly rejected it. On state-law questions, the federal court's duty to apply current state law permitted departure from its prior prediction when subsequent state authority showed that prediction was wrong.
“Circuit precedent interpreting state law, therefore, ‘is only binding in the absence of any subsequent indication from the California courts that our interpretation was incorrect.’”
In a school-zone firearm prosecution, VanDyke combined a plausible statutory-license reading with constitutional avoidance, lenity, and the presumption of scienter. The state statute expressly claimed compliance with the federal exception, local officers said the conduct was lawful, and no prior decision supplied contrary notice.
“Here, the rule of lenity, the presumption in favor of scienter, and the principles articulated in Rehaif coalesce around one central point: fair notice.”
In his Pover dissent, VanDyke read the plan’s list of barred “class, collective or representative” suits contextually, treating neighboring words as defining the type of representative action the provision covered.
“A phrase is given more precise content by its association with neighboring words.”
Procedural preferences
In his Knife Rights rehearing dissent, VanDyke argued that automatically vacating a panel opinion upon en banc review can create incentives for a government defendant to amend the challenged law and moot the case before merits review.
“As I explained then, our court’s practice of automatically vacating panel opinions creates obvious perverse incentives for government defendants.”
Cautions
In a petition to confirm an arbitration award, VanDyke required the jurisdictional facts to appear on the petition itself. A court could not look through a zero-dollar award to the value of the underlying defamation dispute to satisfy the diversity amount in controversy.
“Because a ‘look through’ approach is prohibited under Badgerow, the facts establishing a jurisdictional basis must be present on the face of the application or petition to confirm an arbitration award.”
In his Theis dissent, VanDyke argued that student exposure alone does not automatically convert a public-school employee’s personal expression into government speech; he favored a specific, fact-intensive inquiry.
“Instead, a specific and fact-intensive inquiry is required to determine if a school employee’s speech is a personal expression or speech on behalf of the state.”
In his Trigueros Quizar dissent, VanDyke argued that accepting an immigration petitioner’s factual statement as true should not require the agency to disregard more persuasive contrary evidence.
“After today, the deem-true rule requires the agency not only to accept Trigueros’s statement as true, but also to allow that statement to override all evidence to the contrary.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed below, we deny the petition for review.”
“The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded in a trademark infringement action.”
“Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in reaching that conclusion, and that determination alone was sufficient to deny the petition ... we ... deny his petition for review.”
“The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Nationstar Mortgage LLC in a diversity action alleging claims arising from a nonjudicial foreclosure by a homeowners' association on real property in Nevada.”
“Because Webb's state law claims seek to impose the requirements of her retained water protocol in addition to Trader Joe's FSIS-required protocol, her claims are preempted. ... we affirm the district court's dismissal with prejudice.”
“The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment confirming an arbitration award concerning the parties' joint venture agreement to operate a celebrity bus tour.”
“The panel reversed the district court's summary judgment that was entered in favor of the 732 Hardy Way Trust, its denial of summary judgment to the Bank of New York Mellon, and its dismissal of the Bank's claims against a Homeowners Association in a quiet title action.”
“We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Paradise High School and Paradise Unified School District.”
“With jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1291, we affirm the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”
“The panel reversed the district court's order denying, on summary judgment, qualified immunity to Benjamin Miller, an assistant city attorney for the City of Eugene, Oregon, in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.”
“The panel reversed the district court's judgment in favor of Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company in an ERISA action brought by Bristol SL Holdings, Inc., and remanded.”
“Reversing the district court's dismissal of a wrongful foreclosure action and remanding, the panel held that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion to remand the action to the state court from which it had been removed to federal court by a party not named in the complaint.”
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