Kim McLane Wardlaw
How Judge Wardlaw rules, drawn from 43 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Wardlaw
Kim McLane Wardlaw is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Wardlaw received a commission on August 3, 1998. Judge Wardlaw previously served on the United States District Court for the Central District of California, commissioned there on December 26, 1995.
Judge Wardlaw's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Wardlaw's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Wardlaw decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an excessive-force case, Wardlaw evaluated the particular device and circumstances instead of treating every nonlethal option as equivalent. The taser's pain, physiological effects, and risk of an uncontrolled fall made it significant intermediate force that required a correspondingly strong governmental interest.
“Rather than relying on broad characterizations, we must evaluate the nature of the specific force employed in a specific factual situation.”
In a negligent-design case involving an online platform, Wardlaw identified the legal duty by the defendant's challenged capacity. A claim directed at the platform's own product architecture did not become a publication claim merely because user content was part of the causal setting.
“The duty to design a reasonably safe product is fully independent of Snap’s role in monitoring or publishing third-party content.”
In a vehicle-search case, Wardlaw applied the Fourth Amendment's property-based test in addition to reasonable-expectation doctrine. Physically using a key on a vehicle to learn whether a suspect controlled it was itself an information-gathering search.
“Applying Jones’s property-based analysis, we must conclude that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when an officer physically inserts a key into the lock of a vehicle for the purpose of obtaining information, as occurred here.”
Procedural preferences
In a coerced-confession case, Wardlaw treated specialized testimony as useful where interrogation effects were not necessarily within ordinary juror knowledge. The proposed expert could explain how specific tactics may produce a false confession without directly deciding the witness's credibility.
“A jury could benefit from Dr. Blandón-Gitlin’s expert knowledge about the science of coercive interrogation tactics, which Deputy Vega employed here, and how they could elicit false confessions.”
On a motion to reopen a torture-protection claim, Wardlaw rejects an invented quantitative-proof threshold and requires reasoned consideration of highly probative individualized and expert evidence.
“Our binding precedent demands that the BIA explain why it is rejecting such evidence.”
Cautions
In a copyright limitations case, Wardlaw declined to add a filing-date damages cutoff that the statute did not state. When the discovery rule controls accrual, a timely claimant may seek damages for earlier infringements that it could not reasonably have discovered sooner.
“Neither the text of the Copyright Act nor Petrella imposes a three-year damages bar in a discovery rule case.”
In a copyright infringement appeal, Wardlaw concurred in the judgment but argued that the intrinsic test for substantial similarity gives juries too little objective guidance and makes a no-infringement verdict hard to review. Her proposed change was separate reasoning; the panel's per curiam disposition remains controlling.
“I write separately to suggest that the ‘intrinsic test’ for substantial similarity has fundamental flaws, and we should consider dispensing with it altogether.”
In a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc concerning prison-account restitution, Wardlaw argued that gradually accumulated deposits belong under the provision for adjusting a payment schedule, rather than automatic turnover. The panel's contrary construction remained in force.
“Congress, however, made clear that material changes in a defendant’s financial circumstances are governed by a different provision: 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k).”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because this new test involves determination of facts that have not been fully developed, we reverse and remand for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court's Central Green decision. REVERSED and REMANDED.”
“Because the record below is unclear on whether the district court acted under its own discretion or under an erroneous understanding of the law, we must remand for resentencing. REVERSED and REMANDED.”
“We treat Martinez-Rosas' appeal as a petition for review pursuant to section 106(a) of the REAL ID Act of 2005 ... and dismiss in part and deny in part.”
“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we reverse and remand. ... REVERSED AND REMANDED.”
“Accordingly we REVERSE the district court's denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. REVERSED.”
“We vacate Gardenhire's sentence and remand for resentencing. VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to the Clerk to assign to a different district court judge.”
“We reject Jefferson's argument that recent Supreme Court authority requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the specific type and quantity of the drugs he imported ... Accordingly, we affirm.”
“We agree, and therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment in favor of Russell Road. ... AFFIRMED.”
“We conclude that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge Glendale's installation of the monument but have failed to state a claim that Glendale's actions are preempted. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' preemption claim with prejudice.”
“The parties do not raise any arguments the merits of which we may review. PETITIONS DENIED.”
“The district court's application of Colorado River was an abuse of its narrow discretion ... We therefore VACATE the stay order and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings. VACATED; REMANDED.”
“Therefore, the BAP and the bankruptcy court correctly concluded that Mainline could avoid the County's liens under 545(2), and properly relied on our decision in Cummins. AFFIRMED.”
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