John B. Owens
How Judge Owens rules, drawn from 48 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Owens
John Byron Owens is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Owens received a commission on April 2, 2014.
Judge Owens's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Owens's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Owens decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an accessibility case involving a restaurant's website and app, Owens focused on their connection to the goods and services of the physical restaurants. Customers did not have to encounter the access barrier inside the restaurant for the public-accommodation statute to apply.
“The statute applies to the services of a place of public accommodation, not services in a place of public accommodation.”
In a criminal appeal, Owens found late-disclosed impeachment material consequential because the prosecution had relied on the witness to corroborate other testimony and the jury struggled to reach a verdict. The reasonable likelihood that the evidence affected the jury required a new trial.
“Because there is a reasonable likelihood that the undisclosed evidence impeaching Saad could have affected the judgment of the jury, we are compelled to reverse the convictions and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.”
Reviewing a visa denial, Owens compared the agency's stated interpretation with the source on which it relied. Treating “typically needed” and “normally required” as materially different lacked a rational connection to the evidence and was arbitrary and capricious.
“There is no daylight between typically needed, per the OOH, and normally required, per the regulatory criteria.”
Procedural preferences
In an immigration case, Owens remanded because the agency's categorical analysis had not addressed whether the offense involved the intent, injury, or protected class ordinarily associated with the governing doctrine. Widespread criminalization of the conduct did not itself complete that analysis.
“The answer cannot be that outlawing cockfighting in the 50 states automatically qualifies cockfighting as a CIMT — more is required.”
On a self-represented motion to reopen an in-absentia removal order, Owens does not require a formal affidavit or independent corroboration where the petitioner's factual account is not inherently unbelievable.
“Corroboration of a credible declaration by [a petitioner] moving to reopen is not required.”
Cautions
In a settlement-enforcement appeal, Owens faulted the parties for failing to present a potentially controlling choice-of-law issue squarely to the district court. A fundamental argument mentioned vaguely at the end of an appellate brief risks forfeiture and remand rather than immediate resolution.
“Fundamental questions of law should appear at the beginning of a brief, not thrown in at the end, and should be clearly made.”
In Jaimez, Owens dissented in part because he found the evidence insufficient to show knowing participation in the money-laundering conspiracy. The panel majority reached the opposite result.
“But the evidence does not show, even in the light most favorable to the government, that Alexis Jaimez knew the objective of the money laundering conspiracy or joined with the intent to further its purpose.”
In Gonzalez Romo, Owens concurred under controlling precedent while criticizing the criminal moral turpitude framework that the panel had to apply.
“But I continue to believe that the current moral turpitude jurisprudence makes no sense, and I am not a lone wolf in so thinking.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Martinez’s conviction for vehicle flight under California Vehicle Code § 2800.2 is a predicate violent felony under the ACCA.”
“PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.”
“And because those elements make out traditional hit and run, Petitioner's section 20001(a) conviction qualifies as a CIMT. PETITION DENIED.”
“On remand, the district court used evidence of questionable value in determining the drug quantities attributable to each defendant, so we again vacate and remand for resentencing.”
“The district court held that Schram could not challenge the search of a residence that a no-contact court order barred him from entering. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm.”
“For the reasons provided above, we affirm the district court’s denial of Korte’s suppression motions and his convictions for bank robbery.”
“The district court interpreted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ('SLUSA') to bar the case from proceeding in federal court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we reverse and remand.”
“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm the district court's conclusion that Phillips' promise to forgive an uncollectable debt satisfies the pecuniary value requirement of 1958.”
“Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of Panah’s ineffective assistance claim. AFFIRMED.”
“Weber sued Allergan under state law alleging that she suffered injuries when her breast implants bled silicone into her body. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and we affirm.”
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