James Marshall Carter

How Judge Carter rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Carter no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1967–1979
Appointed by
Lyndon B. Johnson (Democratic)
Commissioned
November 16, 1967
Education
Pomona College, A.B. (1924); Harvard Law School (attended); University of Southern California Law School, J.D. (1927)
Signed orders read
25

About Judge Carter

James Marshall Carter was a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, Judge Carter received a commission on November 16, 1967. Judge Carter previously served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, commissioned there on October 18, 1949. Judge Carter assumed senior status on September 30, 1971 and served until death on November 18, 1979.

How Judge Carter decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In bankruptcy enforcement, Carter treated repeated garnishments threatening employment as unusual circumstances supporting an injunction.

“We hold that this evidence of harassment reasonably constitutes ‘unusual circumstances’ sufficient to warrant an injunction of state proceedings.”

On consent searches, he credited findings supported by the full record and the trial judge's observation of witness demeanor.

“His finding of voluntary consent has substantial support in the evidence.”

Procedural preferences

In Edward L. Suggs v. Lawrence E. Wilson, Carter declined to address additional questions that the habeas petitioner had not raised in the district court.

“Such questions were not raised in the district court”

He used mandamus when a stay improperly displaced a federal action capable of resolving all parties and issues.

“The federal proceedings should not have been stayed.”

Cautions

Carter resisted expanding plea colloquies to require an enumeration of every collateral consequence.

“The consequences of a plea are so numerous that’ a trial judge would have difficulty in enumerating all of them.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Edward L. Suggs v. Lawrence E. Wilson
· 1968-11-13
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

United States v. John V. Wolosyn
· 1969-04-25
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.”

Delbert Henry Witt v. United States
· 1969-09-16
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment is Affirmed.”

Forrest S. Tucker v. Walter E. Craven
· 1970-03-19
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Reversed and remanded.”

United States v. Jeffrey Paul Browning
· 1970-03-19
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“The judgment is reversed.”

Ronald Dean Meeks v. United States
· 1970-06-18
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

George W. Bostick, Jr. v. Walter E. Craven
· 1970-06-23
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Judgment affirmed.”

Edison R. Womack v. Walter E. Craven
· 1970-10-22
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

United States v. Aaron Odell Crank
· 1971-02-03
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

Katherine A. Silvey and Elmer R. Silvey v. Nielsen Corporation
· 1971-02-09
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Manuel T. Paulino and Josefina C. Paulino v. Antonio Leon Guerrero Finona
· 1971-05-25
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

United States v. Michael Henry Ward
· 1971-06-28
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Accordingly, Ward’s conviction based upon refusal to submit to this invalid induction order is reversed.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Not applicable to this circuit-court record.

A historical record

Judge Carter no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.