James Alger Fee

How Judge Fee rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Fee no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1954–1959
Appointed by
Dwight D. Eisenhower (Republican)
Commissioned
April 30, 1954
Education
Whitman College, A.B. (1910); Columbia Law School, LL.B. (1914)
Signed orders read
25

About Judge Fee

James Alger Fee was a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Judge Fee received a commission on April 30, 1954. Judge Fee previously served on the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, commissioned there on December 23, 1931. Judge Fee served until death on August 25, 1959.

How Judge Fee decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Fee treated a nonmalicious response to a public political attack as conditionally privileged.

“He who seizes the sword may be wounded by a sword.”

Procedural preferences

Fee required trial of disputed facts that controlled both jurisdiction and the merits.

“where there are allegations of key jurisdictional facts which are controverted, there always exists power to try the issues thus made.”

Fee resisted using extraordinary writs to supervise ordinary incidents of ongoing trial-court litigation.

“The appellate courts will not supervise the daily incidents of an action in court or a trial by mandamus or prohibition.”

Cautions

Fee expressly disapproved a protective appeal that could not affect the taxpayer's case.

“The taking of the appeal was not justified, and we express our disapproval of such a step.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Benbow v. Wolf; Wolf v. United States
13347_1 · 1954-06-30
Appeal (Benbow and Wolf in consolidated appeals) Granted in part

“The judgment is reversed and set aside. ... The cause against Benbow is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Since there can be no harm in amending the complaint by striking out allegations as to a defendant over whom the Court has no jurisdiction, the case may proceed to another trial as if originally filed against the United States alone.”

Patton v. Administrator of Civil Aeronautics
13921_1 · 1954-09-21
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“The case is reversed with direction that the motion to dismiss be denied and plaintiff be given the opportunity to amend the complaint.”

Robert J. Nelson v. United States
14344 · 1954-11-02
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bear Film Co.
13676 · 1955-01-11
Appeal (appellant) Moot / procedural

“Appeal dismissed.”

Raymond J. Veelik v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
14366 · 1955-04-26
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Jew May Lune v. John Foster Dulles
19-15658 · 1955-05-13
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“The cause is remanded for trial of the issues of fact.”

Motores De Mexicali, S.A. v. Bank of America
14397 · 1955-06-30
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Gerald L. K. Smith v. Albert Levitt
14420 · 1955-07-22
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Reversed.”

Oleta O’Connor Yates v. United States
13535 · 1955-07-26
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“Judgment reversed.”

Arturo Fletes-Mora v. Herbert Brownell
14454 · 1955-12-09
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Dismissal of the petition is affirmed,”

Richards v. Juneau Independent School District
14856 · 1956-04-03
Appeal (appellant) Moot / procedural

“The proceeding is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”

Glen T. Jamison v. Maria Repetti
14825_1 · 1956-09-07
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Not applicable to this circuit-court record.

A historical record

Judge Fee no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.