Jacqueline H. Nguyen
How Judge Nguyen rules, drawn from 53 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Nguyen
Jacqueline Hong-Ngoc Nguyen is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Nguyen received a commission on May 14, 2012. Judge Nguyen previously served on the United States District Court for the Central District of California, commissioned there on December 4, 2009.
Judge Nguyen's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Nguyen's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Nguyen decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a federal tort case arising from airport screening, Nguyen applied the local statutory definition and ordinary meaning of officer and search. She declined to add a criminal-investigation limitation that Congress omitted, where screeners were legally empowered to conduct searches for items prohibited aboard aircraft.
“The Supreme Court instructs us not to ‘read into the text additional limitations designed to narrow the scope of the law enforcement proviso.’”
In a COVID-testing reimbursement case, Nguyen looked for congressional intent before recognizing an implied private remedy. Mandatory language directed at insurers did not create a provider's right of action when providers were only the objects of the obligation and the statutory scheme specified agency enforcement mechanisms.
“Congress’s use of mandatory language alone is not enough to create an implied private right of action.”
In a qualified-immunity appeal arising from a protest, Nguyen resolved disputed facts in the plaintiff's favor at summary judgment. If a jury credited the account that he was peacefully holding a sign rather than obstructing police, the absence of a legitimate justification supported an inference of retaliation for protected speech.
“If a factfinder concludes that there was no legitimate justification for Panighetti’s actions, they could reasonably infer that those actions were motivated by retaliatory animus.”
In the same protest case, Nguyen assessed seizure by the objective intent conveyed through the force used rather than the officer's stated subjective purpose. Firing a projectile designed to incapacitate could manifest an intent to restrain even if the officer said he meant to make the protester leave.
“Whether Panighetti may have subjectively intended to repel Sanderlin rather than restrain him is irrelevant to the analysis.”
In Ling, Nguyen held that a separate housing compliance agreement did not replace the pending False Claims Act suit and therefore was not an alternate remedy that would increase the relator’s share.
“the alternate remedy provision assumes an alternate remedy takes the place of the FCA suit.”
In American Beverage Association, Nguyen concurred in the judgment but concluded that the majority applied too lenient a review standard to commercial speech that was neither false nor misleading.
“I disagree with the majority’s expansion of Zauderer’s rational basis review to commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading.”
In Williams v. Gaye, Nguyen dissented from the copyright verdict because she found the songs objectively dissimilar in melody, harmony, and rhythm.
“‘Blurred Lines’ and ‘Got to Give It Up’ are not objectively similar. They differ in melody, harmony, and rhythm.”
Procedural preferences
In an immigration reopening case, Nguyen kept the threshold prima facie inquiry distinct from the agency's ultimate discretionary decision. Prima facie eligibility requires a reasonable likelihood of success, while the heavier requirement that new evidence would likely change the result belongs to the discretionary ground for denial.
“Today, we clarify any possible confusion in our case law and reaffirm that the ‘reasonable likelihood’ standard applies to decisions made on the prima facie ground, and the ‘would likely change’ standard applies to decisions made on the discretionary ground.”
In the Planned Parenthood funding challenge, Nguyen agreed that standing and mootness permitted review but would have let the district court address the merits first.
“I agree with the majority that Planned Parenthood has standing and that the case is not moot, but I would remand for the district court to address the merits of the challenge to the 2018 Funding Opportunity Announcements (‘FOAs’) in the first instance.”
In Nielsen, Nguyen agreed the particular private-prison challenge failed and emphasized that the decision reached only that case’s deficiencies.
“I write separately, however, to emphasize that our decision is limited only to the deficiencies in this particular case.”
In Sellers, Nguyen separately reasoned that the district court should first decide whether the evidence of selective enforcement warranted further discovery.
“Whether this is enough evidence in this case to entitle Sellers to additional discovery is for the district court to resolve in the first instance.”
In Friedenberg, Nguyen dissented because she concluded the defendants had not invoked the removal statute needed for appellate review of the remand order.
“We do not, in my view, have jurisdiction over this appeal. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because agent Armour's actions were not interrogation or its functional equivalent, we affirm.”
“We affirm Castillo's forfeiture judgment.”
“Because the ALJ failed to do so, we remand for further proceedings.”
“We agree that O'Shea mandates abstention and affirm.”
“The petition for review is DENIED.”
“We therefore reverse and remand.”
“We find no error and affirm.”
“PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.”
“We affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We are not persuaded, and we affirm.”
“We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of OMB.”
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