Danielle J. Forrest
How Judge Forrest rules, drawn from 64 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Forrest
Danielle Jo Forrest is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Forrest received a commission on November 12, 2019.
Judge Forrest's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Forrest's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Forrest decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Thomas v. CalPortland, Forrest held that a miner’s discrimination claim under Section 105(c) of the Mine Act required proof of but-for causation, granted review, and remanded for the Commission to apply that standard.
“In the end, the only question we must answer is simple. Section 105(c)’s unambiguous text requires a miner asserting a discrimination claim under Section 105(c) to prove but-for causation.”
In WhatsApp v. NSO Group Technologies, Forrest affirmed denial of immunity to the defendant entities because they fell outside the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s definition of a foreign state and could not claim common-law sovereign immunity instead.
“We hold that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA or Act) occupies the field of foreign sovereign immunity as applied to entities and categorically forecloses extending immunity to any entity that falls outside the FSIA’s broad definition of ‘foreign state.’”
In United States v. Mathews, Forrest held that the federal property-damage offense was not a crime of violence under the categorical approach, reversed denial of Mathews’s Section 2255 motion, and directed vacatur of his firearm conviction and resentencing.
“No doubt it is strange to classify placing a bomb in an alleyway for the purpose of causing harm to another person or their property as not a crime of violence, particularly where the bomb was picked up by an innocent bystander who was seriously injured by the detonation. But that is what the law requires of us in this case.”
In Stavrianoudakis v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Forrest held that the falconers had standing to challenge a licensing condition that required them to consent to warrantless inspections or forgo a falconry license.
“Therefore, the Falconers’ alleged injury in fact is the forced choice: retention of their Fourth Amendment rights or receipt of a falconry license, which is required to lawfully practice falconry.”
In Day, Forrest would have remanded the wine-shipping challenge for an evidentiary inquiry into whether Arizona's discriminatory rule had a legitimate justification.
“But because Arizona’s law is discriminatory, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s merits analysis under Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504 (2019), in Section II. I would remand for the district court to conduct the required evidentiary inquiry into whether Arizona’s discriminatory regulations may be justified on legitimate, non-protectionist grounds.”
In Ohio House, Forrest applied the circuit’s existing housing discrimination burden shifting framework while urging correction by the en banc court or the Supreme Court.
“I thus conclude that in deciding this case we are compelled to apply Community House’s burden- shifting framework as written until the en banc court corrects our error or the Supreme Court issues intervening authority that permits departure from Community House.”
Procedural preferences
In Morgovsky, Forrest would have affirmed denial of the habeas motion on untimeliness without reaching its merits.
“Because Morgovsky’s motion was untimely and he has not shown that he is entitled to equitable tolling, I would affirm the denial of his motion on that ground alone.”
In Nakka, Forrest concurred in the immigration jurisdiction result but declined to reach whether the statute preserved review of broader collateral challenges to agency policies.
“Therefore, there is no cause in this case to address whether § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserves review of collateral challenges.”
In Doerr, Forrest dissented from a habeas stay because she concluded the petition contained only exhausted claims.
“Because Doerr’s petition asserts only exhausted claims, I respectfully dissent from the court’s grant of a Rhines stay.”
In Kane, Forrest dissented from the bankruptcy appeal because she concluded the panel lacked jurisdiction without a final judgment.
“Unfortunately, I cannot join them because there is no final judgment before us, and we lack appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”
Cautions
In McDonald v. Lawson, Forrest vacated the district court’s judgment and directed dismissal of the challenge to California’s AB 2098 as moot after repeal of the law, finding no reasonable likelihood of reenactment or enforcement.
“Because there is no indication that California is reasonably likely to reenact AB 2098 or anything substantially similar to it”
In Herrera, Forrest dissented from compelling arbitration because the passengers’ refund claim against the airline did not depend on their separate agreement with a ticket seller.
“Because the Herreras’ claim against Cathay Pacific—as they presented it—does not rely or depend on the terms of their ASAP Tickets contract, this is not a case where the Herreras are unfairly trying to avoid their agreement to arbitrate.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We also hold that Colbert does not satisfy the requirements for filing a second or successive habeas petition, and we deny his application.”
“AFFIRMED.”
“he argues the district court miscalculated the amount-of-loss enhancement and improperly imposed the leadership-role and number-of-victims enhancements. We affirm.”
“we hold that Qazi did properly challenge his indictment, and we direct the district court to dismiss his indictment, as we must.”
“We conclude that Kroytor is not entitled to coram nobis relief because, after learning that the only way he could avoid removal was to challenge his conviction, he waited two years, without a valid reason, before filing his petition for writ of error coram nobis.”
“We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.”
“we reverse in part the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CoreCivic and remand for further proceedings.”
“Because we conclude that Walls does not extend to this circumstance, we reverse and remand.”
“We conclude the district court did not err because Merchant repeatedly failed to meet his disclosure obligations, the district court reasonably concluded Merchant's failures were not substantially justified or harmless, and Merchant never moved for a lesser sanction.”
“Interpreting Section 105(c) in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, we conclude the Commission applied the wrong causation standard, and we grant the petition and remand.”
“Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of the alleged employer's motion to compel arbitration.”
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