Daniel P. Collins
How Judge Collins rules, drawn from 64 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Collins
Daniel Paul Collins is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Collins received a commission on May 22, 2019.
Judge Collins's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Collins's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Collins decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a statutory-federal-nexus case, Collins compared neighboring provisions and treated Congress's omission of state and local governments from the narrower list as deliberate. The structural difference supported the ordinary national-government meaning of "United States."
“The obvious omission of the phrase ‘a State, [or a] political subdivision of a State’ from the smaller list in § 1028(c)(1) confirms that an identification document produced by a State would not be sufficient to satisfy the federal nexus described in § 1028(c)(1).”
In a Fourth Amendment case, Collins assessed a protective search by its objective scope and the officer-safety purpose that could justify it. A direct pocket search of a compliant detainee exceeded that purpose where a less intrusive frisk was available and no special circumstance required an immediate intrusion.
“Given that Brown was fully compliant and there were no special circumstances indicating a need for more immediately intrusive measures, the officer’s direct search of Brown’s pocket ‘was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception—the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man.’”
In reviewing an agency's nonprofit-status decision, Collins compared the governing education statute with the tax provision the agency had borrowed. Requirements found only in the tax provision could not replace the distinct test Congress enacted for educational institutions.
“The Department thus invoked the wrong legal standards by relying on IRS regulations that impose requirements that go well beyond the HEA’s requirements and that instead implement a portion of § 501(c)(3) that has no counterpart in HEA § 103(13).”
In the FTC’s challenge to Microsoft’s acquisition of Activision Blizzard, Collins affirmed denial of preliminary relief on the cloud-streaming theory. The evidence did not show that Activision’s games would otherwise have been available to competing streaming services absent the merger.
“The FTC points to no other evidence that Activision Blizzard had ever allowed its games to be included in streaming services, and the company’s CEO testified that Activision Blizzard did not view streaming, economically, as a ‘big opportunity for the company.’”
Procedural preferences
In an electronic-evidence sanctions case, Collins applied Rule 37(e)'s specified findings instead of residual inherent authority. Because the selected sanction effectively resolved the excessive-force issue, the rule required intent to deprive rather than the district court's finding of recklessness.
“Given Rule 37(e)’s careful specification of the findings that must be made before any sanction may be imposed for a covered loss of information, it is clear that the rule, by its terms, precludes a court from resorting to inherent authority to evade its strictures.”
In a foreclosure appeal, Collins required the decree to resolve the parties' rights and supply the substantive sale terms before appellate jurisdiction attached. Unfinished valuation or sale instructions were not merely ministerial details that a premature notice of appeal could overlook.
“In all events, we now clarify that, in accordance with more than 100 years of Supreme Court precedent, for ‘a decree of sale in a foreclosure suit’ to be considered ‘a final decree for the purposes of an appeal’ under § 1291, it must ‘settle[] all the rights of the parties and leave[] nothing to be done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds’ in accordance with the decree’s terms.”
In Mumma, Collins held that payment and distribution of a restitution award did not moot the appeal where correcting an overpayment could support an offset in the victim’s pending civil suit. The panel remanded to correct a $2,500 calculation error.
“a ruling from this court that the amount of restitution was overpaid by $2,500 would give him the ability to seek an offset against any damages that the victim might recover in that civil action. That possibility is enough to save this issue from mootness,”
In Bradford’s capital habeas appeal, Collins addressed the Brady and ineffective-assistance merits under AEDPA before a procedural-default question because the claims’ prejudice components overlapped and AEDPA supplied the more deferential inquiry. The court then reversed the guilt-phase grant of habeas relief while leaving unresolved penalty-phase claims for remand.
“Given these two considerations, we conclude that, as in Lambrix, it is appropriate to address the merits of Bradford’s claims under AEDPA before considering (if necessary) the procedural-bar issue under Coleman.”
In his Manaku concurrence, Collins would have affirmed denial of suppression because he read the intervening Supreme Court decision to supersede a circuit warrant-production rule. The concurrence did not control the panel rationale.
“Because I conclude that Grubbs overruled that aspect of Gantt as well, I concur in the judgment affirming the district court’s denial of Manaku’s motion to suppress.”
Cautions
In United Aeronautical, Collins dissented from a jurisdictional dismissal because he concluded the Contract Disputes Act did not bar the plaintiffs’ statutory claims under the Administrative Procedure Act.
“But the CDA does not impliedly forbid reliance on the APA where, as here, Plaintiffs’ claims and relief are based, not on a Government contract, but rather on Plaintiffs’ independent statutory rights under the Trade Secrets Act.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We review de novo the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim ... and finding no error, we affirm. ... AFFIRMED.”
“The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' federal causes of action for failure to state a claim, and it declined to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. We affirm.”
“We affirm the judgment of the BAP insofar as it holds that California's deduction of unpaid HQAF assessments from the supplemental payments made to Gardens Regional was permissible under the doctrine of equitable recoupment, but we reverse its judgment as to the fee-for-service payments. ... AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.”
“Consequently, the petitioner in this case-who was convicted of a violation of Section 245(a)(1) in 2006-was properly ordered removed, and we deny his petition for review.”
“Although for somewhat different reasons, we agree with the district court that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under the FSIA, and we therefore affirm its judgment dismissing this action.”
“He was therefore properly ordered to be removed from the United States under that section, and we deny his petition for review.”
“AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.”
“The district court therefore erred in denying Brown’s motion to suppress. ... REVERSED and REMANDED.”
“We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sections 1291 and 2253(a), and we affirm.”
“AFFIRMED.”
“Because the 2013 judgment did not address Optional's and DAS's competing rights to the funds DAS had received from the Credit Suisse account in 2011, and did not award those funds to Optional, DAS did not violate the judgment by failing to turn over those funds to Optional. The district court properly concluded that DAS could not be held in contempt on this basis.”
“AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED.”
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