Daniel Aaron Bress
How Judge Bress rules, drawn from 81 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Bress
Daniel Aaron Bress is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Bress received a commission on July 26, 2019.
Judge Bress's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Bress's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Bress decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reasonable suspicion rested on the combined circumstances and officer experience, not on a commonplace accessory viewed in isolation.
“When combined with the officers’ experience with fanny packs, the circumstances taken as a whole created reasonable suspicion that Taylor, who was not permitted to have a gun, might have one.”
In Verthelyi v. PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust, Bress held that the LIBOR Act preserved a valid contractual fallback, including a fixed replacement rate, and did not rewrite the parties’ agreement.
“The LIBOR Act closes gaps in contracts; it does not rewrite otherwise valid contracts.”
Procedural preferences
A conditional plea preserves only the appellate issues identified in the plea agreement or other writing; an unconditional plea does not preserve antecedent constitutional claims.
“the scope of the issues that may be appealed is relatively straightforward: it depends on what is stated in the plea agreement or other writing memorializing the conditional plea.”
The law governing a fee request followed the nature of the claim on which the party prevailed, so state fee law did not apply to a purely federal claim.
“We have long held that ‘[i]n a pure federal question case brought in federal court, federal law governs attorney fees.’”
A discovery order was not final for appeal while the scope of production remained unresolved and further appeals could create piecemeal review.
“A central purpose of the finality requirement is to avoid such piecemeal appeals.”
At class certification, common questions are not enough by themselves; the proponent must show with actual evidence that the central liability issue can be proved classwide, and common damages or materiality cannot substitute for missing common proof of deception.
“on this record, the lack of a classwide showing on deception cannot be overcome by supposedly common issues of materiality and damages that are unmoored from any classwide showing of actionable wrongdoing.”
Cautions
Recycled fee papers with case-specific errors can reduce a fee award because careful editing is part of the quality of representation.
“Sound lawyering (of course) includes making sure that the fee motion papers pertain to the case at issue.”
In his Whitfield rehearing dissent, Bress argued that the circuit’s serious questions route to a preliminary injunction conflicted with Supreme Court precedent.
“Our ‘serious questions’ test for preliminary injunctions is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, especially after Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024).”
In his Zuniga de la Cruz concurrence, Bress questioned a proposed general disclosure duty because that issue was outside the appeal and its legal basis was unclear. The concurrence did not decide that question.
“Setting aside that this issue is not presented in this case, it is not clear what basis we would have to impose such general disclosure obligations.”
In Trout Unlimited, Bress dissented because he viewed the agency’s decision to withdraw from its preliminary process as beyond judicial review. The panel majority reached a different result.
“The agency’s withdrawal from its discretionary exploratory process is not subject to judicial review.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in our accompanying memorandum disposition, Altayar's petitions for review are DENIED.”
“We hold that Chavez-Diaz waived his right to appeal his equal protection and due process claims by entering an unconditional guilty plea. We therefore reverse the district court’s holding to the contrary and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal.”
“Credit One's intent to call a customer who had consented to its calls does not exempt Credit One from liability under the TCPA when it calls someone else who did not consent. ... We affirm the district court in this and all respects.”
“We therefore affirm the district court's judgment dismissing the complaint and denying leave to amend.”
“We therefore hold that, under Morrison step two, the 'focus' of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343, is the use of the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. ... the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.”
“Because appellant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the district court's judgment or obtain a Rule 58(e) order extending the time to appeal, the notice of appeal was untimely as to the district court's underlying judgment. ... DISMISSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.”
“a bulge suggestive of a firearm can be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion, and ... in this case there was ample evidence from which to conclude that Bontemps's 'obvious' bulge was likely a concealed firearm. ... the judgment is AFFIRMED.”
“We vacate the judgment of the district court with instructions to remand to the ALJ for proceedings consistent with this opinion. ... VACATED AND REMANDED.”
“We hold that the government may remove petitioner now and therefore deny the petition for review. ... PETITION DENIED.”
“We hold that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an 'aggravated felony' under the INA because it categorically fits within the generic definition of 'illicit trafficking in firearms' ... the petition for review is DENIED.”
“We thus hold that the Tax Court did not err in concluding that Harborside's inventory cost for each of the years at issue is determined by section 1.471-3(b). ... AFFIRMED.”
“We hold that the preemption challenge fails. CalSavers is not an ERISA plan ... We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.”
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