Wilbur Frank Pell Jr.

How Judge Pell rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Pell no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 2000
Served
1970–2000
Appointed by
Richard Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
1970-04-24
Education
Indiana University Bloomington, A.B., 1937; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1940
Signed orders read
25

How Judge Pell decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Procedural preferences

Pell treated interpleader jurisdiction as fixed at the moment of filing, not subject to later manipulation by a party's waiver.

“interpleader jurisdiction is determined at the time suit is filed and subsequent events do not divest the court of jurisdiction once properly acquired.”

Cautions

He enforced the public-policy limits on exculpatory language, declining to let circumlocutionary contract terms defeat liability for a tower's own negligence.

“in the towage contract situation the ambiguous indemnity language here utilized is insufficient to avoid the public policy rule established by”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Glen Eugene Schofield v. United States
441 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1971) · 1971-03-10
Appeal (criminal defendant/appellant) Granted in part

“The judgment of the district court is affirmed and the cause is remanded solely for the purpose of vacating the sentence under Count I.”

James Haythe v. Decker Realty Co.
468 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1972) · 1972-10-26
Appeal (home buyer/appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

United States v. Anthony Maenza
475 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1973) · 1973-03-28
Appeal (criminal defendant/appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. United States
484 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1973) · 1973-08-03
Appeal (United States/appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Confederation of Police v. Conlisk
489 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1973) · 1973-11-29
Appeal (police officials/appellants) Denied

“the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”

Juna G. Morales v. Wilbur J. Schmidt
494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) · 1974-03-22
Appeal (state corrections official/appellant) Granted in part

“it is deemed necessary that the proceedings be remanded for further determination in accordance with this opinion.”

Carlson Plywood Co., Inc. v. Vytex Plastics Corporation
519 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1975) · 1975-07-22
Appeal (creditor/appellant) Denied

“the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”

The Dow Chemical Company v. M/V Charles F. Detmar, Jr.
545 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1976) · 1976-12-06
Appeal (tugboat owners/appellants) Granted in part

“the judgment of the district court is affirmed as to liability but is reversed as to the amount of damages recoverable.”

Stanley J. Brown v. United States Civil Service Commission
553 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977) · 1977-04-20
Appeal (discharged public employees/appellants) Granted

“the judgment of the district court is vacated and this cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.”

Darlene Guse v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc.
562 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1977) · 1977-08-11
Appeal (employer/appellant) Granted

“the judgment is reversed and upon remand the district court shall dismiss the complaint.”

Glen Prophet v. Jack Duckworth, Warden
580 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1978) · 1978-08-11
Appeal (warden/appellant) Granted

“the judgment of the district court is reversed.”

David Harrison v. State of Indiana
597 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1979) · 1979-05-02
Appeal (habeas petitioner/appellant) Granted

“the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause is remanded for further appropriate proceedings.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Circuit judges do not carry a single assigned trial caseload.

A historical record

Judge Pell no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.