Thomas E. Fairchild

How Judge Fairchild rules, drawn from 32 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Fairchild no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 2007
Served
1966–2007
Appointed by
Lyndon B. Johnson (Democratic)
Commissioned
1966-08-11
Education
Cornell University, A.B., 1934; University of Wisconsin Law School, LL.B., 1938
Signed orders read
32

How Judge Fairchild decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Reviewing an agency classification, Fairchild treated supervisory status as a fact-intensive, practical question within the labor board's expertise. The board's findings therefore received substantial deference where the record supported its view of how authority operated in practice.

“The determination of who is a supervisor ‘is a practical matter and one of fact in which the Board, in the exercise of its primary function as fact finder, must be permitted “a large measure of informed discretion.””

In an employment and union-representation dispute, Fairchild declined to resolve competing interpretations of a report on summary judgment. The report's meaning and weight belonged to the factfinder, and evidence of possible anti-union motivation required further proceedings.

“We consider the proper interpretation of the report in this regard and the weight to be given it to be a matter for the trier of the fact. As to the claim of anti-union motivation, summary judgment was erroneous.”

In a labor-injunction appeal, Fairchild applied the Norris-LaGuardia Act's policy to keep equitable relief tied to the dispute actually before the court. The injunction could not extend broadly to other disputes merely because they might involve similar conduct.

“In the present case, however, we think the policy of Norris-LaGuardia requires that the injunction should have been limited to the dispute before the court.”

Procedural preferences

In a habeas appeal involving a warrantless search, Fairchild remanded rather than decide whether the searched area was within the home's curtilage on an underdeveloped record. The district court was directed to develop the location and use evidence needed for the constitutional analysis.

“We think the curtilage issue should be decided by the district court after the facts have had further illumination.”

Cautions

In a criminal appeal, Fairchild examined the cumulative effect of the trial judge's comments and conduct toward the defense, not isolated remarks alone. Persistent judicial disparagement in front of the jury contributed to the conclusion that the convictions could not stand.

“The district judge’s deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude toward the defense is evident in the record from the very beginning.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottling Co. of Chicago
371 F.2d 256 · 1967-01-11
Appeal (defendant-appellant) Granted

“The judment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded.”

Klarkowski v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
· 1967-09-13
Petition for review (petitioner-taxpayer (appellant)) Denied

“The decision of the tax court is affirmed.”

James Mahoney v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., etc.
392 F.2d 156 · 1968-03-26
Appeal (defendant-appellant (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.)) Granted

“The order appealed from will be reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to grant judgment for defendant.”

Joseph Muncie Victor v. Ward Lane, Warden of Indiana State Prison
· 1968-05-06
Appeal (petitioner-appellant) Denied

“The judgment appealed from will be affirmed.”

Allico National Corporation, etc., and Richard Woike v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America
397 F.2d 727 · 1968-06-06
Appeal (plaintiff-appellant) Granted

“The judgment of dismissal will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.”

United States v. Klehman
397 F.2d 406 · 1968-07-03
Appeal (defendant-appellant) Granted

“The judgment against Klehman is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the information as to him.”

Guido v. United States
· 1968-07-17
Appeal (petitioner-appellant) Denied

“The judgment appealed from is affirmed.”

United States ex rel. William Lawrence v. Max P. Frye, Warden
· 1969-01-21
Appeal (petitioner-appellant) Granted

“The order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Williams v. Wisconsin Barge Line, Inc.
416 F.2d 28 · 1969-08-14
Appeal (plaintiff-appellant) Granted in part

“In so far as the judgment appealed from dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, it is affirmed. In so far as it granted defendant recovery on its counterclaim and costs of suit, it is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the counterclaim, without costs to either party.”

United States ex rel. John Adams v. Frank J. Pate, Warden
· 1969-11-05
Appeal (petitioner-appellant) Granted

“The judgment appealed from is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board
424 F.2d 1151 · 1970-04-28
Petition for review (employer-petitioner (Westinghouse Electric Corporation)) Denied

“The order of the board will be enforced.”

Jackson v. Ogilvie
426 F.2d 1333 · 1970-05-06
Appeal (plaintiff-appellant) Granted

“The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.”

A historical record

Judge Fairchild no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.