Richard Dickson Cudahy

How Judge Cudahy rules, drawn from 32 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Cudahy no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Position
circuit
Status
Retired 2015
Served
1979–2015
Appointed by
Jimmy Carter (Democratic)
Commissioned
1979-09-26
Education
United States Military Academy (B.S., 1948); Yale Law School (J.D., 1955)
Signed orders read
32

How Judge Cudahy decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In a Miranda-waiver appeal, Cudahy treated the defendant's selective answers, prior experience with law enforcement, and effort to negotiate as evidence that he understood his rights and chose to speak. A signed waiver or an express verbal assent was not indispensable on that record.

“There can be an implied waiver where a defendant ‘selectively chose not to answer some of the questions that were put to him.’”

In a trade-secret dispute, Cudahy required the claimant to have taken concrete steps to protect its proprietary information. The claimant had not marked disclosures confidential or obtained a reciprocal confidentiality agreement, so the law did not supply protection it had declined to arrange.

“But where one company fails to take any protective steps to shield its proprietary information, it cannot then expect the law to protect it when the relationship sours.”

In an ADA appeal, Cudahy treated reassignment to a vacant position as a potentially required accommodation even when an employer normally selected the best-qualified applicant. The employer remained free to prove fact-specific undue hardship, but its selection policy did not create a categorical exception.

“The Supreme Court has found that accommodation through appointment to a vacant position is reasonable. Absent a showing of undue hardship, an employer must implement such a reassignment policy.”

Procedural preferences

On an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, Cudahy required the appealing officers to accept the well-supported facts the district court had identified for trial. By disputing those facts instead of presenting a pure legal question, the officers placed the appeal outside the court's jurisdiction.

“In denying rather than embracing the facts the district court held to be sufficiently well-supported to create jury issues, the defendants have pleaded themselves out of court.”

Cautions

In a suppression appeal, Cudahy held that consent given during an ongoing unlawful detention remained tainted by the constitutional violation. Because the consent was not sufficiently attenuated, the resulting evidence could not support the conviction.

“And in this case, the unlawful seizure was ongoing when Johnson voiced his consent, foreclosing the possibility that the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful conduct as to purge the taint.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Brown
664 F.3d 1115 · 2011-12-30
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.”

Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp.
674 F.3d 889 · 2012-03-29
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.”

Northington v. H & M International
712 F.3d 1062 · 2013-03-21
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“AFFIRMED.”

Chavarria v. United States
739 F.3d 360 · 2014-01-09
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Having determined that the distinction between affirmative misadvice and failure to advise does not somehow evade the non-retroactivity of Padilla, we AFFIRM.”

United States v. Diggs
768 F.3d 643 · 2014-09-24
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Chavis Webster
666 F.3d 1023 · 2012-01-19
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“It was therefore not erroneous for the district court to fail to consider the § 3553(a) factors in reducing the defendant's sentence. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”

United States v. Sutton
742 F.3d 770 · 2014-02-10
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“WE AFFIRM.”

Hernandez v. Sheahan
711 F.3d 816 · 2013-04-01
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“We REVERSE the judgment of the district court.”

Swanson v. City of Chetek
719 F.3d 780 · 2013-06-19
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.”

Harrell v. American Red Cross
714 F.3d 553 · 2013-04-23
Appeal (appellant) Granted in part

“AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.”

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Airlines, Inc.
693 F.3d 760 · 2012-09-07
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is Reversed and we Remand this matter to the district court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.”

Everett v. Paul Davis Restoration, Inc.
771 F.3d 380 · 2014-11-03
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons the judgment is REVERSED and REMANDED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated.

A historical record

Judge Cudahy no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.