Quick facts
Court U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Position circuit
Status Retired 1974
Served 1968–1974
Appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson (Democratic)
Commissioned 1968-04-22
Education Brown University, A.B., 1930; Trinity College, Cambridge, 1930-1931; Northwestern University School of Law, LL.B., 1934
Signed orders read 25
Last updated 2026-07-15
Motion outcomes
AppealN = 24
counts only
Granted 7 Granted in part 2 Denied 14 Moot / procedural 1
Petition for enforcementN = 1
counts only
Denied 1
Counted from classified signed orders. A “1 of 1” is one ruling, not a tendency.
About this data
A free Ezel research resource. This profile is built from public records: the judge's own signed orders, public docket records, and published biographies. It is not legal advice and is not affiliated with the court.
How Judge Kerner decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
Kerner treated summary judgment as improper where the record left a genuine factual question for a jury to resolve.
“the granting of summary judgment on this issue was improper.”
He insisted that juries be instructed on the governing law, not merely handed the statute, before deciding a case.
“A jury cannot be expected to know exactly what rights are guaranteed an individual under the Constitution and the failure to instruct the jury accordingly is error.”
Cautions
He scrutinized custodial interrogation closely, requiring warnings before evidence that itself established the offense could be compelled.
“we think that the defendant should have been given Miranda warnings before he was asked to produce his alien registration receipt card a second time.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
John E. Bussell v. General Motors Corporation
401 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1968) · 1968-08-21
Appeal (design claimant/appellant)
Denied
“The judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
Shutter v. United States
406 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-01-27
Appeal (taxpayers/appellants)
Denied
“The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.”
United States v. Palermo
410 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-04-03
Appeal (criminal defendants/appellants)
Granted
“Remanded with directions.”
United States v. Horace Teasley
408 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-04-03
Appeal (criminal defendant/appellant)
Denied
“the judgment of conviction is affirmed.”
Norton Manufacturing Corporation, a Corporation v. United States
409 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-04-18
Appeal (government/appellant)
Denied
“The judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
James Demetrion v. William Edwards and Yellow Cab Company
416 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-08-04
Appeal (cab company/appellants)
Denied
“Affirmed.”
Strauss v. Smith
417 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-09-08
Appeal (habeas petitioner/appellant)
Denied
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.”
Blazon, Inc. v. Blazon Mobile Homes Corporation
416 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-09-12
Appeal (trademark holder/appellant)
Denied
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.”
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.
416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-09-26
Appeal (female employees/appellants)
Granted in part
“Affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified and remanded.”
United States v. Maurice Friedman
416 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-10-09
Appeal (criminal defendant/appellant)
Denied
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.”
Tamaron Distributing Corp. v. Weiner
418 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-11-07
Appeal (antitrust plaintiffs/appellants)
Granted
“Reversed and remanded.”
United States v. Joseph Richard Wick
416 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1969) · 1969-12-08
Appeal (criminal defendant/appellant)
Denied
“the judgment of the district court is affirmed.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a single assigned trial caseload.
A historical record
Judge Kerner no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.