Louis FitzHenry

How Judge FitzHenry rules, drawn from 25 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge FitzHenry no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Position
Circuit judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1933–1935
Appointed by
Franklin D. Roosevelt (Democratic)
Commissioned
June 16, 1933
Education
Illinois Wesleyan University Law School, LL.B., 1897
Signed orders read
25

About Judge FitzHenry

Louis FitzHenry was a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Judge FitzHenry received a commission on June 16, 1933. Judge FitzHenry previously served on the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, commissioned there on July 6, 1918. Judge FitzHenry served until death on November 18, 1935.

How Judge FitzHenry decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Procedural preferences

FitzHenry declined to decide abstract legal propositions when the record did not establish an actual dispute over the funds at issue.

“Federal courts are without power to decide questions unless a case is presented in which the rights of persons or property are actually involved.”

In habeas review, he limited federal intervention to violations of fundamental rights protected by federal law.

“It is well established that it is only when fundamental rights secured by the Federal Constitution are invaded that the interference of federal courts is warranted.”

Cautions

A party could not use a void reconsideration order to extend a statutory appeal deadline.

“Appellant acquired no rights by reason of it, and the appeal must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Mitchell v. New York Life Ins.
5287 · 1934-12-13
Appeal (appellants) Denied

“The decree is affirmed.”

Seifer Furniture Co. v. Surprise
5305 · 1935-05-28
Appeal (creditor/appellant) Moot / procedural

“the appeal must therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”

Brown v. United States
5249 · 1934-10-27
Appeal (insurance claimant/appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

O'Connell v. Mitchell
5313 · 1935-07-02
Appeal (probate judge/appellant) Denied

“Affirmed.”

Culhane v. Rockford Finance & Thrift Co.
5236 · 1934-12-08
Appeal (bank receiver/appellant) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

United States v. Polley
4997 · 1933-11-02
Appeal (United States/appellant) Denied

“the judgment must be, and is, affirmed.”

United States v. Krueger
5282 · 1935-04-02
Appeal (United States/appellant) Granted

“Reversed.”

Wisconsin & Michigan Transp. Co. v. Pere Marquette Line Steamers
4800 · 1933-12-22
Appeal (steamship operator/appellant) Denied

“It is therefore ordered that the decree of the District Court be affirmed.”

United States v. Beller
5135 · 1934-04-23
Appeal (United States/appellant) Denied

“the judgment must be, and is, affirmed.”

Commissioner v. Cora B. Igleheart Trust Estate
5191, 5197 · 1935-01-03
Appeal (tax litigants/petitioners) Granted in part

“the decision of the Board must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to take the valuation of the stock as of the date of the death of the donor to-determine the amount of profit from the sale. In all other respects the decision of the Board is affirmed.”

City of New York Fire Ins. v. Chapman
5344 · 1935-03-26
Appeal (insurers/appellants) Denied

“The judgment is affirmed.”

Cohan v. United States
5298 · 1935-04-30
Appeal (insured veteran/appellant) Granted

“The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Circuit judges do not carry a single assigned trial caseload.

A historical record

Judge FitzHenry no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.