Kenneth Francis Ripple

How Judge Ripple rules, drawn from 34 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Position
circuit
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
1985-05-10
Education
Fordham University (A.B., 1965); University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 1968); George Washington University Law School (LL.M., 1972)
Signed orders read
34

How Judge Ripple decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In an ineffective-assistance appeal, Ripple resolved the claim on Strickland's prejudice prong without deciding whether counsel performed deficiently. The omitted witness testimony did not create a reasonable probability of a different result, so the habeas petitioner could not obtain relief.

“the prudent course is to pretermit any discussion of the performance prong of the Strickland analysis and to decide this case on the prejudice prong.”

In an armed-career-criminal appeal, Ripple applied an intervening Supreme Court decision requiring a jury to decide whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions. He also examined harmlessness independently and vacated the sentence because a properly instructed jury could have reached a different conclusion.

“Given the advent of Erlinger, we now know that the district court erred in declining to send the different-occasions question to a jury. This error, moreover, was not a harmless one.”

In a contract dispute, Ripple enforced the agreement's named appraisal methods instead of substituting lists maintained by successor banks. The contract already supplied an alternative selection method, so its literal terms were workable rather than absurd.

“The plain language of the contract does not produce results so absurd as to warrant adding in language that the drafters quite rationally omitted.”

Procedural preferences

In a felon-in-possession appeal, Ripple tested a proposed affirmative defense against the defendant's own factual proffer before deciding whether the circuit should recognize the defense. Because the proffer did not show prompt, reasonable steps to surrender the firearm, the defense could not reach the jury.

“Even if we were to recognize a broader innocent possession defense, Mr. Sorensen’s proffered facts would not entitle him to present such a defense in this case.”

Cautions

In a state-prisoner habeas appeal, Ripple acknowledged that the prosecutor's remarks would cause concern under de novo review but treated AEDPA's deferential standard as controlling. A petitioner must show more than a debatable state-court ruling when Supreme Court precedent states the governing rule at a high level of generality.

“If our review were de novo, the prosecutor’s comments might give us significant pause. But in this habeas corpus case, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (‘AEDPA’) limits our review.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Gerrod R. Bell v. Randall Hepp
21-2819 · 2023-06-07
Appeal (appellant (petitioner Gerrod Bell)) Denied

“If our review were de novo, the prosecutor's comments might give us significant pause. But in this habeas corpus case, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (‘AEDPA’) limits our review. Under AEDPA's deferential standard, we must conclude that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”

United States v. Steven Sorensen
22-1801 · 2023-07-11
Appeal (appellant (defendant Steven Sorensen)) Denied

“We decline to recognize an innocent possession defense to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in this case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Robert Smith
23-2472 · 2024-07-11
Appeal (appellant (defendant Robert Smith)) Denied

“The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of counsel to withdraw. Mr. Smith's sentence is not unreasonable. We affirm the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Cameron Johnson
23-2338 · 2024-08-20
Appeal (appellant (defendant Cameron Johnson)) Granted

“Given the advent of Erlinger, we now know that the district court erred in declining to send the different-occasions question to a jury. This error, moreover, was not a harmless one. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Daroush Ebrahimi v. Mohammed Siddiqui
23-1859 · 2024-08-21
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff-prisoner Daroush Ebrahimi)) Denied

“Based on the record before it, the district court did not err in awarding costs to Wexford and Dr. Siddiqui. We therefore affirm the assessment of costs against Mr. Ebrahimi.”

Full Circle Villagebrook GP, LLC v. Protech 2004-D, LLC
23-2974 · 2024-10-16
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Full Circle Villagebrook GP)) Denied

“Because the terms of the contract did not permit a unilateral selection of an appraiser from the lists of the successor banks, and because Full Circle did not seek the approval of the Investor Limited Partner, Full Circle did not comply with the terms of the option and a contract was never formed. The district court therefore properly granted the motion for summary judgment.”

William Thomas Hudson, III v. Sue DeHaan
23-2395 · 2025-02-11
Appeal (appellant (petitioner William Hudson)) Denied

“Proceeding in this manner, our evaluation of the record convinces us that, even assuming Mr. Hudson's contentions concerning counsel's performance have merit, his petition still fails because he has not demonstrated that any possible deficiencies by his trial counsel were prejudicial.”

United States v. Joel Rosario
20-2330 · 2021-07-19
Appeal (appellant (defendant Joel Rosario)) Denied

“In obtaining Mr. Rosario's cell-site location information, the officers relied in good faith on the procedures set forth in the Stored Communications Act. Moreover, the officers inevitably would have discovered Mr. Rosario's cell-site location information. The district court correctly ruled in denying Mr. Rosario's motion to suppress and his motion for a new trial. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.”

Mildred Chatman v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago
20-2882 · 2021-07-20
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Mildred Chatman)) Denied

“Even taking all reasonable inferences in her favor, the record cannot support her contention that the Board discriminated or retaliated against her. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board.”

United States v. Kyle S. Matthews
20-2686 · 2021-08-27
Appeal (appellant (defendant Kyle Matthews)) Denied

“An objectively reasonable officer, having consulted with the State's Attorney in the preparation of the complaint and affidavit accompanying the application for the warrant, could have relied in good faith on the search warrant that he obtained from a judge. The warrant here, although incomplete, was not so utterly lacking in indicia of probable cause that suppression is justified.”

Tracy Anderson v. Nations Lending Corporation
21-1885 · 2022-03-09
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Tracy Anderson)) Denied

“The district court correctly determined that Ms. Anderson has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact that her termination constituted an interference with her FMLA leave.”

Cheryl Weaver v. Speedway, LLC
21-1957 · 2022-03-15
Appeal (appellant (plaintiff Cheryl Weaver)) Denied

“For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”

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