Doris L. Pryor
How Judge Pryor rules, drawn from 47 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Pryor
Doris Lenea Pryor is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Pryor received a commission on December 9, 2022.
Judge Pryor's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Pryor's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Pryor decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Technical Security Integration’s contract dispute, she rejected both parties’ attempts to read a missing mediation timeline into their agreement.
“the Agreement leaves a 'yawning void' that 'cries out for an implied term' as to the mediation timeline. ... We are not convinced by either party's attempt to read in contract language that does not exist.”
In Walker, Pryor looked to the sentencing judge’s actual findings, rather than what the judge could have found, to determine the statute of conviction for First Step Act eligibility.
“What matters instead is what the sentencing judge did.”
In the Indiana buffer-law case, she found the lack of guidance let officers expose pedestrians to criminal liability simply by ordering them not to approach.
“Without such guidance, any on-duty officer can use the buffer law to subject any pedestrian to potential criminal liability by simply ordering them not to approach... The Fourteenth Amendment will not tolerate a law subjecting pedestrians to arrest merely because a police officer had a bad breakfast.”
In Nicodemus v. South Bend, Pryor rejected a facial challenge to Indiana’s police buffer law because the law could require a recorder to stop approaching an officer while allowing the recorder to remain in place.
“the Indiana buffer law, at most, directs someone to stop approaching.”
Procedural preferences
In United States v. Henson, she examined appellate jurisdiction independently despite the parties’ agreement and declined to infer an assignment absent a precise record.
“The parties maintain that we have jurisdiction ... But their agreement does not make it so. We must independently assure ourselves of our jurisdiction in every case. ... We see no virtue in permitting our jurisdiction to depend on inferences where both the statute and common sense call for precision.”
In Anderson’s Title VII suit, she found no showing that any specific plaintiff had received the EEOC right-to-sue letter required before filing.
“Before bringing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies by filing charges with the EEOC and receiving a right to sue letter. ... Neither Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint nor appellate briefing reflect that any specific plaintiff obtained a right to sue letter.”
In Breyley v. Fuchs, Pryor vacated summary judgment on exhaustion because Breyley’s sworn declaration and contemporaneous journal entry created a factual dispute over whether he had filed a prison complaint on time.
“we have more than a 'bald assertion' that Breyley timely filed a complaint on January 2. Breyley stated in a sworn declaration that he filed a complaint on January 2... He corroborated his declaration with a copy of his journal entry.”
In her separate concurrence in Castañon-Nava v. Department of Homeland Security, Pryor concluded that the government could not unilaterally rewrite this consent decree to reflect its new detention policy without seeking modification under Rule 60(b).
“Defendants must be held to the bargain they struck.”
In Anderson v. United Airlines, Pryor affirmed dismissal of the Title VII claims on administrative-exhaustion grounds without reaching the district court’s alternative merits ruling.
“Because we affirm on the issue of exhaustion, we need not reach the district court’s alternate grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims.”
Cautions
If the district court rests on multiple independent grounds (e.g. forfeiture AND the merits), the appellant must contest every one; leaving an independent ground unchallenged waives the appeal of that claim.
“Where a party 'lose[s] in the district court on multiple grounds,' such as 'forfeiture and the merits,' that party 'must contest all on appeal; prevailing on one won't suffice.' ... Because forfeiture went unaddressed on appeal ... we find Plaintiffs have waived their ability to appeal these claims.”
A due-process property/liberty interest must be pleaded concretely; paying tuition does not by itself create a contractual right not to be suspended, and speculative future-career harm does not meet the 'stigma plus' liberty test.
“attending a university does not automatically create a constitutional property right. ... the allegations merely speculated about the suspension's stigmatizing effect.”
An argument affirmatively urged below cannot be flipped into an appellate challenge: asking a district court to adopt a specific factual finding waives any later attack on that same finding.
“A defendant waives an argument that a sentencing decision was erroneous when, before the district court, his lawyer argued in favor of the sentencing decision that the defendant seeks to challenge on appeal... Pugh waived any challenge to the attribution on appeal.”
Qualified-immunity holdings tied to split-second threat perception should not be read as permission to continue using force after an officer has had time to recognize that a suspect is subdued.
“I caution that this case should not be overread, lest we create a safe haven for the use of force.”
In United States v. Wilkinson, Pryor vacated an enhanced sentence after the government relied on a prior conviction omitted from its pre-plea notice, depriving Wilkinson of an informed choice about the plea.
“strips a defendant of the chance to make an informed choice when, as here, it relies on a different predicate after the defend- ant pleads guilty.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because Malhotra did not meet the threshold requirement of pleading a property or liberty interest, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment dismissing his complaint.”
“For these reasons, we VACATE the grant of EPI's motion for summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs' claims are either improperly preserved or inadequately pled. We further find the district court did not err in declining to afford Plaintiffs an additional opportunity to file a proposed amended complaint ... For these reasons, we AFFIRM.”
“Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to not apply equitable tolling to Pettis's claim under the judicial recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. 455. ... For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“For those reasons, we AFFIRM ... the district court’s denial of Walker’s motion for First Step Act relief.”
“Because the ALJ in this case did precisely that when concluding that Baptist could perform light work and because her decision is supported by substantial evidence, the denial of benefits must be upheld.”
“For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“In sum, Ellison showed that she lacks meaningful access to the Postal Service's program without an accommodation. We therefore VACATE the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Postal Service and REMAND for further proceedings on whether Ellison's proposed accommodation is reasonable.”
“Unfortunately for Sargeant, his claim falls outside of the narrow category of suits allowed under today's doctrine. ... For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
“In sum, under our precedent, Thompson made false statements within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Section 1014. ... For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.”
“For these reasons, we VACATE Wilcher's sentence and REMAND for a full resentencing hearing.”
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