Diane Pamela Wood
How Judge Wood decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Second Amendment 'Arms' line under Heller/Bruen as a history-and-tradition line-drawing exercise: even the most important personal freedoms have limits, and weapons closer to military-grade arms than to common self-defense firearms can be regulated. She frames the question as where a given weapon falls between a personal handgun and a battlefield weapon.
“Using the tools of history and tradition to which the Supreme Court directed us in Heller and Bruen, we conclude that the state and the affected subdivisions have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. ... Everyone can agree that a personal handgun, used for self-defense, is one of those Arms that law-abiding citizens must be free to 'keep and bear.' Everyone can also agree, we hope, that a nuclear weapon ... can be reserved for the military ... Many weapons, however, lie between these extremes.”
Broad, functional reading of the grand jury's investigatory reach: under R. Enterprises the relevance bar for a grand-jury subpoena is minimal, and the grand jury may legitimately probe HOW evidence was collected -- including possible government misconduct -- because that bears on whether and what to charge.
“It is well within the legitimate purview of the grand jury to inquire about the manner in which evidence was collected, including whether any government misconduct occurred in the process.”
Procedural preferences
Strict appellate-finality discipline: she will not entertain a Rule 54(b) interlocutory appeal where the certified claim factually and legally overlaps with claims still pending below; section 1291 and the bar on piecemeal appeals control, even where the district court certified the order.
“to determine whether an order truly is 'final,' we ask whether there is significant factual and legal overlap between the claim proposed for appeal and the part of the case pending in the district court. ... we VACATE the Rule 54(b) judgment and DISMISS this appeal for want of jurisdiction.”
Rodriguez dog-sniff analysis turns on a single, well-defined question -- did the sniff ADD TIME to the stop -- not on whether the officer paused traffic tasks; and arguments not raised in the district court (e.g., officer diligence) are forfeited on appeal.
“the 'critical question' under Rodriguez is not whether the officer conducted any investigatory task during the stop. It is 'whether conducting the sniff prolongs -- i.e., adds time to -- the stop.'”
Cautions
Litigation integrity is non-negotiable: a litigant who submits a forged document and perjures himself can have his ENTIRE action dismissed with prejudice as a proportionate sanction -- even a sympathetic, serious claim and even a pro se / IFP / death-row plaintiff -- because lesser sanctions would not protect the integrity of the court's proceedings.
“As we have noted before, 'perjury is among the worst kinds of misconduct.' ... 'Dismissal can [thus] be appropriate when the plaintiff has abused the judicial process by seeking relief based on information that the plaintiff knows is false.'”
On a suppression appeal she holds the appellant to the record made below: a Fourth Amendment timing theory not developed in the district court is forfeited, and the absence of record facts about officer diligence is charged to the party who failed to raise the issue.
“To the extent Johnson is now trying to rely on 'parsing the time line of the stop' to show that the officers failed diligently to pursue their traffic mission, that argument is forfeited.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Using the tools of history and tradition to which the Supreme Court directed us in Heller and Bruen, we conclude that the state and the affected subdivisions have a strong likelihood of success in the pending litigation. We therefore affirm the decisions of the district courts in appeals No. 23-1353 and 23-1793 refusing to enjoin these laws, and we vacate the injunction issued by the district court in appeals No. 23-1825, 23-1826, 23-1827, and 23-1828.”
“Our conclusion that the dog sniff did not unreasonably prolong the stop makes the remainder of the Fourth Amendment analysis straightforward. ... The search of Johnson's car therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In light of that fact, we have no need to reach the government's alternative arguments. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“It was well within the district court's discretion to conclude that dismissal was a sanction 'proportionate to the circumstances.' ... After finding that Fulks presented a forged document and perjured testimony, the district court determined that the appropriate sanction for his litigation misconduct was dismissal of the entire action. ... The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“The grand jury is entitled to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the collection of evidence relevant to its investigation of Doe Corporation, including any government misconduct that may have occurred in the process. We REVERSE the district court's grant of the motion to quash the grand jury subpoena.”
“Because the district court erred in granting partial final judgment on SSK's spoliation claim, we VACATE the Rule 54(b) judgment and DISMISS this appeal for want of jurisdiction.”