Amy J. St. Eve
How Judge Eve rules, drawn from 61 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Eve
Amy Joan St. Eve is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge St. Eve received a commission on May 23, 2018. Judge St. Eve previously served on the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, commissioned there on August 2, 2002.
Judge Eve's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Eve's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Eve decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Rigorous summary-judgment evidentiary discipline: conclusory allegations (even sworn verified-complaint statements) that omit the who/when/how do not create a triable issue; the nonmovant must come forward with specific, admissible proof.
“Allegations that are 'conclusory as a legal matter' will not demonstrate an issue of material fact and stave off summary judgment ... (reminding litigants that 'summary judgment is not a time to be coy').”
In Candice Martin’s Illinois-law case, she certified three questions to the state supreme court, then used its answers to affirm denial of the motion to dismiss.
“Recognizing that the viability of Martin's claims depended on novel and important questions of Illinois law, we certified three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court. ... The Illinois Supreme Court's responses to our certified questions make clear that the ODA does not bar Martin's suit from proceeding. So we affirm the district court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss and remand the case for further proceedings.”
Safety-valve eligibility removes the statutory minimum for both imprisonment and supervised release; a court cannot treat the minimum supervised-release term as binding after applying the safety valve.
“As a result of Wylie qualifying for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), the district court had the authority to impose a sentence without regard to the statutory minimum.”
Class certification cannot rest on a legally mistaken view of the uniform contract; here the commonality and predominance analysis depended on an erroneous conclusion about the insurer’s duties.
“we conclude that the district court abused its discretion because it rested its analysis of commonality and predominance—and ultimately its class certification decision—on an erroneous legal conclusion about the duties contained in Progressive’s standard-form Indiana auto insurance policy.”
Procedural preferences
Strict enforcement of waiver/exhaustion: a petitioner who fails to challenge an independent, dispositive agency finding (or to present a claim to the Board) waives it; one unaddressed dispositive ground defeats the appeal.
“She does not address their independent and dispositive determination that she failed to establish the Guatemalan government's inability or unwillingness to protect her. Without a challenge to this dispositive finding, we must deny the petition for review of her asylum, humanitarian asylum, and withholding of removal claims.”
Standing is the threshold for injunctive relief: a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show a credible fear of enforcement; speculative chill from a voluntary, non-disciplinary program is not enough.
“When a party seeks a preliminary injunction before the district court, the burden rests on that party to demonstrate that it has standing to pursue its claims. Speech First failed to meet that burden for two of the policies it challenges.”
After Jones v. Hendrix, the Section 2255 saving clause does not give federal courts jurisdiction over a Section 2241 petition used to raise an intervening statutory-interpretation claim barred as successive.
“Jones holds that federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners in Hogsett’s position.”
A habeas petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing where the record did not conclusively resolve whether equitable tolling made the petition timely.
“We therefore VACATE the denial of Lairy’s habeas petition and REMAND to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the issue of equitable tolling.”
Cautions
In United States v. Campbell, she found the sentencing transcript did not show that the district court had relied on speculative or inaccurate information.
“a review of the entire sentencing transcript provides us no reason to believe that the district court intended its final remarks at Campbell's sentencing to serve as 'literal statement[s] of fact to support the sentence imposed.' ... Campbell has failed to show that the district court relied on speculative or inaccurate information in imposing his sentence.”
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference requires actually-known risk and (against a contractor) a causal Monell policy; a pro se inmate cannot supply medical causation by his own lay testimony under Rule 701.
“Feazell failed to come forward with either direct or circumstantial evidence of Dr. Tilden's knowledge of his hemorrhoids prior to his colonoscopy. ... He was not qualified to testify about medical causation or diagnosis.”
An unconditional guilty plea waives a later collateral challenge to the legal sufficiency of a Section 924(c) charge.
“By unconditionally pleading guilty, he waived his right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the § 924(c) charge.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Speech First failed to meet that burden for two of the policies it challenges; namely, it failed to demonstrate that its members face a credible fear that they will face discipline on the basis of their speech as a result of those two policies. And for its challenge to the third policy, that claim is moot. The district court therefore correctly denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and we affirm.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Goodrich's motion to dismiss and REMAND the case for further proceedings.”
“Feazell appeals both the magistrate judge's summary judgment decision and her evidentiary rulings. Finding no error in either, we affirm.”
“Campbell has failed to show that the district court relied on speculative or inaccurate information in imposing his sentence. ... The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.”
“Their claims thus fail for lack of proof, and we AFFIRM the district court's entry of summary judgment for the Village.”
“For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.”
“For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we find that Walker has waived his RLUIPA claim. AFFIRMED”
“Put another way: this appeal is too much, too late. AFFIRMED.”
“The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.”
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