William Eugene Davis
How Judge Davis rules, drawn from 43 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Davis decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Lujan, the panel required reliable record evidence before converting all seized cash into drug quantity and rejected a conclusory presentence statement that did not show the money would all fund future purchases.
“Without evidence showing that Lujan and Alvarado would purchase 1,600 grams of methamphetamine, this is the sort of ‘[b]ald conclusionary statement[]’ that lacks a ‘patina of reliability’ despite its inclusion in the PSR.”
He treats a negotiated bankruptcy sale as contingent on the trustee's statutory duties and court approval, not as an automatically enforceable private bargain. An auction was proper when it served the trustee's duty to maximize estate value and the earlier proposed sale had never been approved.
“Thus, any sale required court approval. Furthermore, by requesting authority to conduct an auction of the property, the Trustee was fulfilling his fiduciary duty to maximize the assets of the estate.”
For False Claims Act materiality, he applies a holistic rather than single-factor test. Alleged false certifications were material where they governed patient eligibility and payment for costly hospice services, not merely compliance with a minor procedural detail.
“The materiality test under the FCA is demanding. No one factor is dispositive, and our inquiry is holistic.”
He evaluates workplace harassment cumulatively and respects a jury's resolution when repeated physical contact, explicit messages, and ignored complaints support the verdict. The conduct is not reduced to isolated incidents examined one at a time.
“Based on those interactions, coupled with the text messages that Reasoner sent Cherry, the jury was reasonable in determining that the harassment was severe and pervasive.”
Procedural preferences
In Molzan, Judge Davis required the district court to resolve personal jurisdiction before dismissing claims against those defendants on the merits.
“Because the district court erred in ruling on the merits of Molzan’s claims against the Web Defendants prior to ruling on personal jurisdiction, we vacate the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the Web Defendants.”
In Hunter, the panel enforced an appeal waiver only after applying the Supreme Court's miscarriage-of-justice limit and asking whether the alleged sentencing error was sufficiently obvious and grave.
“For these reasons, we find no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing Hunter’s appeal waiver.”
Before imposing sex-offender registration or treatment on a parolee who was never convicted of a sex offense, he requires constitutionally adequate procedures. Written submissions reviewed after an ex parte presentation, without disclosure of the evidence or reasons for the decision, did not provide enough process.
“This court has made clear that sex offender conditions may only be imposed on individuals not convicted of a sex offense after the individual has received due process.”
Cautions
A sentencing enhancement cannot rest on an unexplained choice between materially different theories. When the record did not show whether firearm possession was personal or attributable through a conspiracy, he required the trial court to identify the factual and legal basis on remand.
“In such a situation, our circuit precedent supports vacating the sentence and remand for the district court to make the appropriate findings.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we (1) affirm the district court's order denying Wilkins's request for funds; (2) vacate the district court's order denying payment under Sheard's CJA vouchers; and (3) remand for further proceedings. AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.”
“Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the factual basis for Hopkins's guilty plea was sufficient to sustain his conviction under the ACA, assimilating the Texas offense of evading arrest or detention. Therefore, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.”
“Based on the foregoing, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court denying Uranga's Sec. 2254 application and REMAND this case to the district court. We further direct that a writ of habeas corpus be issued, unless within 90 days ... Uranga is resentenced in accordance with Texas law ... REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.”
“we AFFIRM the district court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's decision granting the Trustee's motion to approve auction and for authority to sell certain real property of the bankruptcy estate of VCR. We further DENY the Trustee's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. AFFIRMED; MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS MOOT DENIED.”
“For the reasons that follow, we agree that Davis did not receive adequate warnings. We therefore vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.”
“Defendants-Appellants Jeffery W. Gieger and Tracie L. Gieger ... challenge on a number of grounds their convictions for conspiracy to submit false claims to Medicare in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 286. For the reasons that follow, we affirm their convictions. However, we vacate their sentences and remand this case for resentencing.”
“We find no error except in the court's order refusing to allow Butler to conduct an independent chemical analysis of the substance alleged to be cocaine base. We therefore affirm on the cocaine charge (Count I), vacate the judgment on the cocaine base charge (Count II), and remand to the district court with instructions to allow Butler to test the substance alleged to be cocaine base.”
“Vaden challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We find no error and affirm.”
“The district court held that they were not engaged in such activity, and thus the City was not entitled to a limited exemption from the FLSA's overtime compensation requirements. We reverse and render judgment for the City.”
“The survivors of Eugene G. Bach, Jr. appeal the summary judgment dismissal of their claims made under the Jones Act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and the general maritime law. ... We affirm.”
“The State of Mississippi (the state) appeals the district court's order granting James Murphy's (Murphy) petition for habeas corpus. We affirm.”
“The district court granted Parker's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of Davis' claims against Parker on the grounds that they were prescribed by Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5605 ... For the reasons explained below, we vacate and remand.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a federal trial caseload. Davis's earlier W.D. La. district-judge caseload (1976-1983) predates electronic docket coverage and is not enumerated here (a future addition).
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