Stuart Kyle Duncan

How Judge Duncan rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Position
circuit
Appointed by
Donald Trump (Republican)
Commissioned
2018-05-01
ABA rating
Well Qualified
Education
Louisiana State University (B.A., summa cum laude, 1994); Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center (J.D., Order of the Coif, 1997); Columbia Law School (LL.M., 2004)
Signed orders read
41

How Judge Duncan decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Estevis, the qualified-immunity analysis demanded precedent at a specific factual level and rejected broadly framed comparisons that did not squarely govern the dangerous encounter shown on video.

“That is not the ‘specificity and granularity’ demanded by prong two of the qualified immunity analysis.”

He uses grammar and punctuation to test whether contextual canons actually fit the statutory structure. In Buluc, commas and disjunctive phrasing separated a broad catchall from the narrower verbs before it, so the general term retained independent meaning.

“The punctuation of Subsection (C) underscores this point: ‘connives or conspires’ is cordoned off from ‘takes any other action’ by a conspicuous set of commas.”

He keeps pleading requirements separate from later evidentiary frameworks. A discrimination complaint need not establish every element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case to survive dismissal; it must plausibly allege ultimate facts supporting discriminatory motive.

“A district court therefore errs by requiring ‘a showing of each prong of the prima facie test for disparate treatment at the pleading stage[.]’”

In administrative review, he tests an agency's technology choice against its own findings and the statutory standard. Selecting an acknowledgedly ineffective, decades-old method for two waste streams while requiring modern controls elsewhere was not adequately reasoned.

“We need not reach petitioners’ first argument, because we conclude for multiple reasons that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by setting a BAT limit for legacy wastewater equal to the outdated BPT standard of surface impoundments.”

He applies immunity by function rather than title. A neutral payment-dispute decision maker received arbitral immunity because it considered competing submissions and issued a binding choice in the same manner as an arbitrator.

“What matters in assessing whether an official has immunity is his function, not his title.”

Procedural preferences

In Briar Capital, Judge Duncan enforced the civil-trial preservation rule strictly: without the required post-verdict motion, the court could not review evidentiary sufficiency on appeal.

“Briar Capital’s failure to do so leaves us ‘powerless to review the sufficiency of the evidence.’”

In Great Lakes Dredge, he treated a new theory supporting standing as forfeited when it had not been presented in the district court, even though standing itself is jurisdictional.

“In other words, this alternate standing argument is making its debut on appeal. It is therefore forfeited.”

Cautions

Even in complex consolidated litigation, dismissal with prejudice requires an individualized record of delay or contumacious conduct. He distinguished claimants who ignored a clear order after an extension from those who made a documented good-faith effort to comply.

“We fail to find that clear record as to one of the two groups before us, the D'Amico Appellants.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Lauren C. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist.
17-40796 · 2018-09-14
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment that Lauren is not a prevailing party for attorneys' fee purposes.”

United States v. Buluc
17-20694 · 2019-07-09
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“We therefore hold that the phrase 'takes any other action' in 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1)(C) is not limited to acts requiring joint or concerted action by the defendant. ... AFFIRMED”

United States v. Varner
19-40016 · 2020-01-15
Appeal (appellant) Moot / procedural

“We VACATE the district court's judgment. Varner's motion to require use of female pronouns, to submit a photograph, and to appear are DENIED.”

Perry v. Mendoza
22-20436 · 2023-09-29
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“In sum, the magistrate correctly found that no genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment. AFFIRMED.”

Alliance for Good Government v. Coalition for Better Government
17-30859 · 2018-08-22
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's summary judgment ruling, but MODIFY the injunction to restrain only the use of Coalition's logo.”

United States v. Vasquez-Puente
17-41099 · 2019-05-01
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Following those principles, we find ambiguity -- rather than conflict -- between Vasquez-Puente's oral and written sentences... we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by including the surrender condition in Vasquez-Puente's written judgment.”

United States v. Araiza-Jacobo
18-40474 · 2019-02-28
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“Because the instruction was not supported by evidence showing Araiza-Jacobo engaged in any purposeful contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct, the district court erred... we find the error in the jury instruction was harmless. AFFIRMED.”

Mejia v. Davis
17-40860 · 2018-10-11
Appeal (appellant) Granted

“We conclude that the federal court failed to defer to the state court's reasonable application of Strickland v. Washington... and therefore erred in granting Mejia habeas corpus relief... We therefore VACATE the district court's judgment and RENDER judgment for the State.”

In re: Larry Swearingen
19-20565 · 2019-08-16
Motion for authorization successive habeas (movant) Denied

“Finding Swearingen's claims fail to meet the strict requirements imposed by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2244(b) for authorizing a successive petition, we DENY his application and also DENY his motion for stay of execution.”

Lloyd's Syndicate 457 v. FloaTEC, L.L.C.
17-20550 · 2019-04-17
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The district court sided with FloaTEC on both points... The court dismissed Underwriters' claims with prejudice. Underwriters appeal both issues. We affirm.”

Bank of Louisiana v. FDIC
17-30044 · 2019-03-28
Appeal (appellant) Denied

“The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly dismissed the Bank's lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It did. We therefore AFFIRM.”

Cicalese v. University of Texas Medical Branch
18-40408 · 2019-05-16
Motions to dismiss (appellant) Granted in part

“We AFFIRM the district court's judgment concerning Appellants' Title VII disparate impact and hostile work environment claims. We VACATE the district court's judgment dismissing Appellants' Title VII disparate treatment claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Circuit judges do not manage an assigned federal trial docket in their appellate role. Duncan had no prior judicial service before joining the Fifth Circuit.

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