Stephen Andrew Higginson
How Judge Higginson rules, drawn from 64 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Higginson
Stephen Andrew Higginson is a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Higginson received a commission on November 2, 2011.
Judge Higginson's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Higginson's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Higginson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Starbucks v. NLRB, the panel required the agency to apply the legal test governing coercion under the totality of the circumstances, rather than treating a discovery-balancing rule as the liability standard.
“For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Starbucks’ petition for review, DENY the Board’s cross-application to enforce, VACATE the Board’s order, and REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”
In La Unión, Higginson held that an agency’s declaration of future compliance did not by itself establish compliance with the Freedom of Information Act’s disclosure duties.
“But it has also provided that this presumption of legitimacy ‘does not relieve’ an agency of its burden to demonstrate compliance.”
Procedural preferences
In Hall v. UiPath, Judge Higginson treated the appellant's failure to challenge an independent summary-judgment rationale in the opening brief as forfeiture and did not reach the alternative causation issue.
“Because Hall has forfeited any challenge to UiPath’s proffered rationale, which is an independent basis for summary judgment on his retaliation claim, we need not reach Hall’s challenge to causation.”
In Arnesen v. Raimondo, he followed the court's review-first principle by remanding a newly developed ratification issue for considered treatment by the district court before addressing the constitutional questions.
“We therefore REMAND to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
In Texas v. Travis County, he concluded that comity principles required dismissal of the state’s declaratory-relief action.
“Franchise Tax Board therefore reinforces comity among federal and state courts and mandates dismissing Texas's declaratory relief action.”
In United States v. Moreno-Torres, he found no remaining due process concern because counsel had explained the Anders brief and appeal rights in a language the client understood.
“Because counsel communicated to Moreno-Torres, in a language Moreno-Torres understands, the substance of the Anders brief and Moreno-Torres’s rights under Anders, this case no longer implicates due process concerns.”
In United States v. Caudillo, he found the defendant had waived a Sixth Amendment challenge to restitution through his plea agreement’s provision for court determination of the amount.
“Here, Luna Caudillo explicitly waived any Sixth Amendment challenge to the district court’s restitution award in his plea agreement by agreeing that ‘the [c]ourt will determine the amount of full restitution to compensate all victim(s).’”
In Harris, after a Supreme Court remand, Higginson enforced the defendant’s appeal waiver because the asserted sentencing errors did not satisfy the miscarriage-of-justice exception.
“On remand, we do not find a miscarriage of justice in Harris’s case that permits him to pursue an appeal despite his appeal waiver.”
Cautions
In United States v. Villalobos, he held that the government could not add new evidence on remand after failing to present the restitution evidence originally.
“The government generally may not present new evidence on remand when reversal is required due to the failure to present evidence originally.”
In Savage’s failure-to-prosecute appeal, he found a clear record of delay and concluded that lesser sanctions had proved futile.
“Here, we find that there is a clear record of delay, and that lesser sanctions proved futile.”
In Lucio v. Brownsville Independent School District, Higginson concluded that a coach’s refusal to shake officials’ hands at a team celebration did not plausibly allege speech as a private citizen, and he therefore did not reach whether the conduct addressed a public concern.
“Because Plaintiffs fail to allege that Lucio spoke as a private citizen, we need not address whether he spoke on an issue of public concern.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Consequently, we AFFIRM the district court's dismissal. Because we find that the district court lacked federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331, we need not reach the district court's Article III standing analysis.”
“Avondale invoked the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and removed to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district court remanded, holding that Avondale failed to show the required ‘causal nexus’ to support federal jurisdiction. We affirm.”
“After exhausting his state court remedies, Jenkins filed a § 2254 petition, which the district court denied. We affirm.”
“Because the district court made no ‘actual finding[s] of professional misconduct,’ United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 579 (5th Cir. 2011), the appeal is DISMISSED.”
“We vacate the sentence imposed by the district court and remand for resentencing.”
“AFFIRMED; REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF CORRECTING THE CLERICAL ERROR IN THE JUDGMENT.”
“excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.”
“We VACATE the COA and REMAND for clarification as to whether Ratliff has made a substantial showing of the denial of her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and is entitled to a COA on that issue.”
“we GRANT Huntington's motion to dismiss summarily the appeal, and DISMISS the appeal for want of prosecution.”
“Because the district court was correct to find complete diversity between Tewari and Appellee Mountain States/Rosen, LLC (‘MTSR’), we AFFIRM.”
“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's order finding Lopez competent to waive federal habeas proceedings.”
“Dixon has failed to state a claim for relief under the CLA. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated. Higginson had no prior judicial service (AUSA in the District of Massachusetts and Eastern District of Louisiana; Loyola law professor) before his 2011 elevation.
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