Priscilla Richman (formerly Priscilla Richman Owen)
How Judge Owen) rules, drawn from 43 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Owen) decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In contract, insurance, and arbitration disputes she works closely from the text of the agreement or policy, often reversing or vacating a lower-court ruling that did not track the contract's own terms.
“Defendants appeal the district court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration submitted by National Oilwell Varco Norway (NOV Norway). ... Because we conclude that there was an arbitration agreement and that NOV Norway cannot be held responsible for the actions of its codefendants in this case, we vacate and remand.”
Reading a municipal separation agreement as enforceable, Richman held the city to the payment provision it had tried to rescind.
“We agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, the separation agreement was valid regarding the separation payment, and the City breached the agreement when it attempted to rescind.”
Procedural preferences
In qualified-immunity appeals she reads 'clearly established law' narrowly, requiring precedent closely on point before denying immunity to the government official: she has repeatedly reversed or rendered judgment against plaintiffs at the interlocutory stage on this ground even while sometimes finding a constitutional violation adequately alleged.
“We conclude that the contours of First Amendment law regarding retaliation were not clearly established at the time the events at issue occurred. We therefore reverse and render judgment in favor of the defendants on Wetherbe's First Amendment retaliation claim.”
Richman required a damages award to rest on a legally recognized measure supported by evidence, rather than treating an apparently conservative estimate as sufficient.
“A damages award cannot be upheld if it is not based on a legally cognizable methodology.”
Richman treated an immigration appeal as requiring remand when the agency relied in part on disputed facts that its appellate regulations prohibited it from finding in the first instance.
“The BIA’s decision reflects that it hinged its decision, in part, on disputed facts, engaging in prohibited factfinding.”
Richman also remanded an alternative path to immigration relief because the agency had not addressed the claim and therefore supplied no reasoned basis for judicial review.
“Because the BIA said nothing about Santos’s claim, we remand it to the BIA.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The district court granted summary judgment in favor of C.R.E.S., concluding that the apartment complex's criminal history was insufficient to render foreseeable the assault against Jenkins. We reverse and remand.”
“We agree with the district court that the Settlement Program does not contemplate the requested compensation, and we affirm the district court's judgment.”
“The district court granted summary judgment in favor of United, holding that Ramirez's infection was not an ‘Accident’ within the meaning of the policy. Ramirez has appealed. We affirm.”
“After the IRS Office of Appeals (IRS Appeals) rejected that argument ... The Duncans appealed to the Tax Court, which rejected the Duncans' arguments. We affirm.”
“We reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment on Hogan's excessive-force claim because the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, but we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment on Hogan's unlawful-arrest claim.”
“Because there are material fact issues that preclude summary judgment in favor of Faul on the basis of qualified immunity, we reverse the summary judgment as to Faul on the Masons' Fourth Amendment and state law claims and remand them to the district court. We otherwise affirm the district court's judgment.”
“Because the district court properly applied the sentencing guidelines and did not clearly err in its factual findings, we affirm.”
“Charles Ray Dorsey, Texas prisoner # 859151, appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing his application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. section 2254, which challenges his Texas conviction for murder. We affirm.”
“Because there is a genuine issue of material fact, we transfer the case to a United States district court for a hearing and decision on Hernandez's nationality claim with regard to that factual issue.”
“Because we hold that the Florida offense of which Paez Sarmientos was convicted is not categorically an aggravated felony, we grant the petition, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings.”
“Lagrone contends that 18 U.S.C. section 641 does not permit her to be convicted of more than a single felony count. We agree and accordingly vacate and remand.”
“In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mathis v. United States, we conclude that Hinkle's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance is not a 'controlled substance offense' within the meaning of the Guidelines, and therefore, the career-offender enhancement did not apply based on the record presently before us. We vacate Hinkle's sentence and remand for resentencing.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated. Richman's prior judicial service was on the Supreme Court of Texas, not a federal district court.
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