Leslie Harburd Southwick
How Judge Southwick rules, drawn from 67 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Southwick decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
A defamation claim failed where the challenged speaker used caustic language to characterize publicly disclosed facts without implying reliance on undisclosed information.
“Sharpe’s statements were his ‘strongly stated’ opinions ‘based on truthful established fact[s],’ and thus nonactionable.”
Under Texas law, an automobile policy's payment of actual cash value did not include taxes and fees associated with buying a replacement vehicle.
“actual cash value, which is the equivalent of ‘fair market value[,] does not include the taxes and fees payable to purchase a replacement vehicle’ under Texas law.”
An administrative record containing years of medical documents, agency consultation, physician findings, and family testimony was sufficiently developed without another consultative examination.
“Nothing in the record suggests that the ALJ needed any more medical information to reach an informed decision about whether Webster was disabled. The ALJ’s decision was based upon substantial evidence in a sufficiently developed record, and he did not err in declining to order the CE.”
He enforces the statutory limits on restitution rather than treating every serious consequence as compensable. Lost income based only on psychological harm was unavailable where the governing provision required accompanying bodily injury.
“We conclude that the MVRA does not allow restitution for lost income when there is no accompanying bodily injury. Those are our facts — purely psychological harm — and we need decide no more than that.”
He treats extreme one-sidedness and meaningful lack of choice as evidence that contractual consent is missing. A plainly visible arbitration clause was still unenforceable where only the drafter could elect arbitration and recover enforcement costs.
“Together, the evidence relevant to the four factors demonstrates that MAPP was sufficiently aware of the unequal terms but that it had little choice but to accept them in order to obtain the contract.”
For the tort-claims misrepresentation exception, he identifies the claim's operational focal point rather than treating any promise or reliance as dispositive. A failure to carry out promised protective steps remained distinct from negligent communication.
“We hold that the allegedly negligent failure to take minimal actions to protect Morris is a separate and available claim.”
Procedural preferences
A party challenging a grand-jury subpoena generally had to comply or incur contempt before obtaining appellate review when the documents remained with interested subpoena recipients.
“We lack jurisdiction over the appeal, and PAA and Black must either comply with the subpoena or be held in contempt to seek this court’s review.”
He reserves liberty-affecting sentencing choices to the court while allowing probation officers to administer details. Choosing inpatient rather than outpatient treatment entails confinement and therefore cannot be delegated as a managerial decision.
“We hold that giving that determination to the probation office was error.”
He separates Article III standing from the ultimate merits at the class-certification stage. Alleged payment for a service worth less than represented is an economic injury sufficient for standing even if causation and recovery remain disputed.
“Because the Plaintiffs’ ability to recover for a claim ‘under governing law is a separate question’ from standing, ‘it is sufficient for standing purposes that the Plaintiffs seek recovery for an economic harm that they allege they have suffered.’”
Cautions
A setoff defense was forfeited when it was not raised before final judgment, despite later appellate proceedings and a petition for Supreme Court review.
“Because Magness failed to raise his setoff defense before the district court’s entry of final judgment, he has forfeited that defense.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We VACATE the district court's final judgment and REMAND for the district court to DISMISS the case for lack of jurisdiction.”
“We AFFIRM the dismissal of Swindol's defamation claim. We REVERSE the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim and REMAND.”
“We VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND to that court with instructions to remand the case to the Texas state court from which it came.”
“AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not manage individually assigned federal trial cases in their appellate role. Southwick's prior judicial service was on the Mississippi Court of Appeals; his federal district-court nomination lapsed without confirmation.
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