Jennifer Walker Elrod
How Judge Elrod rules, drawn from 47 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Elrod decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
A plaintiff's evidence of a personal religious belief and notice to the employer presented credibility questions for a jury rather than resolution at summary judgment.
“Because a plaintiff’s sincerity in espousing a religious practice ‘is largely a matter of individual credibility,’ Davis, 765 F.3d at 485–86 (quoting Tagore, 735 F.3d at 328), Wright’s evidence would be better weighed by a jury than by the court at the summary judgment stage.”
A pre-enforcement plaintiff established standing by alleging an intent to engage in constitutionally protected conduct prohibited by state law and a resulting prospect of enforcement.
“IFS’s complaint sufficiently alleges that IFS has an intent to engage in a prohibited course of conduct that is affected by a constitutional interest, and that if it so engages, it will face enforcement under Texas law.”
In a securities-fraud enforcement case, Elrod compared the agency's claims and penalties with traditional common-law fraud to determine whether adjudication required a jury. A public-rights argument should address the historical cause of action, remedy, and compatibility of a jury with the statutory scheme.
“these fraud claims and civil penalties are analogous to traditional fraud claims at common law in a way that the ‘new’ claims and remedies in Atlas Roofing were not.”
Reviewing an employment-data rule, Elrod confined the agency to authority Congress actually supplied. A broad public-interest mandate did not independently authorize collection once the specific regulations to which Congress had tied that power were no longer in effect.
“While its authority to act in the public interest is broad, the FCC cannot invoke public interest to expand the scope of its authority to act in ways Congress has not authorized it to act.”
In an ERISA benefits pleading, Elrod accounted for plan documents controlled by the defendants and accepted fact-based allegations made on information and belief. A plaintiff should describe good-faith efforts to obtain the documents and plead enough surrounding facts to make the benefit claim plausible.
“when discoverable information is in the control and possession of a defendant, it is not necessarily the plaintiff's responsibility to provide that information in her complaint.”
Procedural preferences
When contractual scope and the parties' expectations were clear, the maritime-contract analysis did not require examining how a vessel was actually used.
“Because the scope of the contract and the parties’ expectations are not ‘unclear,’ we need not turn to the parties’ evidence of how the Vessel was actually used.”
Elrod required supervised-release conditions to match the sentence pronounced in court, identify their duration, and rest on a record tied to the defendant. A written judgment cannot add home detention or leave monitoring open-ended when the sentencing court imposed only standalone monitoring.
“the district court erroneously imposed home detention, failed to determine the duration of Mendoza’s location monitoring, and erroneously imposed financial-disclosure and credit-approval conditions of supervised release.”
Cautions
A brief containing fabricated quotations and assertions constituted an abuse of the judicial process and supported monetary sanctions.
“Submitting a brief riddled with fabricated quotations and assertions is such an abuse.”
Without proof on an essential element such as general causation, disputes over other facts could not prevent summary judgment.
“The ‘complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.’”
Elrod treated continued arbitration activity after notice of a bankruptcy as a willful automatic-stay violation and upheld compensation for the litigation needed to stop it. A party with notice should seek bankruptcy-court guidance before pursuing claims that may affect estate property.
“Because the Bankruptcy Code entitles Neugebauer to damages caused by a willful violation of the automatic stay, because the Ayers parties willfully violated the automatic stay, and because the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in its calculation of the damages award, we AFFIRM.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“We hold that: (1) the SEC's in-house adjudication of Petitioners' case violated their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial; (2) Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the SEC ...; and (3) statutory removal restrictions on SEC ALJs violate the Take Care Clause of Article II. Because the agency proceedings below were unconstitutional, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the decision of the SEC, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Because we agree with Petitioners that the FCC lacks statutory authority, we GRANT the petition and VACATE the order.”
“Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we must, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
“Once again Lois Davis appeals the district court's dismissal of her lawsuit against her former employer, Fort Bend County. We previously reversed and remanded, and we do so again today.”
“Because there is a fact issue as to whether BNSF discriminated against Nall, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment to BNSF on Nall's disability discrimination claim and REMAND for further proceedings. Because Nall fails to identify a material fact issue regarding his retaliation claim, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment on this claim.”
“Mr. Shepherd's mother brought excessive force claims against the officer and the city. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. We AFFIRM.”
“We REMAND to the district court to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of his sentence and AFFIRM in all other respects.”
“Because there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude the qualified-immunity determination as to one of the defendants, we AFFIRM in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND to the district court.”
“Because we conclude that Rodriguez did not waive his right to direct appeal and as a result his habeas petition was timely under AEDPA, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for the district court to consider Rodriguez's habeas petition on the merits.”
“For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of habeas relief and DENY Norris's motion for a certificate of appealability.”
“Because Matamoros cannot meet his burden under AEDPA, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of relief.”
“Because Montano has exhausted all available state remedies in accordance with our precedent, we REVERSE the dismissal of his habeas petition and REMAND for adjudication of his Double Jeopardy claim.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Circuit judges do not carry a trial caseload; not enumerated. Elrod's pre-federal judicial service was on a Texas state district court (state court, not in the federal docket record).
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