Harold Raymond DeMoss Jr.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit circuit Deceased · served 1991–2020 Appointed by George H. W. Bush (Republican) 25 signed orders read

Judge DeMoss no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge DeMoss decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He resisted summary judgment when the existing evidence did not sufficiently establish that an insurance exclusion applied as a matter of law.

“We are unconvinced that this evidence, without further development, is sufficient to establish as a matter of law that Barnes is a leased worker as defined by the policy.”

He deferred to a labor arbitrator’s construction when it remained anchored in the collective bargaining agreement rather than radically departing from it.

“Accordingly, the Arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA was not a radical departure from the terms of that document”

Procedural preferences

He favored returning purely state-law disputes to state court when federal claims disappeared at the beginning of the case.

“The courts in this circuit must remain diligent in following the Supreme Court’s almost fifty-year-old command that federal courts avoid needless decisions of state law.”

He required notice and an opportunity to respond before a sentencing court relied on material outside the existing record.

“If the district court chooses to consider a presentence report addendum or any other matter outside of the record, it shall give the parties notice and an opportunity to respond.”

Cautions

He required the government to use readily available information to make additional notice efforts after an initial immigration-bond notice was returned undeliverable.

“When the government can attempt to ascertain the necessary information through such minimal effort, it is incumbent on the government to do so.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Chacon
· 2014-02-06
Appeal (criminal appellant) Denied

“Therefore, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”

United States v. Cortez-Cortez
· 2014-10-29
Appeal (criminal appellant) Denied

“Because we find that a violation of the Indiana statute constitutes sexual abuse of a minor under § 2L1.2 we AFFIRM the district court’s imposition of a 16-level crime of violence enhancement.”

South Louisiana Sugars Cooperative, Inc. v. Audubon Insurance Group
· 2007-04-20
Appeal (insured appellant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons we VACATE the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Audubon and REMAND for further proceedings.”

Jesco Construction Corp. v. NationsBank Corp.
· 2003-02-05
Appeal (defendants appellants) Granted in part

“AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.”

United States v. Smith
· 2008-05-16
Appeal (criminal appellant) Denied

“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.”

Stiftung v. Plains Marketing, L.P.
· 2010-04-09
Appeal (plaintiff appellant) Denied

“AFFIRMED.”

United States v. King
· 2008-08-26
Appeal (criminal appellant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM King’s conviction and sentence.”

Crosby v. Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co.
· 2010-12-29
Appeal (plan participant appellant) Granted

“VACATE and REMAND.”

Echavarria v. Pitts
· 2011-05-11
Appeal (bond obligors appellants) Denied

“The district court’s order granting summary judgment is affirmed.”

United States v. Larry
· 2011-02-08
Appeal (criminal appellant) Granted

“VACATE and REMAND.”

Overstreet v. Contigroup Companies, Inc.
· 2006-08-23
Appeal (defendants appellants) Granted

“REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.”

Peres v. Sherman
· 2008-06-06
Appeal (debtors appellants) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.”

A historical record

Judge DeMoss no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.